Six years ago, in early 2018, we blogged about the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (“FinCEN’s”) designation of ABLV Bank, AS (“ABLV”), then the second-largest bank in Latvia, as a foreign financial institution “of primary money laundering concern” pursuant
The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (the “Philly Fed”) recently executed an agreement (the “Agreement”) with Pennsylvania-based Customers Bank (and its Customers Bancorp, Inc. holding entity) (collectively, “Customers”). According to the Agreement, “the most recent examinations and inspections” of Customers by the Philly Fed identified “significant deficiencies” related to the bank’s risk management practices, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering (“BSA/AML”) compliance, and regulations issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”).
The source of these alleged deficiencies is alluded to by the Agreement, which immediately highlights two “digital assets-friendly” elements of Customers’ business model:
The Agreement calls for Customers to submit a number of plans to the Philly Fed by October 5, 2024, several of which explicitly require the Philly Fed’s approval.
Continue Reading Bank’s Digital Assets Business Strategy Draws Federal Reserve Scrutiny
In United States v. An, et al., 22-cr-640 (KAM) (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2024), the Eastern District of New York recently addressed and rejected an argument by defendants that Ciminelli v. United States required dismissal of money laundering charges against them because the government had failed to allege that they had deprived or attempted to deprive banks of “property”. In attempting to harmonize the government’s approach with Ciminelli, the court defined a property interest by the banks in their customers’ accounts that will likely require further refinement by the Second Circuit, and perhaps draw the attention of the Supreme Court.
We previously blogged on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ciminelli, in which Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected the Second Circuit’s longstanding “right to control” theory of fraud as a basis of liability under the federal wire fraud statute. In that post, we articulated the possible ramifications for the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and its prosecution of bank fraud cases, because the opinion did not limit itself to wire fraud but instead made frequent and more general reference to “the federal fraud statutes”. We suggested that the DOJ may have to reconsider its tactic of charging bank fraud, rather than a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), based upon a defendant’s alleged acts of concealment which impacted victim banks’ ability to comply with the BSA.
The An opinion is complicated, and we summarize here only. Although the DOJ won the motion at issue, which turned on the face of the indictment, related factual issues remain for trial. Further, the basic legal issue may produce different outcomes in different courts.
Continue Reading EDNY Upholds Money Laundering Charge Against Defense Attack Under Ciminelli
We previously blogged on the lawsuit filed by the National Small Business Association (“NSBA”) and one of its individual members, which sought to challenge the constitutionality of the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”). Most recently, we analyzed the March 1 decision in that case by the Northern District of Alabama court, finding the CTA to be unconstitutional and enjoining the United States government from enforcing it against the plaintiffs.
The government sought an appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, and last Monday the Treasury Department filed its appellate brief. Before the District Court, the government argued that Congress had authority to enact the CTA under three distinct enumerated powers: (1) oversight of foreign affairs and national security; (2) its Commerce Clause-derived regulatory authority; and (3) its power to tax. The government’s brief on appeal focuses primarily on regulation of commercial activity, and its value as a component of the federal focus on combatting financial crime.
Continue Reading Treasury Asks the Eleventh Circuit to Uphold the CTA and Congressional Authority
We previously have blogged on actions taken by the DOJ’s “Task Force KleptoCapture,” an interagency law enforcement task force with a mandate to target sanctioned Russian and pro-Russian oligarchs. While explicitly launched in May 2022 as a direct response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the task force’s mission is consistent with the U.S. government’s characterization of Russia as a kleptocratic regime (see our post here) and the Biden Administration’s promotion of anti-corruption as a “core United States national security interest” (see our posts here and here).
This week, DOJ announced (via both a press release and a filmed podium announcement by Attorney General Merrick Garland) a series of enforcement actions in five separate federal cases in districts up and down the East Coast, dealing with money laundering and evasion of sanctions, in several cases centered on quintessentially oligarchic luxury goods: high-end real estate and superyachts. The enforcement actions also emphasize the continuing themes in these cases of the use of shell companies, proxies and lawyers to allegedly evade sanctions.
Farewell to 2023, and welcome 2024. As we do every year, let’s look back.
We highlight 10 of our most-read blog posts from 2023, which address many of the key issues we’ve examined during the past year: criminal money laundering enforcement; compliance risks with third-party fintech relationships; the scope of authority of bank regulators; sanctions
The SEC’s Division of Examinations (the “Division”) released on October 16 a report on its “Examination Priorities” (the “Report”) for fiscal year 2024. This release occurred earlier than in prior years, which the Report’s prefatory message characterizes as an example of the Division’s “intention to provide more transparency” and “to move forward together with investors and industry to promote compliance.”
The Report highlights four major areas of focus for the Division’s examinations in the coming year, which it terms “risk areas impacting various market participants”:
As to AML, the Report first rehearses the requirement of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) for broker-dealers: namely, that they establish AML programs tailored to their unique risk profile – their location, size, customer base, menu of products and services, and method of delivery of those products and services. The Report further notes that such AML programs must be reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the BSA and related regulations, must undergo independent testing of their viability, and must include customer due diligence procedures and ongoing transaction monitoring – including, where appropriate, filing of Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”). Although the Report also references “certain registered investment companies,” investment advisers as a group are not (yet) subject to the BSA.
In February 2022, we blogged on the seizure of a record $3.6 billion in stolen Bitcoin (“BTC”) and an accompanying criminal complaint, charging husband and wife Ilya “Dutch” Lichtenstein and Heather “Razzlekhan” Morgan with conspiracy to commit money laundering and conspiracy to defraud the United States. Last week, the couple pleaded guilty, pursuant to plea agreements with the government, with sentencing to follow.
As we discuss below, both of their plea agreements contemplate attempting to reduce their sentences via cooperation with the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). As we also discuss, this case presents a cautionary tale for financial institutions and the need to not “tip off,” unwittingly or otherwise, the recipients of grand jury subpoenas.
Continue Reading Crypto Couple Plead Guilty to Money Laundering Conspiracy
In January, we blogged on the Southern District of New York sentencing of Danske Bank to three years of probation and a forfeiture of $2.059 billion. As we noted at the time, the bank was charged with bank fraud, rather than violation of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), even though the “heart of the criminal case” was Danske Bank’s concealment (now acknowledged via plea) of its own AML failures in its dealings with three U.S. banks, thus impacting their own compliance with the BSA.
This was, of course, not the first time that the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has used bank fraud charges instead of proceeding under the BSA in dealing with a foreign bank. Indeed, the pending case against Turkish bank Halkbank involves in part bank fraud charges.
But DOJ may be forced to reconsider tactics soon: The Supreme Court’s decision earlier this month in Ciminelli v. United States, et al., which addressed and ultimately voided the Second Circuit’s longstanding “right to control” theory of fraud as a basis for liability under the federal wire fraud statute, could have ramifications for DOJ’s approach using the similarly structured bank fraud statute.
Continue Reading Will Ciminelli’s Impact on Wire Fraud Cases Ripple Out to Bank Fraud?
Last month we blogged on an indictment in the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”) charging Vladimir Voronchenko (“Voronchenko”) with scheming to make payments to maintain multiple properties in New York and Florida owned by sanctioned Russian oligarch Viktor Vekselberg (“Vekselberg”), whom we had previously blogged about here.
Last Friday, the SDNY U.S. Attorney’s Office filed a follow-on civil forfeiture complaint (the “Forfeiture Complaint”) against the six properties at issue – one address in Southampton, NY; two units at 515 Park Avenue in Manhattan; and two addresses in Miami Beach (the “Subject Properties”). The Forfeiture Complaint seeks forfeiture of the Subject Properties on three bases: (a) as real property derived from proceeds traceable to violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), various Executive Orders (13660-662 and 13685), and 31 C.F.R.§ 589.201 (which implemented those Executive Orders as part of a package of regulations promulgated by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury Department (“OFAC”)); and (b) as real property involved in international money laundering to promote violations of the IEEPA, and (c) as assets of an entity involved in international money laundering to promote violations of the IEEPA.