On April 8, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a joint Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to implement the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (GENIUS Act). The proposal would create a comprehensive anti‑money‑laundering/countering‑the‑financing‑of‑terrorism (AML/CFT) and sanctions compliance framework for “permitted payment stablecoin issuers” (PPSIs), treating them as financial institutions under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). Treasury frames the rule as an effort to support responsible innovation in payment stablecoins while mitigating illicit‑finance risks (see also Treasury’s press release and Fact Sheet).
For our coverage of Treasury’s related Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on state oversight of stablecoin issuers, see our post here.
Statutory Background and Policy Context
The GENIUS Act directs that PPSIs be treated as financial institutions for BSA purposes and comply with federal laws relating to sanctions, money‑laundering prevention, customer identification, and due diligence. It also requires PPSIs to maintain an effective sanctions compliance program.
Treasury’s March 2026 Congressional Report highlights the rapid growth of digital assets, the increasing use of stablecoins in payments, and the ways illicit actors exploit them for fraud, ransomware, sanctions evasion, and money laundering. These findings inform the risk‑based approach reflected in the NPRM.
Primary and Secondary Market Activity
A central concept in the NPRM is the distinction between primary and secondary market activity. Primary market activity refers to direct interactions between a PPSI and a user, such as issuing, redeeming, converting, repurchasing, burning, reissuing, or providing custodial services. Secondary market activity involves transactions between third parties that rely on the PPSI’s smart contract but do not involve the PPSI as a counterparty. This distinction matters because several obligations—including suspicious activity reporting—apply only to primary‑market transactions. This distinction will shape how PPSIs design monitoring, SAR processes, and technical controls, because only primary‑market activity triggers most BSA obligations.
AML/CFT Program Requirements
The NPRM would require PPSIs to establish and maintain a written AML/CFT program that mirrors the core elements required of other financial institutions, with tailoring for stablecoin‑specific risks. PPSIs must implement internal policies, procedures, and controls to identify, assess, and mitigate illicit‑finance risks. Risk assessments must evaluate the PPSI’s business activities, incorporate the national AML/CFT priorities, and be updated promptly when risks change.
PPSIs would also be required to conduct ongoing customer due diligence, including understanding the nature and purpose of customer relationships, developing customer risk profiles, and monitoring for suspicious activity. On a risk basis, PPSIs must maintain and update customer information, including beneficial ownership information for legal‑entity customers.
Independent testing is required to assess whether the PPSI has implemented an effective AML/CFT program. PPSIs must designate a U.S.‑based AML/CFT compliance officer responsible for day‑to‑day compliance. The program must also include ongoing employee training tailored to employee roles and responsibilities and must be approved by the PPSI’s board or equivalent governing body.
The NPRM outlines a supervisory framework under which FinCEN would generally not take enforcement action if a PPSI has established an AML/CFT program and does not exhibit significant or systemic failures. It also describes a notice and consultation process between FinCEN and primary federal payment‑stablecoin regulators for significant supervisory actions. For many issuers, this will require adopting governance, documentation, and testing practices that resemble those of traditional financial institutions—a significant shift for engineering‑driven companies.
Suspicious Activity and Currency Transaction Reporting
PPSIs would be required to file suspicious activity reports (SARs) for any suspicious primary‑market transaction. The NPRM explicitly states that secondary‑market transfers are not, by themselves, considered transactions “by, at, or through” a PPSI for SAR purposes. PPSIs must retain SARs and supporting documentation for five years.
Currency‑transaction reporting (CTR) requirements would apply to transactions in currency exceeding $10,000, though Treasury notes that stablecoin issuers rarely engage in physical‑currency transactions.
Recordkeeping, Travel Rule, and Information Sharing
The NPRM would require PPSIs to comply with the BSA’s Recordkeeping Rule and Travel Rule for transfers of $3,000 or more and would amend the definition of “transmittal order” to expressly include payment stablecoins. PPSIs would also be integrated into the BSA’s information‑sharing framework, including Section 314(a) requests and voluntary Section 314(b) sharing.
Enhanced Due Diligence and Special Measures
The NPRM would apply the BSA’s enhanced due‑diligence requirements for correspondent accounts for foreign financial institutions and private‑banking accounts for non‑U.S. persons. PPSIs would also be subject to special measures under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, Section 9714(a) of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act, and 21 U.S.C. 2313a.
Sanctions Compliance Program Requirements
The NPRM reflects a significant change in Treasury’s expectations for PPSIs. PPSIs would be required to maintain a formal sanctions compliance program—something other BSA‑regulated financial institutions are not explicitly required to do. OFAC sanctions remain a strict‑liability regime, but Treasury is elevating sanctions compliance to the same programmatic level as AML/CFT. Examiners would look not only at whether a PPSI violated sanctions, but at whether its program is designed, resourced, and operating in line with OFAC’s risk‑based expectations. A strong program would meaningfully mitigate enforcement exposure, while gaps or weak controls could carry greater consequences given the statutory mandate.
OFAC proposes requiring PPSIs to maintain an effective sanctions compliance program incorporating five core elements: senior‑management commitment; holistic risk assessments; risk‑based internal controls, including technical capabilities; independent testing and auditing; and risk‑based training. These elements align with OFAC’s existing guidance and reflect the GENIUS Act’s mandate that PPSIs comply with all federal sanctions laws applicable to financial institutions.
Technical Capabilities and Lawful Orders
The GENIUS Act requires PPSIs to maintain the technological capability to block, freeze, and reject impermissible transactions and to comply with lawful orders, including orders to seize, freeze, burn, or prevent the transfer of payment stablecoins. These expectations apply whenever a PPSI’s smart contract is involved, even in secondary‑market activity, and will require issuers to document how these controls function in practice. Because these controls must function whenever a PPSI’s smart contract is implicated, issuers will need to document how block, freeze, reject, and burn capabilities operate in practice and ensure they can withstand regulatory scrutiny.
Economic Impact
Treasury estimates that approximately 50 PPSIs may be subject to the rule, with first‑year compliance costs of about $1.8 million and ongoing annual costs of roughly $1 million. Government costs are estimated at $5.9 million in the first year, and customer costs at approximately $1.2 million annually. Treasury expects many PPSIs to be money‑services businesses or insured‑depository‑institution subsidiaries already subject to similar requirements, reducing incremental burden.
Key Takeaway
The proposal makes clear that Treasury now expects permitted stablecoin issuers to operate with the same level of AML, sanctions, governance, and technical rigor long required of mature financial institutions. The NPRM signals that PPSIs will need to build compliance into the core of their operating models—risk assessments, beneficial‑ownership collection, primary‑market SAR obligations, enhanced due diligence, and the ability to block, freeze, or burn tokens cannot be bolted on later. These expectations create a high regulatory bar, and not every current or aspiring issuer will be able to meet it. Firms with the capital, staffing, and engineering capacity to stand up a full BSA/OFAC program will be positioned to move forward, while smaller or less‑resourced issuers may struggle to qualify as PPSIs. The practical effect is a market that shifts toward a smaller number of issuers capable of operating under a full federal compliance regime. The framework ultimately favors well‑capitalized issuers and is likely to accelerate consolidation in the stablecoin market.
Next Steps
FinCEN and OFAC are accepting public comments for 60 days following publication in the Federal Register. Treasury seeks input on the clarity of definitions, the feasibility of technical requirements, the tailoring of obligations for PPSIs of different sizes and business models, and the interaction between federal and state regulatory frameworks.
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