The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recently published a report titled Virtual Assets: Red Flag Indicators of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. The report discusses a number of red flag indicators of suspicious virtual asset (VA) activities identified “through more than one hundred case studies collected since 2017 from across the FATF Global Network, literature reviews, and open source research.” The purpose of the report is to help financial institutions (FIs), designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) to create a “risk-based approach to their Customer Due Diligence (CDD) requirements.”

The report focuses on the following six categories of red flag indicators: those (1) related to transactions, (2) related to transaction patterns, (3) related to anonymity, (4) about senders or recipients, (5) in the source of funds or wealth, and (6) related to geographical risks.

When discussing red flags relating to transactions, FATF suggests that the size and frequency of transactions can be a good indicator of suspicious activity. For example, making multiple high-value transactions in short succession (i.e. within a 24-hour period) or in a staggered and regular pattern, with no further transactions during a long period afterwards. With regard to transaction patterns, FATF notes that large initial deposits with new users or transactions involving multiple accounts should also raise suspicion. Continue Reading FATF Identifies Red Flags for Virtual Assets and Money Laundering

We are pleased to offer the latest episode in Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Monitor Podcast series — a weekly podcast focusing on the consumer finance issues that matter most, from new product development and emerging technologies to regulatory compliance and enforcement and the ramifications of private litigation.  Following up on a recent blog post, our podcast discusses how the banking regulators and FinCEN will approach the decision whether to take enforcement action against a financial institution (including what BSA/AML program failures typically would – or would not – result in cease and desist orders), and how the regulators’ statement differs from 2007 guidance.  We also discuss how the enforcement statements relate to recent updates to the BSA/AML examination manual, suggested practices for reducing compliance risk for institutions and individuals, and the upcoming national election’s potential impact on BSA/AML enforcement.

We hope that you enjoy the podcast, moderated by our partner Alan Kaplinksy, and find it useful.

If you would like to remain updated on these issues, please click here to subscribe to Money Laundering Watch. To learn more about Ballard Spahr’s Anti-Money Laundering Team, please click here.  To visit Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Monitor blog, please click here.

 

“Front” Seafood Businesses Allegedly Hid the Proceeds From Smuggled Shark Fins and Marijuana Distribution

Last week, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Georgia unsealed an indictment returned in July, charging twelve defendants and two businesses with wire and mail fraud conspiracy, drug trafficking conspiracy, and money laundering conspiracy. The indictment describes a transnational criminal organization that allegedly began as early as 2010 and spanned multiple locations including, Georgia, District of Columbia, California, Florida, Michigan, Arizona, Hong Kong, Mexico, and Canada. The indictment accuses the defendants of submitting false applications for import/export licenses to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services, and using two seafood businesses and dozens of bank accounts to hide the proceeds of illegal activities.

According to the indictment, the criminal organization engaged in an international wildlife trafficking scheme involving shark finning—where a shark is caught at sea, its fins are removed, and the remainder of the living shark is discarded and left to die in the ocean. According to the indictment, shark finning supports the demand for shark fin soup, an Asian delicacy. Shark finning is among many illegal wildlife trade practices. Continue Reading DOJ and Multi-Agency Task Force Charge International Money Laundering, Drug Trafficking, and Illegal Wildlife Trade Scheme

It may go too far to say things are looking up for Danske Bank, but the institution was handed a significant victory when the Southern District of New York dismissed an investor lawsuit on August 24, 2020. As we blogged about here, here, here, and here, Danske Bank has been the subject of significant regulatory oversight, which has resulted in a foreseeable onslaught of investor lawsuits.

One such class action securities suit was brought by purchasers of DB American Depository Receipts against Danske and its former officers and board members over alleged misrepresentations about the bank’s financial condition in light of the now well-known anti-money laundering (AML) deficiencies in its Estonia branch, as well as the subsequent fallout. The suit relies heavily on the September 19, 2018 Bruun & Jhejle investigative report, which outlined various internal whistleblower complaints about the Estonia branch’s AML controls that were confirmed by a published audit by the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority. Subsequent investigations followed, including by U.S. authorities, resulting in significant financial blows to the bank.

The Court found that the plaintiffs not only had failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements regarding mental state for securities fraud claims, but had not even alleged facts sufficient to allege a material misrepresentation.  The decision reflects the potential difficulty of alleging (much less proving) a successful securities fraud claim based on alleged AML failures, particularly because it arises out of the globe’s largest and most notorious money laundering scandal.

Continue Reading Danske Bank Gets a (Rare) Break: New York Investor Lawsuit Dismissed for Failure to Sufficiently Allege Misrepresentations or Scienter

Regulators’ Joint Statement Attempts to Clarify AML Expectations Regarding Potential Corrupt Actors

On August 21, the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and other banking regulators – specifically the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the National Credit Union Administration, and the OCC – issued a joint statement that provides additional guidance in applying Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) due diligence requirements to customers who may be “politically exposed persons” (“PEPs”).

According to the joint statement, PEPs are “foreign individuals who are or have been entrusted with a prominent public function, as well as their immediate family members and close associates.” By nature of their roles in government and/or relationships with people of public influence, PEPs may present a higher level of risk of public corruption and bribery and, in turn, may pose a higher risk of taking part in transactions that involve illicit proceeds.

The joint statement thus identifies what constitutes a PEP; describes various risk-based factors that banks and other financial institutions should consider when determining whether to collect additional information from PEPs; and clarifies expectations on due diligence requirements for PEPs. Key clarifications regarding PEPs in the joint statement include:

  • PEPs do not include U.S. public officials.
  • PEPs are not high risk, ipso facto, by virtue of their status. Rather, banks ought to assess risk by a variety of factors, including, for instance, the nature of the PEP’s authority or influence over government activities or officials, his or her access to significant government assets or funds, the volume and nature of their transactions, and the type of products and services used.
  • There is no regulatory requirement in FinCEN’s customer due diligence (“CDD”) rule nor a supervisory expectation for banks and other financial institutions to implement “unique, additional due diligence steps for customers who are considered PEPs.” That said, PEPs are subject to traditional BSA/anti-money laundering requirements, including, for instance, suspicious activity reporting, customer identification, and beneficial ownership identification.
  • The CDD rule does not require banks to screen for or determine whether a customer – or a beneficial owner of the customer – is a PEP.

Notably, this guidance may be at odds with previously issued Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) guidance that measures countries’ compliance with FATF standards; namely, a requirement in local law to conduct enhanced due diligence in certain “high risk circumstances,” a phrase that includes foreign PEP relationships.

Looking ahead, financial institutions may take comfort that there are no unique, additional due diligence requirements for PEPs. In practice, however, financial institutions should continue to assess their BSA/AML programs to ensure that its risk-based procedures are sufficient for conducting CDD on PEPs.

If you would like to remain updated on these issues, please click here to subscribe to Money Laundering Watch. Please click here to find out about Ballard Spahr’s Anti-Money Laundering Team.

Can BSA/AML Requirements Lead to Deemed Knowledge of Borrower Fraud?

The first two weeks of August brought a milestone of sorts in the ongoing recovery from the economic downturn brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) ended its enrollment period on August 8, 2020 and the window for borrowers to apply to have their PPP loans forgiven opened on August 10, 2020.

The PPP was a centerpiece of the over $2 trillion Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) that, according to a study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology published on July 22, 2020 had to that point saved between 1.4 and 3.2 million jobs. Less formally observed but possibly more widely agreed, the PPP caused at least as many headaches with its rocky initial rollout and the ongoing uncertainty over applicable loan forgiveness standards. But, whereas implementing the PPP poses challenges to lenders now, due to the rampant fraud in the program (which, along with all COVID-19-related enforcement actions and policy statements, we track here) and its funding mechanics, it creates substantial downstream enforcement risk through the False Claims Act (“FCA”) for participating financial institutions.

Numerous districts already have charged borrowers with PPP-related fraud. To date, cases generally involve one of these scenarios:

  • Borrowers submitted fraudulent loan applications and supporting documents to seek PPP funds for businesses that either already had failed pre-pandemic or that they did not actually own.
  • Borrowers lied about amount, or even existence, of employees and payroll. These schemes involve inflated numbers of employees for companies, or even completely fake companies.
  • Borrowers certified that they would use loan funds to support payroll expenses or other allowable expenses, but in fact used all or most loan funds to pay personal and non-business expenses.

The prosecutions to date have all centered on relatively obvious fraud by borrowers, not lenders. But, wider-reaching investigations are occurring and though we are very much at the beginning of the enforcement phase, the magnitude of fraud in these programs is coming into focus. On September 1, 2020, the House Select Committee on the Coronavirus Crisis released a preliminary analysis finding, among other things, over $1 billion in fraudulent PPP loans were issued and identifying red flags with respect to an additional $2.98 billion in loans made to 11,000 borrowers.

And, as we discuss, the anti-money laundering (“AML”) requirements of lenders imposed under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) may expose lenders to greater risk under the FCA, which can impose civil liability for the reduced mental state of reckless disregard. Many lenders have extended PPP loans to previously-existing customers. This is a rational business decision, given typically lower business risks presented by existing customers and lower compliance costs, because existing customers do not need to provide beneficial ownership information under the Customer Due Diligence (“CDD”) rule of the BSA. However, because lenders also are required under the BSA to understand to a degree the historical and current activities of its customers, lenders may be deemed in future FCA actions to have “known” about red flags generated by fraudulent borrowers because of information obtained by the lenders properly executing their AML programs. That is, compliance with the BSA ironically may generate evidence for downstream FCA enforcement actions based on deemed “knowledge” by the lender of borrower malfeasance. This irony may be exacerbated by any disconnect in real time between the AML compliance staff at financial institutions and the front-line business people extending loans, particularly given the incredible speed with which institutions have extended PPP loans, at the government’s urging.

The point here is not that PPP lenders will face direct regulatory liability for alleged BSA/AML failures – although they may. Rather, the point is that PPP lenders may face enhanced FCA liability due to borrower information obtained through an entirely functional BSA/AML program. This phenomenon highlights the need for the “front” and “back” offices at lenders to communicate. Continue Reading PPP Lenders and Fraudulent Borrowers: False Claims Act Liability and AML Risk

High Profile Corruption, High End Real Estate, Shell Companies . . . and Fine Art

Second of Two Posts on Evolving Issues Regarding Real Estate and Money Laundering

In our last post, we blogged on a major regulatory tool to combat the use of real estate as a potential vehicle for money laundering: the real estate Geographic Targeting Orders (“GTOs”) issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. Today we explore a major enforcement tool in action: civil forfeiture of real estate by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”).

This summer, the International Unit of the DOJ’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section (MLARS) filed numerous complaints for civil forfeiture for real estate and other assets. This blog post will highlight a few – but not all – of these interesting and high-profile cases. Some of these cases may have been informed by data and leads obtained through the GTOs.

We explore here a trio of civil forfeiture actions pertaining, respectively, to alleged public corruption cases arising out of Gambia, Nigeria, and Malaysia. All of these cases involve foreign public officials who allegedly obtained wealth through corruption schemes committed abroad and laundered that money through shell companies to purchase real estate and other assets – sometimes located in the U.S., but sometimes not. Although the officials’ alleged initial crimes – the “specified unlawful activity,” or SUAs, as underlying crimes are defined under the federal money laundering statutes – took place overseas, the U.S. money laundering statutes provide that foreign misappropriation, embezzlements, and theft of public funds to benefit a public official constitute SUAs, thereby allowing the U.S. government to pursue civil forfeiture claims against assets located in the U.S. or abroad which are linked to the funds from underlying crimes committed primarily or even outside of the U.S.

This is the “civil forfeiture version” of a tactic used with increasing frequency by DOJ on which we repeatedly have blogged: the use of the criminal money laundering statutes to prosecute foreign officials for spending the fruits of entirely foreign crimes, when some of the financial transfers involved in the subsequent money laundering transactions occurred in the U.S.

Finally, another theme running throughout the allegations in these civil forfeiture actions is the unfortunate connection between money laundering and corruption and human rights abuses. Continue Reading Civil Forfeiture of Real Estate to Fight Money Laundering: A Round-Up

Law Enforcement Has Been Using GTO Data

First of Two Posts on Evolving Issues Regarding Real Estate and Money Laundering

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) has issued a report on the status and effectiveness of the Geographic Targeting Orders (“GTOs”) issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) since 2016, and on which we repeatedly have blogged.  The GAO’s report, entitled “Anti-Money Laundering — FinCEN Should Enhance Procedures for Implementing and Evaluating Geographic Targeting Orders,” (“the Report”) is lengthy.  In this post, we will describe the Report at a high level, and will attempt to focus on the portions which shed possible light on two key questions:  (1) how is law enforcement using the information culled from filings received by FinCEN as a result of the GTOs; and (2) whether the information obtained from GTO fillings may fuel legislation or regulations that will permanently subject portions of the real estate industry to anti-money laundering (“AML”) reporting requirements under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”).

In our next post, we will turn from regulatory requirements to enforcement actions, and explore some recent high-profile civil forfeiture actions by the Department of Justice — at least some of which may have been fueled by information obtained through GTOs — involving real estate and alleged foreign corruption.  Under any scenario, these forfeiture actions confirm the U.S. government’s sustained focus on real estate as a mechanism for money laundering. Continue Reading GAO Publishes Report on Effectiveness of Real Estate GTOs Issued by FinCEN

Regulators Provide Greater Transparency into BSA/AML Enforcement Process

On August 13, 2020 the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the “Agency” or collectively the “Agencies”) issued a joint statement updating and clarifying their 2007 guidance regarding how they evaluate enforcement actions when financial institutions violate or fail to meet BSA/AML requirements. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) followed with its own statement on August 18, 2020, setting forth its approach when considering enforcement actions against financial institutions that violate the BSA.

Below are a few highlights from the two sets of guidance:

  • The joint statement repeatedly emphasizes that isolated or technical deficiencies in BSA/AML compliance programs will not generally result in cease and desist orders.
  • The joint statement provides specific categories and examples of BSA/AML program failures that typically would (or would not) result in a cease and desist order. Certain of these examples are discussed below.
  • Compared to the 2007 guidance, the joint statement provides more detailed descriptions and examples of the pillars of BSA/AML compliance programs, such as designated BSA/AML personnel, independent testing, internal controls, and training.
  • FinCEN explains in its statement that it will base enforcement actions on violations of law, not standards of conduct contained solely in guidance documents.
  • The FinCEN statement lays out the factors FinCEN considers when determining the disposition of a BSA violation. Unsurprisingly, these factors include the pervasiveness and seriousness of the conduct and the violator’s cooperation and history of wrongdoing.

All in all, the two statements, particularly the joint statement, succeed in providing greater transparency into the regulators’ decision-making processes with regards to pursuing enforcement actions for violations of the BSA and for AML program deficiencies. Continue Reading Federal Banking Agencies Issue Joint Statement On Enforcement of BSA/AML Requirements; FinCEN Follows With Its Own

AML Standards May Exist in Theory, But Often are Not Enforced in Practice

Today we are very pleased to welcome, once again, guest bloggers Gretta Fenner and Dr. Kateryna Boguslavska of the Basel Institute on Governance (“Basel Institute”). The Basel Institute recently issued its Basel AML Index for 2020. Ms. Fenner and Dr. Boguslavska guest blogged for Money Laundering Watch last year on this data-rich and fascinating annual Index, which is one of several online tools developed by the Basel Institute to help both public- and private-sector practitioners tackle financial crime. The Index is a research-based ranking that assesses countries’ risk exposure to money laundering and terrorist financing.

Established in 2003, the Basel Institute is a not-for-profit Swiss foundation dedicated to working with public and private partners around the world to prevent and combat corruption, and is an Associated Institute of the University of Basel. The Basel Institute’s work involves action, advice and research on issues including anti-corruption collective action, asset recovery, corporate governance and compliance, and more.

Gretta Fenner is the Managing Director of the Basel Institute, where she also holds the position of Director of the Institute’s International Centre for Asset Recovery. She is a political scientist by training and holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees from the Otto-Suhr-Institute at the Free University Berlin, Germany, and the Paris Institute for Political Science (Sciences Po), France. She also holds an MBA from the Curtin University Graduate School of Business, Australia.

Dr. Kateryna Boguslavska is Project Manager for the Basel AML Index at the Basel Institute. A political scientist, she holds a PhD in Political Science from the National Academy of Science in Ukraine, a master’s degree in Comparative and International Studies from ETH Zurich as well as a master’s degree in Political Science from the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Ukraine. Before joining the Basel Institute, Dr. Boguslavska worked at Chatham House in London as an Academy Fellow for the Russia and Eurasia program.

This blog post again takes the form of a Q & A session, in which Ms. Fenner and Dr. Boguslavska respond to several questions posed by Money Laundering Watch about the Basel AML Index 2020. We hope you enjoy this discussion of global money laundering risks — which addresses AML standards vs. their actual implementation, human trafficking, AML vulnerabilities in the U.S., the effects of covid-19, and more. –Peter Hardy Continue Reading The Basel AML Index 2020: Across the Globe, Weak Oversight and Dormant Enforcement Systems. A Guest Blog.