Art & Antiquities; Beneficial Owners; Foreign Corruption — and MoreWe are really pleased to be moderating, once again, the Practising Law Institute’s 2021 Anti-Money Laundering Conference on May 11, 2021, starting at 9 a.m. This year’s conference again will be entirely virtual — but it will be as informative, interesting and timely as
As we have blogged, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (the “Act”) (part of the National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”), passed on January 2, 2021), represents a historic overhaul of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”). One of the most important changes – and certainly one that has attracted great attention by the media and commentators – is Section 6314 of the NDAA, entitled “Updating whistleblower incentives and protections.” The Act’s expanded whistleblower provision is modeled after the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions, and seeks to follow in Dodd-Frank’s footsteps. But, there are some key differences between the Act and Dodd-Frank. The Act also creates a more limited whistleblower program specifically pertaining to foreign corruption.
Aside from expanding the potential monetary rewards, the most significant aspect of the Act is that it explicitly invites internal compliance officers of financial institutions to use the information obtained through their compliance functions in order to pursue a whistleblower reward. This provision highlights the tension between individuals and institutions, and increases the pressure on financial institutions to comply with the law, take whistleblowers seriously, and be ready to deal with employees who purport to be whistleblowers but may be pursuing their own agenda. It also is a prudent time for financial institutions to review their internal complaint procedures and assess whether any changes are warranted given this new development.
Continue Reading AMLA Adds Robust New Whistleblower Provisions for Anti-Money Laundering Violations
We are pleased to offer the latest episode in Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Monitor Podcast series — a weekly podcast focusing on the consumer finance issues that matter most, from new product development and emerging technologies to regulatory compliance and enforcement and the ramifications of private litigation.
In this podcast, we examine two recent OCC
Plaintiffs Failed to Sufficiently Allege Knowledge or Recklessness by Company Concerning AML Compliance Problems, Despite Admissions Made by Company When Responding to Major Government Enforcement Actions On February 25, 2020, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of shareholders’ securities-fraud class action against the Western Union Company (“Western Union”) and several of its current and former executive officers based on the company’s alleged anti-money laundering (“AML”) compliance failings.
The suit was filed in February 2017 following the announcement of a deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) between Western Union and the U.S. Department of Justice. The DPA was based upon Western Union’s alleged willful failure to maintain an effective AML program and aiding and abetting of wire fraud between 2004 and 2012. The DPA, about which we have previously blogged, charged Western Union with filing Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) regarding activity by its customers but failing to file SARs regarding the actions of its own agents who were likely complicit. The DPA and related civil enforcement actions from the Federal Trade Commission and FinCEN required Western Union to pay a combined penalty of $586 million.
As we also have blogged, shareholder derivative suits based on alleged AML failures are proliferating, for both U.S.-based and foreign-based financial institutions – as well as their executives. Primary examples include Danske Bank and some of its former executives, as well as Westpac, Australia’s second-largest retail bank, which currently face such lawsuits in the U.S. Such lawsuits now represent predictable collateral consequences flowing from AML-related scandals. Here, Western Union obtained dismissal because the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts regarding the key issue of mental state – that is, facts that would support a strong inference of actual knowledge or reckless disregard that the public statements regarding Western Union’s actual state of AML compliance were false. The detailed Tenth Circuit opinion illuminates the practical contours of the scienter standard regarding AML compliance, or alleged lack thereof. Ultimately, plaintiffs’ arguments based upon a “fraud by hindsight” theory will fail.
Continue Reading Tenth Circuit Rejects Shareholders’ Fraud Claims Against Western Union Based on Alleged AML Failings
A Modest ProposalThe European Union (“EU”) recently has grappled with a series of massive money laundering scandals and strategized about how to more effectively combat international money laundering and corruption. Generally, the EU has continued to issue a series of reports identifying systemic vulnerabilities to money laundering and suggest process-based recommendations for how to address future threats. These recommendations typically mirror the same range of process-based improvements set forth in earlier reports: from enhancing cross-border information sharing to increasing resources for adequate implementation and enforcement of anti-money laundering (“AML”) and counter financing of terrorism (“CFT”) policies implemented by EU member states and financial institutions. Noticeably absent from these recommendations is one of the most powerful deterrents available – and a distinctly American approach – prosecuting the bad actors.
Although many of the recent EU money laundering scandals rest on conduct occurring years ago, the recurring waves of scandals strongly suggest that the EU – like the U.S. – has a serious problem with money laundering that is not going away any time soon. They likewise indicate that the EU’s financial system will continue to be abused by bad actors who appear to be unfazed by any potential consequences. The EU therefore should consider emulating – at least in part – the American approach of more aggressively investigating and prosecuting individuals, including the corrupt politicians, kleptocrats, drug dealers, fraudsters, and other criminals from around the globe who are laundering sometimes massive amounts of funds through European financial institutions.
Very recently, in a different but related context, the Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), Jay Clayton, delivered a speech during which he bemoaned his perception that his foreign counterparts failed to rigorously enforce their own anti-corruption laws. Specifically, Chairman Clayton asserted the following:
Corruption is corrosive. We see examples where corruption leads to poverty, exploitation and conflict. Yet, we must face the fact that, in many areas of the world, our work may not be having the desired effect. Why? In significant part, because many other countries, including those that have long had similar offshore anti-corruption laws on their books, do not enforce those laws.
Granted, the above comments pertained specifically to enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), and arguably the comments were in furtherance of a pro-American message regarding international competition between countries. The comments nonetheless exemplifies a certain American perception: the U.S. aggressively prosecutes individuals, whereas Europe does not. Obviously, this issue entails a lot of cultural baggage on both sides.
Although there are viable criticisms of the U.S. approach (both in theory and in practice), and although the EU’s strong focus on process and institutions’ AML and CFT systems is critical, any government’s enforcement “tool bag” must include targeted prosecutions of the people responsible for the laundering violations. Otherwise, few bad actors around the world will think twice about continuing to turn to EU institutions for their laundering needs. This blog post explores this idea.
Continue Reading The EU’s Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, the Financing of Terrorism and Corruption Seem to Overlook a Very American Approach: Prosecute People
The Office of the Comptroller of Currency (“OCC”) issued an extraordinary announcement regarding the decision of a former bank general counsel – Daniel Weiss, formerly employed by Rabobank, N.A. – to enter into a Consent Order in which Mr. Weiss agreed to be barred from the banking industry and pay a $50,000 fine. The Consent
Authorities Begin to Focus on Individual ResponsibilityThis week, Danish prosecutors charged Thomas Borgen, the former chief executive officer of Danske Bank, for his involvement in the money laundering scandal arising out of Danske Bank’s Estonian branch, involving an astonishing 200 billion euros ($224 billion) in alleged suspicious transactions. Borgen, whose home prosecutors reportedly raided
More Allegations of Nordic Malfeasance Surface as Private Party Lawsuits Beset Danske Bank and SwedBank Gets Sucked into Unfolding Scandal“Something was indeed rotten in the state of Denmark.” – Olav Haazen
In what is perhaps the least surprising development in the sprawling, continuously unfolding Danske Bank (“Danske”) money laundering scandal, investor groups have filed private securities fraud actions against the Denmark-based bank and its top executives: first in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York then, most recently, in Copenhagen City Court in Denmark. These suits coincide with an announcement from the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) that it, too, was opening its own probe of potential securities and Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) violations at Danske that could result in significant financial penalties on top of what could be the enormous private judgments. More significantly, the Danske shareholder suits and SEC investigation illustrate a second front of enormous exposure from a securities fraud standpoint for banks involved in their own money laundering scandals and a rock-solid guaranteed template for future investors similarly damaged by such scandals.
As we have blogged here, here and here, the Danske scandal – the largest alleged money laundering scandal in history – has yielded criminal and administrative investigations in Estonia, Denmark, France and the United Kingdom and by the United States Department of Justice. Those investigations have focused primarily on Danske’s compliance with applicable AML regulations, as well as the implementation and effectiveness of those regulations. The SEC and civil plaintiffs now have opened a new line of inquiry focusing less on the institutional and regulatory failures that yielded the scandal and responsibility for them and more on the damage those failures have caused Danske investors.
Meanwhile, banking stalwart Swedbank is reacting, with mixed success at best, to allegations that suspicious transactions involving billions of Euros passed from Danske’s Estonian branch through Swedbank’s own Baltic branches — allegations which have produced a controversial internal investigation report, a law enforcement raid, the loss of the bank’s CEO, and plunging stock value.
Continue Reading And Here Come the Lawyers: Securities Fraud Suits Commence Private Litigation Phase of Danske Bank Scandal
This week Danske Bank released a report detailing the results of its much anticipated internal investigation into allegations of money laundering perpetrated in its Estonian branch. The results of the investigation dwarfed even the boldest predictions. The report found between 2007 and 2015 the Estonian branch processed a staggering 200 billion Euros, or $234 billion, in suspicious transactions by thousands of non-resident costumers. The report finds the AML procedures at the Estonian branch were “manifestly insufficient and inadequate,” resulting in numerous breaches of legal obligations by the Estonian branch. The report details a numerous red flags that allegedly should have alerted the parent Danske Bank Group (“Group”) to the issues.
However, the report also concludes that the Group’s Board of Directors, Chairman, Audit Committee, or Chief Executive Officer did not violate any legal obligations in failing to detect or stop the suspicious transactions. Despite this finding, the CEO, Thomas Borgan, resigned the same day the report was released. Borgan stated, “Even though I was personally cleared from a legal point of view, I hold the ultimate responsibility. There is no doubt that we as an organization have failed in this situation and did not live up to expectations.” The consequences of this colossal money laundering scandal are unlikely to stop with Brogan’s resignation.
This blog post will summarize the scope of the report, findings of suspicious activity, the causes and red flags of potential money laundering violations, and outline the known and anticipated consequences of this scandal for Danske Bank.
Continue Reading Danske Bank CEO Resigns on Heels of Report Detailing an Astounding $234 Billion in Suspicious Transactions in Money Laundering Scandal
Conduct Performed Without Knowledge Still Can Lead to the Most Serious PenaltiesUnder the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), the most onerous civil penalties will be applied for “willful” violations. That mental state standard might sound hard for the government to prove. For example, in criminal and civil tax fraud cases under the Internal Revenue Code, “willfulness” is defined to mean a voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty – a very demanding showing. But as we will discuss, two very new court opinions discussing a required BSA filing – a Form TD F 90-22.1, or Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, otherwise know as a FBAR – remind us that, under the BSA, a “willful” violation does not require proof of actual knowledge. A “willful” BSA violation only needs to be reckless, and the government can prove it through the doctrine of “willful blindness” or “conscious avoidance.”
The fact that courts in civil FBAR cases have been holding that “willfulness” can mean “just recklessness” is not a new development, and it is well known to those practicing in the tax fraud and tax controversy space. This blog post will not attempt to delve into the long-running offshore account enforcement campaign that has been waged by the IRS and the DOJ; the related case decisions; or the related voluntary disclosure programs for offshore accounts (for those interested in this fascinating but complicated topic, the Federal Tax Crimes blog is one of many excellent resources). Rather, the point of this post is that the case law now being made in the FBAR and offshore account context will have direct application to more traditional Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”)/BSA enforcement actions, because the civil penalty statute being interpreted in the FBAR cases is the same provision which applies to claimed failures to maintain an adequate AML program and other violations of the BSA. Thus, the target audience of this post is not people involved in undisclosed offshore bank account cases, but rather people involved in day-to-day AML compliance for financial institutions, who may not realize that some missteps may be branded as “willful” and entail very serious monetary penalties, even if they were done without actual knowledge. This may be news to some, and it underscores in particular the risks presented by one the topics that this blog frequently has discussed: the potential AML liability of individuals.
Continue Reading The BSA Civil Penalty Regime: Reckless Conduct Can Produce “Willful” Penalties