A Huge Monetary Penalty for Sprawling Allegations – But Will Zhao Receive a Prison Sentence?

As the world now knows, Binance Holdings Limited, doing business as Binance.com (“Binance” or the “Company”), has entered into a plea agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”).  

Binance is registered in the Cayman Islands and regarded as the world’s largest virtual currency exchange. It agreed to plead guilty to conspiring to willfully violating the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) by failing to implement and maintain an effective anti-money laundering (“AML”) program; knowingly failing to register as a money services business (“MSB”); and willfully causing violations of U.S. economic sanctions issued pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”). Despite the plea agreement, Binance will continue to operate.

Changpeng Zhao, also known as “CZ,” also pleaded guilty to violating the BSA by failing to implement and maintain an effective AML program. Zhao is Binance’s primary founder, majority owner, and – until now – CEO. As part of his plea agreement, Zhao has stepped down as the CEO, although he apparently will keep his shares in Binance.

As part of its plea agreement, Binance has agreed to forfeit $2,510,650,588 and to pay a criminal fine of $1,805,475,575 for a total criminal penalty of $4,316,126,163. Binance also entered into related civil consent orders with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), and the Office of Foreign Assets Controls (“OFAC”). Zhao also entered into a consent order with the CFTC.

The allegations are vast and detailed, and much digital ink already has been spilled regarding this matter. Our discussion therefore will be relatively high-level. Distilled, the government alleges that Binance – under the direction of Zhao – tried to hide the fact that it operated in the U.S., purposefully avoided any meaningful AML compliance, and consequently laundered many millions of dollars’ worth of cryptocurrency involving extremely serious criminal conduct, including terrorism, child pornography, and U.S. sanctions evasion.

As for Zhao, and as we will discuss, whether he will go to prison – and if so, for how long – is an open and very interesting question. His sentencing currently is scheduled for February 23, 2024.

Continue Reading  Binance Settles Criminal and Civil AML and Sanctions Enforcement Actions for Multiple Billions – While its Founder, Owner and Former CEO Zhao Pleads Guilty to Single AML Crime

Earlier this month, John Can Unsalan, the president of a steel-making company with ties to Russian oligarchs, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, based on financial transactions committed with the alleged intent to promote U.S. sanctions violations.

Unsalan’s company, known as Metalhouse LLC, was formed in Florida in 2014. According to the plea agreement, between 2018 and 2021 Unsalan facilitated transactions through Metalhouse with companies controlled by Sergey Kurchenko, a Russian oligarch who has been on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN”) List since 2015 (Kurchenko was initially put on the SDN List for allegedly misappropriating state funds belonging to Ukraine). It is generally illegal for U.S. persons to directly or indirectly conduct business with individuals or entities on the SDN List – although the U.S. government is able to grant exceptions on a case-by-case basis.

According to the factual basis supporting the plea agreement, Unsalan knowingly participated in a scheme with Kurchenko to evade sanctions through Metalhouse transactions, which totaled around $157 million over the relevant three-year period. The scheme involved two shell companies – one formed in Hong Kong and one in Cyprus – controlled by Kurchenko. Unsalan and his associate at Metalhouse met with Kurchenko in person and subsequently contracted with Kurchenko’s companies to order steel and other raw materials and to pay for the materials using offshore bank accounts. Ultimately, Unsalan and Metalhouse received a total of over $160 million from reselling those materials to third parties – and although most of that money went to Kurchenko to pay for additional raw materials, the factual basis supporting the plea agreement alleged that Unsalan kept millions in profits for his own personal use.

Continue Reading  Steel Company President with Ties to Russian Oligarch Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering Conspiracy Involving Alleged Sanctions Violations

Couple Appears to Be Cooperating with DOJ

In February 2022, we blogged on the seizure of a record $3.6 billion in stolen Bitcoin (“BTC”) and an accompanying criminal complaint, charging husband and wife Ilya “Dutch” Lichtenstein and Heather “Razzlekhan” Morgan with conspiracy to commit money laundering and conspiracy to defraud the United States.  Last week, the couple pleaded guilty, pursuant to plea agreements with the government, with sentencing to follow. 

As we discuss below, both of their plea agreements contemplate attempting to reduce their sentences via cooperation with the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).  As we also discuss, this case presents a cautionary tale for financial institutions and the need to not “tip off,” unwittingly or otherwise, the recipients of grand jury subpoenas.

Continue Reading  Crypto Couple Plead Guilty to Money Laundering Conspiracy

Factual Statement Is a Tale of Whistleblowing, High-Risk Customers, and Misleading U.S. Banks

Earlier this month, Danske Bank was sentenced in the Southern District of New York to three years of probation and forfeiture of $2.059 billion.  The sentencing capped a tumultuous and global scandal that became public several years ago, as the enormous scope of the bank’s anti-money laundering (“AML”) compliance problems emerge:  several hundred billion in suspicious transactions allegedly were processed over time at the bank’s former Estonian branch.  As a result of the sentencing, Danske Bank was ordered to make an actual payment of $1,209,062,646; the bank received credit for the rest of the forfeiture amount on the basis of a $178.6 million payment to the Securities and Exchange Commission and a $672.3 million payment to Denmark authorities.

Danske Bank was charged not with violating the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), but rather with bank fraud.  According to the press release issued in December 2022  by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) at the time of the bank’s plea, the bank had “defrauded U.S. banks regarding Danske Bank Estonia’s customers and [AML] controls to facilitate access to the U.S. financial system for Danske Bank Estonia’s high-risk customers, who resided outside of Estonia – including in Russia.”  The DOJ’s choice to charge bank fraud presumably was predicated upon issues relating to U.S. jurisdiction and the actual applicability of the BSA to Danske Bank and activities in Estonia – but the heart of the criminal case is that Danske Bank allegedly hid its own AML failures from three U.S. banks, thereby thwarting the U.S. banks’ own AML programs and compliance with the BSA.

The plea agreement contains a lengthy statement of facts full of eye-catching allegations.  As we describe, it sets forth a tale of intentional and sometimes brazen misconduct by Estonian branch employees, coupled with lax oversight and implicit approval, or at least tolerance, of such conduct by some people in upper management.  Further, it involves another example of a financial institution, in the eyes of law enforcement and regulators, over-valuing profit and under-valuing compliance systems.  The case also highlights, again, the potential risks associated with correspondent bank accounts held by non-U.S. banks, the importance of having fully integrated and coordinated monitoring systems, and the potential role of whistleblowers.

Finally, this saga is not necessarily over entirely.  Danske Bank is subject to three years of probation.  The plea agreement requires numerous compliance commitments by the bank, including signed certificates of compliance and self-reporting of potential AML failures.  Danske Bank’s troubles also have involved lawsuits brought by investors claiming to have been defrauded, although the bank has had success in fending off these actions (see here, here and here).

Continue Reading  SDNY Sentences Danske Bank in Massive AML Scandal

On Friday, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced two developments:  First, the release of a 66-page report, The Role of Law Enforcement in Detecting, Investigating, and Prosecuting Criminal Activity Related to Digital Assets (the “Report”), issued under President Biden’s March 9, 2022 Executive Order on Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets.  Second, the establishment of the Digital Asset Coordinator (“DAC”) Network, a nationwide group of prosecutors designated as legal and technical experts in digital asset cases.

We focus here on the regulatory and legislative recommendations of the Report, which seek to expand significantly the ability of the DOJ to investigate and prosecute offenses involving digital assets. The recommendations include increasing criminal penalties, extending statutes of limitations, expanding venue provisions, enhancing the government’s forfeiture powers, and prohibiting virtual asset service providers from “tipping off” the subjects of grand jury subpoenas received by the providers.  The recommendations also include making clear that the federal criminal law against maintaining an unlicensed money transmitter applies to peer-to-peer platforms that purportedly do not take custody or assume control over the digital asset being exchanged; ensuring that the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issues a final rule expanding the application of the Travel Rule under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) to digital asset transfers; and expanding or arguably clarifying that the BSA applies to platforms dealing in non-fungible tokens, or NFTs, including online auction houses and digital art galleries.

Continue Reading  DOJ Issues Report on Digital Asset Law Enforcement Seeking Expansive New Powers, and Launches New Crypto Prosecutor Network

Hefty Monetary Penalties – Accompanied by the Possibility of No Prison Time

The legal saga involving the civil and criminal cases against the entity and former individual owners of the Bitcoin Mercantile Exchange, or BitMEX—a large and well-known online trading platform dealing in futures contracts and other derivative products tied to the value of cryptocurrencies (see here, here, and here)—continues unabated. 

Most recently, BitMEX co-founder and former CEO, Arthur Hayes, a high-profile leader in the cryptocurrency industry, settled his civil charges with the CFTC and pleaded guilty to criminal charges brought by the DOJ.  He now faces sentencing in the criminal case, currently scheduled for the end of this week.  As we will discuss, Hayes and the government take very different views regarding his appropriate sentence.

These cases emerged publicly in October 2020 when: (1) the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) filed a civil complaint against the entities operating the BitMEX trading platform and its three individual owners for allegedly failing to register with the CFTC and violating various laws and regulations under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”); and (2) the Department of Justice obtained an indictment against the three individual owners and another individual, including Hayes, charging each with violating, and conspiring to violate, the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) by failing to maintain an adequate anti-money laundering (“AML”) program.

The cases have raised novel legal questions concerning which, if any regulatory regimes, apply to participants in the cryptocurrency market.  Moreover, Hayes’ upcoming sentencing raises the question of whether an offense is so novel that it can merit probation, despite the high dollar value of the alleged scheme at issue.

Continue Reading  BitMEX Co-Founder and Owner Settles with CFTC and Now Faces Criminal Sentencing

Sentencing is a critical stage in the federal criminal process, particularly given the incredibly high rate of guilty pleas in federal court.  There is a very strong argument that sentencing far eclipses the importance of the increasingly rare trial in the federal criminal system.  If a federal criminal investigation cannot be “killed,” then in many cases – particularly in “white collar” cases – the focus early on for both the defense and the prosecution is the sentencing hearing, and how to maximize one’s position, because a federal charge often produces a conviction via plea, or less often, via trial.  Stated otherwise, federal criminal defense is often all about sentencing.

At sentencing, sometimes defendants – and, less often, the prosecution – will make arguments regarding “similarly situated” defendants, and the sentences that they received.  Sometimes these arguments resonate with the sentencing court; sometimes not.  Regardless, these arguments can be tricky because reliable “statistics” are elusive, and it’s not always clear that justifiable comparisons are being drawn by either side.  We therefore were interested when the U.S. Sentencing Commission (“the Commission”) recently issued the Judiciary Sentencing Information (“JSIN”) platform.  Although it is difficult to draw clear conclusions from the JSIN platform, the data is nonetheless fascinating, and we discuss in this blog potential insights into sentences for money laundering and Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) offenses.

We have reviewed the data and created summary charts for your consideration.  Because the Commission has invited federal judges to use the JSIN platform when sentencing, it by definition is relevant to defense attorneys and prosecutors.
Continue Reading  U.S. Sentencing Commission Data on Money Laundering and BSA-Related Offenses Reveals:  Courts Often Sentence Below the Guidelines Range

FCA Applies Penalty Formulas, Including Thirty Percent Reduction for Early Agreement by Bank

U.K. Enforcement System Provides Contrast to More Open-Ended U.S. System

On June 17, 2020, the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”), the non-governmental financial regulator in the United Kingdom, issued a Final Notice to Commerzbank London (the “Bank”), a branch of the large German business bank, assessing it £37.8 million for systemic failures to establish and effectively maintain an anti-money laundering (“AML”) program.

This was not the first large assessment for Commerzbank relating to AML. In 2015, Commerzbank AG and its U.S. affiliate entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice to forfeit $563 million and pay a $79 million fine for violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”). The FCA noted this fact as an aggravating factor in determining the financial penalty for the Bank.

Despite the egregious nature of the alleged violations, the FCA still provided a 30% discount pursuant to its executive settlement procedures in light of the Bank’s agreement to resolve the matter at an early stage. Without the discount, the financial penalty would have been £54,007,800.

The Final Notice underscores the relatively formulaic penalty regime of the FCA, which presumably provides the value of (some) predictability for industry. It also provides an interesting foil to U.S. enforcement regarding AML violations and the resulting penalties. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, has no formal and mechanistic system for adjusting financial penalties for AML violations. The closest U.S. counterpart appears to be general U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) guidance regarding the prosecution of corporations, and the factors set forth by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines regarding the sentencing of convicted corporate defendants.
Continue Reading  UK Regulator Fines Commerzbank London £37.8 Million for AML Violations

The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) continues to pursue Venezuelan nationals through high-dollar and high-profile money laundering and foreign bribery charges. The latest development in this ongoing saga is the recent sentencing of the former national treasurer of Venezuela, Alejandro Andrade Cedeno (“Andrade”), by the Southern District of Florida to a decade in prison, after Andrade pleaded guilty last year to a single-count information charging him with conspiracy to commit money laundering (specifically, a conspiracy to violation 18 U.S.C. § 1957, the so-called “spending” money laundering provision, which requires transactions involving over $10,000 in criminal proceeds, but no specific intent) in an alleged sprawling bribery and money laundering scheme. His plea agreement (the “Plea”) was one of several connected proceedings unsealed on November 20, most notable of which is the grand jury indictment (the “Indictment”) of fugitive Raúl Gorrín Belisario (“Gorrín”), the owner of Venezuelan cable news network Globovision, erstwhile resident of Miami, and alleged architect of the money laundering conspiracy.

Although he retired to Florida after having served as the head of the Venezuelan treasury, Andrade did not begin his career in the world of high finance. Rather, his climb to power and wealth began when he used to serve as the bodyguard for the President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez.

As we will discuss, there is more to come. Aside from telling a lurid tale of corruption rewarded through high-end bribes involving aircraft, real estate (widely acknowledged as a major vehicle for laundering) and thoroughbred horses, Andrade’s plea agreement contains cooperation language, and his counsel has stated publically that Andrade has been cooperating with the DOJ for some time. Notably, Andrade was charged only with a single count of Section 1957, which has a statutory maximum sentence of 10 years – exactly the sentence imposed on Andrade, whose advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines range was presumably much, much higher. It is fair to assume that Andrade will be pursuing a second sentencing hearing at which his sentence could be reduced based on his cooperation with the government.

Andrade’s case is part of a steady stream of money laundering and bribery charges recently brought by the DOJ which relate to Venezuela, which is reeling from massive inflation and a near-existential economic crisis that is inflicting widespread suffering. His case also represents another instance of the DOJ’s increasing tactic of using the money laundering statutes to charge foreign officials who cannot be charged directly under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).
Continue Reading  Another Sprawling Money Laundering and Bribery Scheme Involving Venezuela: Currency Exchange Rate Manipulation, Rewarded By Aircraft, Real Estate, and Thoroughbred Horses

Earlier this month, the District Court for the Central District of California imposed a prison sentence of one year and a day, with three years of supervised release, on defendant Theresa Lynn Tetley, who had pleaded guilty to: (i) the unlicensed operation of a digital currency exchange due to failure register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a) and (b)(1)(B), and (ii) a money laundering charge, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B), arising out of an undercover “sting” operation run by the Drug Enforcement Agency and Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation involving the attempt to conceal proceeds supposedly obtained by selling drugs.  Tetley also was ordered to pay a $20,000 fine and forfeit 40 Bitcoin, $292,264 in cash, and 25 gold bars that were the alleged proceeds of her illegal activity.

The Court imposed a sentence significantly lower than the sentence of 30 months requested by the government, a recommendation which already was lower than the advisory sentencing range recommended by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) of 46 to 57 months in prison, as calculated by the U.S. Probation Office.

Tetley, a 50 year old woman living in Southern California, is a former stockbroker and real estate investor. She operated her digital currency exchange under the alias “Bitcoin Maven” for over three years, running an unregistered Bitcoin for cash exchange service.  According to the government, her service “fueled a black-market financial system” that “purposely and deliberately existed outside the regulated bank industry” and which catered to an alleged major darknet vendor of illegal narcotics.  According to the defense, however, the defendant “departed from a lifetime of integrity and good deeds and showed terrible judgment by failing to comply with federal registration requirements and buying bitcoins from individuals who represented themselves as engaged in criminal activity.”

In this post, we will drill into this sentencing and the parties’ respective positions, which provide a window into the prosecution and sentencing of alleged crimes involving both digital currency and undercover money laundering operations — and into the process for the sentencing of federal crimes in general, and how other factors which are entirely unrelated to the facts of the specific offense can be important.  Further, the Tetley case is interesting in part because it represents a sort of “hybrid” case — seen from time to time in money laundering cases involving professionals — which straddles both the typically very different realms of “pure” financial crime cases and illegal narcotics cases.  The government sentencing memorandum is here; the defense sentencing memorandum is here.
Continue Reading  Unlicensed Bit Coin Exchange Operator Sentenced to One Year and a Day for Attempted Money Laundering in Undercover Sting Operation and Failure to Register with FinCEN