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But Five Justices Express Deep Concern as to Civil Forfeiture Regimes

On May 9, in Culley et al. v. Marshall, the Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. Constitution does not require a preliminary hearing in civil forfeiture cases involving personal property for claimants to raise the “innocent owner” defense. Rather, the Court ruled that a “timely” forfeiture hearing affords claimants due process and that no separate preliminary hearing is constitutionally required. Although Culley arose under Alabama law, it has direct consequences for the forfeiture laws of many states, as well as federal civil forfeiture proceedings, in which claimants can raise the innocent owner defense.

It is important to remember that Culley involves personal property: as the Court noted, existing Supreme Court law allows States to immediately seize personal property (i.e., cars, currency, art, jewelry, etc.) subject to civil forfeiture if the property otherwise could be removed, destroyed, or concealed before a forfeiture hearing. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 679–680 (1974). In contrast, existing Supreme Court law provides that States ordinarily may not seize real property (i.e., land and structures) before providing notice and a hearing. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 62 (1993). Moreover, States and Congress of course still can craft statutes which afford protections beyond the bare minimum required by the Constitution.

Finally, and more importantly, the dissenting and concurring opinions make clear that the legal and social debates over civil forfeiture practices, and their potential abuse, are far from over.

Continue Reading  Supreme Court:  Innocent Owners of Forfeited Personal Property Must Wait

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) has issued a detailed and complicated Order in the case Banco San Juan Internacional, Inc. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, denying a motion for preliminary injunction by Banco San Juan Internacional, Inc. (“BSJI”), a Puerto Rican bank entity, against the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the “FRBNY”) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Board”).

The case arose out of the FRBNY’s decision to close BSJI’s master account for alleged deficiencies in its anti-money laundering (“AML”) system, which thereby posed systemic risk. The Court held, amongst other rulings, that there is no statutory right to a so-called “master account” with a federal reserve bank.

After the Court filed its Order on October 27, BSJI filed its appeal on October 30, and requested an emergency stay pending appeal and an expedited appeal. On November 9, 2023, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit referred BSJI’s motion for a stay pending appeal and to expedite to a three-judge motions panel and denied the request for a stay pending appeal.

As we have blogged, and generalizing greatly, having a master account allows financial institutions to operate in the normal course as a custodial bank in the U.S. Having a master account is therefore critical to any institution looking to operate in the U.S. financial system. Accordingly, the FRBNY’s decision, and the Court’s Order, in effect prevent BSJI from operating.

Although some of the background allegations are eye-catching, the Order makes broad legal pronouncements, many of which are not necessarily tied to the alleged facts. The Order therefore emphasizes the significant and unilateral powers of a federal reserve bank, and its discretion to provide or deny master accounts going forward. These powers apply to all financial institutions and require financial institutions to take a serious approach in meeting their AML obligations under the BSA as well as regulator remediation and recommendations regarding the same.  This matter also illustrates how a financial institution can resolve an enforcement action with the Department of Justice, only to find itself still facing an existential threat posed by a regulator for the same underlying activity. 

Continue Reading  SDNY Court Finds Broad Fed Powers Over Master Accounts in Puerto Rican Bank Case Involving AML Concerns

Complaint Illustrates Existential Fight Over OFAC’s Ability to Sanction Open-Source Code – and OFAC Responds (?) By Issuing FAQs on Tornado Cash Use

Last month, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) sanctioned Tornado Cash, a virtual currency “mixer” operating on the Ethereum blockchain which allegedly has been used to launder the virtual currency equivalent of more than $7 billion since its creation in 2019, by adding it to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (the “SDN List”). The initial response from certain elements of the crypto community was, not surprisingly, negative: for example, an 8/15 Coin Center whitepaper and an 8/23 letter from Congressman Tom Emmer to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen argued that OFAC lacked the legal authority.

In the intervening month, things have heated up considerably. Last week, six plaintiffs filed a complaint against OFAC and the Treasury Department, as well as Secretary Yellen and OFAC Director Andrea Gacki in their respective official capacities, in the Western District of Texas (Waco Division), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief – specifically, that the court declare OFAC’s addition of Tornado Cash to the SDN List as unlawful, and permanently enjoin the enforcement of the designation and any sanctions stemming therefrom.  Plaintiffs allege that venue is proper due to Plaintiff Joseph Van Loon’s residence in Cedar Park, TX, within the Western District.  Plaintiffs’ decision to opt for the Waco Division, rather than the Austin Division, may be intentional, because the Waco Division has only one judge, who until recently has been the go-to choice for patent litigation plaintiffs.

The complaint has and will continue to draw considerable attention.  It lays out the framework for a fascinating question:  under existing law, can OFAC act directly against a piece of technology such as open-source code?  Or, must OFAC pursue enforcement, through a more difficult, piece meal and time-consuming process, only against specific individuals and specific legal entities? Presumably, both sides will invoke broad policy-related and equity-related arguments regarding “privacy,” “transparency,” and the need to fight crime.  However, the key issue may come down to a more traditional and rather dry legal issue of parsing the meaning of statutory language.

Continue Reading  Civil Complaint Challenges OFAC’s Tornado Cash Sanctions

Questions of which, if any, regulatory regimes apply to the variety of participants in the cryptocurrency market continue to dog the industry.  On February 28, 2022, whether a cryptocurrency futures trading platform constitutes a “futures commission merchant” (“FCM”) under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) subject to Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) regulations took center stage in a U.S. District Court decision denying a motion to dismiss an indictment alleging violations of the BSA against the founders and chief executives of BitMEX.

As we will discuss, the District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected a motion to dismiss the indictment, in which the defendants argued that they lacked notice under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment that they could face criminal charges based on two technical questions, the answers to which were “unknowable” at the relevant time: (1) whether Bitcoin is a “commodity;” and (2) was BitMEX an FCM brokering cryptocurrency futures.
Continue Reading  Cryptocurrencies as Commodities Plays Out in BitMEX Criminal Prosecution Under the BSA

Court Defers Heavily to the FDIC and the FFIEC Manual

First Part in a Two-Part Series

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld the decision of the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to issue a cease and desist order against California Pacific Bank (the “Bank”) for the Bank’s alleged failure to comply with Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) regulations or have a sufficient plan and program in place to do so.

This decision, California Pacific Bank v. FDIC, provides a nearly step-by-step analysis of what is required of banks under the BSA and a vivid illustration of an Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) program that did not pass muster in the eyes of a regulator.  It highlights the general rules that banks of all sizes, but particularly smaller community banks, must keep in mind concerning their compliance programs – size does not matter and you are on notice of what compliance entails.

Importantly, and before upholding the FDIC’s factual findings regarding the Bank’s violations, the Ninth Circuit first rejected the Bank’s claim that the regulation at issue (which required the Bank to implement an AML compliance program which complied with the “four pillars” of such a program) was unconstitutionally vague. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit found that the FDIC has broad discretion when interpreting this regulation, described by the Court as “ambiguous.”

This post will summarize the case and the key role played by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Manual (“FFIEC Manual”) in both the Court’s rejection of the constitutional challenge and the broad deference which the Court accorded to the FDIC and its interpretation of its own regulations.  The second post will turn to the Bank’s alleged AML program failings and the Bank’s challenges to the FDIC’s many factual findings.
Continue Reading  Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Rejects Constitutional Challenge to AML Compliance Program Regulation