The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has been busy lately, and has issued a flurry of proposed rulemakings and requests for comment. Although “reform” is often in the eye of the beholder, all of these proposals will have a practical impact.
As part of Ballard Spahr’s webcast series, Consumer Financial Services in Turbulent Times, we
Court Rejects Halkbank’s Claim That the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Shields the Bank From ProsecutionA motion to dismiss an indictment accusing Turkey’s majority state-owned Halkbank of money laundering, bank fraud and Iran-related sanctions offenses was denied by U.S. District Judge Richard M. Berman of the Southern District of New York in a recent 16-page decision. The Court ruled that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) does not bestow immunity in U.S. criminal proceedings on financial institutions owned in whole or in part by foreign governments. Even if it did, the FSIA’s commercial activity exemptions would apply and support Halkbank’s prosecution. This development is the latest in the ongoing, complex battle between Halkbank the U.S. Department of Justice – a prosecution involving potential political battles as well.
As we have blogged, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York charged Halkbank on October 15, 2019 with a six count indictment for bank fraud, money laundering and conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), stemming from the bank’s alleged involvement in a multi-billion dollar scheme to evade U.S. sanctions against Iran. The Court later rejected an attempt by Halkbank to enter a “special appearance” contesting jurisdiction, making it clear that international financial institutions must appear for arraignment in criminal actions. The decision served as a warning to foreign defendants brought into U.S. federal court: issues of jurisdiction in criminal cases must be litigated only after arraignment.
Judge Berman’s most recent ruling found that Halkbank is not immune from criminal prosecution in the United States under FSIA, and that the allegations in the indictment were plead sufficiently to avoid dismissal. This ruling of course has a potentially broader application to any foreign majority state-owned entities which allegedly scheme to violate U.S. criminal law: given sufficient nexus between the scheme and the United States, FSIA will not shield the foreign entities, because the Act only applies to civil matters that do not fall under its “commercial activities” exceptions.
Continue Reading Turkey’s Majority State-Owned Halkbank Is Not Immune from U.S. Prosecution in Iran Sanctions and Money Laundering Case
Final Post in a Three-Post Series Regarding Recent Regulatory Action by FinCENOn September 29, 2020, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) published a request for comment on existing regulations regarding enhanced due diligence (“EDD”) for correspondent bank accounts. The notice seeks to give the public an opportunity to comment on the existing regulatory requirements and burden estimates. Written comments must be received on or before November 30, 2020.
Currently, Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) regulations for due diligence and EDD for correspondent bank accounts require certain covered entities (banks, brokers or dealers in securities, futures, commission merchants, introducing brokers in commodities, and mutual funds) to establish due diligence programs that include risk-based, and, where necessary, enhanced policies, procedures, and controls reasonably designed to detect and report money laundering conducted through or involving any correspondent accounts established or maintained for foreign financial institutions. The regulations also require that these same financial institutions establish anti-money laundering (“AML”) programs “designed to detect and report money laundering conducted through or involving any private banking accounts established by the financial institutions.”
In issuing the request, FinCEN has not proposed any changes to the current regulations for correspondent or private banking. Instead, the request is intended to cover “a future expansion of the scope of the annual hourly burden and cost estimate associated with these regulations.”
This is the third and final post in a series of blogs regarding a recent flurry of regulatory activity by FinCEN. In our prior posts, we discussed a final rule by FinCEN extending BSA/AML regulatory requirements to banks lacking a Federal functional regulator, and FinCEN’s advanced notice of proposed rulemaking as to potential regulatory amendments regarding “effective and reasonably designed” anti-money laundering (“AML”) programs. Unlike the first two regulatory actions discussed in our series, FinCEN’s request for comments on the burdens of correspondent bank account due diligence and EDD seems purely procedural: it simply asks covered institutions to report how much time and resources are spent on compliance. Nonetheless, it’s hard not to conclude that this request for comment is a prelude to some future, more substantive action regarding correspondent bank account regulation. The U.S. Department of Treasury identified correspondent banking as a “key vulnerability” for exploitation by illicit actors in its 2020 National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing. Further, and as we will discuss, correspondent banking has long had a troubled status: such accounts are simultaneously necessary to the world economy but also regarded as higher risk from an AML perspective. As a real-world example, an alleged lack of diligence regarding the risks posed by correspondent bank accounts played a prominent role in the major alleged AML failures suffered by Westpac, Australia’s second-largest retail bank, which contributed to the bank recently agreeing to a whopping $1.3 billion penalty for violating Australia’s AML/CTF Act.
Internal Investigation Report Stresses Lack of Intentional Misconduct – But the Investigation May BroadenWestpac Banking Corporation (“Westpac”), Australia’s second largest retail bank, has been besieged by serious allegations of violating Australia’s Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) and Counter-Terrorism Financing (“CTF”) Act. Just as Westpac was attempting to put some of these problems behind it, new potential AML/CTF problems have come to light.
In this post, we discuss what to expect for Westpac going forward, and the potential broadening of Australian regulator’s investigation into Westpac – a recent revelation quickly coming on the heels of Westpac’s public release on June 4 of the findings by the bank’s own internal investigation report into allegations that systemic compliance failures resulted in Westpac committing over 23 million breaches of Australia’s AML/CTF laws, pertaining in part to financial transactions involving alleged child exploitation. We previously have blogged on these alleged breaches (and the Statement of Claim brought by AUSTRAC, Australia’s AML/CTF regulator, stemming from those breaches), as well as on the private securities suits that followed these serious revelations.
The headline finding in the internal investigation report — which has been criticized — was its conclusion that the significant AML/CTF violations and failures it admitted were “due to technology failings and human error,” and that “[t]here was no evidence of intentional wrongdoing.” Consistent with a theme that emerges in many AML scandals, the lack of adequate and sufficiently trained personnel has been a key factor here. Likewise, the Westpac internal investigation report also underscores the limits of automated AML/CFT systems. Ultimately, any AML/CFT program is only as good as the people running it.
Continue Reading Westpac’s Alleged AML Failures Back in the News
On May 28, 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) unsealed a 50-page indictment against 28 North Korean and 5 Chinese bankers accused of using more than 250 front companies to obscure $2.5 billion in illicit financial dealings (“the Indictment”). The complex and far-flung scheme purportedly involved covert branches of North Korea’s state-owned Foreign Trade Bank (“FTB”)—all opened in foreign countries in an attempt to access the U.S. financial system, and to circumvent sanctions intended to guard against threats to national security, foreign policy, and the U.S. economy. The Indictment charges the individuals with conspiring to launder money, violations of the “international” prong of the money laundering statute (about which we have blogged), bank fraud, and violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
Although the Indictment is interesting standing alone, it also represents the latest in a series of enforcement actions involving North Korea and the U.S. financial system.
Continue Reading 28 North Korean and 5 Chinese Bankers Accused of a $2.5 Billion Laundering Scheme
First in a Two-Post SeriesThe U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) has issued its 2020 National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing (“2020 Strategy”). This document sets forth the key priorities of the U.S. government regarding enforcement of the Bank Secretary Act (“BSA”), and the furthering of the government’s Anti-Money-Laundering (“AML”) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (“CFT”) goals in general. It is lengthy document addressing numerous issues – albeit in a relatively high-level fashion in regards to any specific issue.
In this post, we will summarize the findings and recommendations of the 2020 Strategy, and will highlight some topics this blog has followed closely – including calls for: increased transparency into beneficial ownership; strengthening international regulation and coordination, and modernization of the AML/BSA regime. Our next post will focus on the 2020 Strategy as it relates to combating money laundering relating to real estate transactions and “gatekeeper” professions, such as lawyers, real estate professionals and other financial professionals, including broker-dealers.
The 2020 Strategy also focuses on several other important issues which we will not discuss in this limited blog series, but on which we certainly have blogged before, including the role of money laundering in international trade, casinos, money services businesses and digital assets.
Continue Reading Treasury Department’s 2020 National Illicit Finance Strategy: Aspirations for BSA/AML Modernization and the Combatting of Key Threats
AML Scandals Seem to Inevitably Spawn Investor LawsuitsAs we recently blogged, Westpac, Australia’s second-largest retail bank, has been embroiled in a scandal arising from approximately 23 million alleged breaches of Australia’s anti-money laundering/countering terrorist financing (“AML/CTF”) laws and regulations involving nearly $12 billion in transactions. The scandal broke on November 20, 2019 when the Federal Court of Australia filed a Statement of Claim (“SOC”) detailing how Westpac allegedly failed to monitor transactions involving its correspondent banks that, in turn, facilitated child exploitation abroad.
In this post, we discus the Westpac scandal, its massive consequences and the details of follow-on private securities litigation, including in U.S. courts. As we further discuss, the same legal threats continue to bedevil Dankse Bank, the center of the world’s largest AML scandal.
Continue Reading Investors Bring 10b-5 Action Against Westpac Over Money Laundering Scandal
On November 20, 2019, AUSTRAC, Australia’s anti money-laundering (“AML”) and counter-terrorism financing (“CTF”) regulator, initiated an action in the Federal Court of Australia seeking civil penalty orders against Westpac Banking Corporation (“Westpac”), Australia’s second largest retail bank, alleging systemic failures to comply with Australia’s AML-CTF laws. Specifically, AUSTRAC alleges over 23 million breaches of those laws, including activity involving potential child exploitation. As we will discuss, the bank has taken, and continues to take, several steps to try to mitigate and contain the scandal’s consequences.
AUSTRAC’s Statement of Claim focuses on Westpac’s correspondent banking relationships with financial institutions in other countries. Correspondent banking relationships require increased due diligence efforts because of the inherent money laundering and terrorism financing risks associated with cross border movement of funds; dealing with banks in high risk jurisdictions, doing business with banks who themselves do business in, or with, sanctioned or high risk countries; and the limited information about the identity and source of funds of customers of the correspondent banks.
Continue Reading Westpac Banking Corporation Faces Money Laundering Scandal in the Land Down Under
On November 12, 2019, FinCEN issued its latest Advisory on the Financial Action Task Force-Identified Jurisdictions with Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism Deficiencies and Relevant Actions by the United States Government. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is a 39-member intergovernmental body, including the United States, that establishes international standards to combat money laundering, the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). As part of its listing and monitoring process to ensure compliance with its international Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) standards, the FATF identifies certain jurisdictions as having “strategic deficiencies” in their AML/CFT regimes.
In its latest Advisory, FinCEN notes the changes in the FATF-named jurisdictions and directs financial institutions to consider these changes when reviewing their obligations and risk-based policies, procedures and practices relating to the named jurisdictions. We will discuss these changes and suggest some practical takeaways for U.S. financial institutions seeking to ensure compliance with these changes in their AML programs.
Continue Reading FinCEN Issues Advisory on Foreign Jurisdictions with AML Deficiencies
On October 25, 2019, FinCEN issued a final rule imposing the Fifth Special Measure against the Islamic Republic of Iran as a “jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern” (“Final Rule”) under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT ACT. The Final Rule will prohibit the opening or maintaining of a correspondent bank account in the U.S. for, or on behalf of, an Iranian financial institution. It also will prohibit the correspondent accounts of foreign financial institutions at covered U.S. financial institutions from processing transactions involving Iranian financial institutions.
Continue Reading FinCEN Identifies Iran as a Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern