Six years ago, in early 2018, we blogged about the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (“FinCEN’s”) designation of ABLV Bank, AS (“ABLV”), then the second-largest bank in Latvia, as a foreign financial institution “of primary money laundering concern” pursuant
On August 27, 2024, the New York State Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) announced a consent order involving a $35 million settlement with Nordea Bank Abp (“Nordea”) for alleged significant failures related to anti-money laundering (“AML”) compliance. Nordea, headquartered in Helsinki, Finland, operates globally, including through a licensed branch in New York, which has its own AML and transaction monitoring requirements.
The enforcement action, which followed revelations from the Panama Papers leak, found that Nordea allegedly failed to conduct proper due diligence on high-risk correspondent banking relationships and maintained inadequate AML controls. According to the NYDFS, the Panama Papers implicated Nordea in aiding clients in establishing offshore shell companies in order to facilitate illicit activities.
The consent order alleges that Nordea violated New York law by allowing compliance failures in its AML program and procedures to persist. Meanwhile, Danish officials recently charged Nordea with repeatedly violating Denmark’s anti-money laundering act between 2012 and 2015, thereby exposing Nordea, potentially, to extremely significant fines. As we will discuss, although the consent order implicates many different issues, the NYDFS enforcement action represents, in part, the latest chapter in the continued fall-out from the massive AML scandal involving Dankse Bank. The consent order also highlights, once again, the particular risks posed by correspondent banking relationships, on which we repeatedly have blogged (for example, here, here, and here).
The Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) announced on June 20 that Swedbank Latvia AS (“Swedbank Latvia”), a subsidiary of Swedbank AB (“Swedbank AB”) headquartered in Riga, Latvia, agreed to pay $3,430,900 to settle its potential civil liability for 386 “apparent” violations of OFAC sanctions involving Crimea. Specifically, Swedbank Latvia allegedly allowed a client to initiate payments from Crimea through an e-banking platform that ultimately were processed by a U.S. correspondent bank. The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that Swedbank Latvia’s conduct was “non-egregious” – but not voluntarily self-disclosed.
Although unrelated to this OFAC action, Swedbank Latvia was the topic of a 2019 internal investigation report commissioned by Swedbank AB revealing that from before 2007 through 2016, Swedbank Latvia (and Swedbank Estonia) actively pursued certain high-risk customers as a business strategy. This conduct, related to the Danske Bank scandal and its now-notorious Estonian Branch, resulted in Swedish and Estonian authorities ordering Swedbank AB in 2020 to pay a record 4 billion Swedish Krona (then, approximately $38 million) in anti-money laundering related penalties.
This OFAC enforcement action involves alleged conduct which occurred even before Russia’s 2022 unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the ensuing host of expanded U.S. sanctions, and the recent drive by U.S. regulators and prosecutors to combat the attempted evasion of Russia sanctions and export controls. The enforcement action reflects how OFAC can learn of potential sanctions violations through other financial institutions. It also emphasizes, once again, some of the risks inherent in providing correspondent bank services to foreign banks, and the need for good communication between U.S. and foreign banks. It further reflects the need for a financial institution (or any company) to integrate customer data into a sanctions compliance program, keep up to date on evolving sanctions, and pursue potential red flags of non-compliance – including in the face of customer representations of compliance.
Continue Reading Swedbank Latvia Settles with OFAC for Apparent Crimea Sanctions Violations
The Department of Treasury (“DOT”) recently released its first ever strategy report (the “Strategy”) on the topic of de-risking, taking the form of a 54-page document that combines a summary of the problem of de-risking with an overview of recommended steps to solve it. While the Strategy is the first document of its kind issued by the U.S. government, it is not unexpected – Section 6215 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (“AMLA”) requires the DOT to develop a strategy to mitigate the adverse effects of de-risking after conducting interviews with regulators, non-profit organizations and other public and private stakeholders.
As we’ve discussed over the years, “de-risking” is a practice taken by financial institutions (FIs) to restrict certain categories of customers from accessing their services – typically due to the perception that the compliance risk associated with such customers would outweigh the benefits, financial or otherwise, of servicing them. It is important to note that the concept of de-risking is not about a customer’s individual risk profile; rather, de-risking involves a FI making a wholesale or indiscriminate determination about a category of customers, and failing to use an individualized risk-based approach favored by the anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regulatory framework. As we have discussed, and as global watchdog groups have noted, de-risking often has a disproportionate impact on developing countries. The Strategy itself notes that de-risking “prevent[s] low- and middle-income segments of the population, as well as other underserved communities, from efficiently accessing the financial system[.]” Thus, the issue of de-risking is intertwined with concerns regarding economic and ethnic disparities.
As the Strategy notes, de-risking also can undermine development, humanitarian and disaster relief funds flowing to other countries. Finally, de-risking can threaten the U.S. financial system because driving funds outside of the regulated financial system makes it harder to detect and deter illicit finance, and increases the risk of sanctions evasion.
According to the Strategy, the profit motive of FIs is the main driver behind the ongoing problem of de-risking: because the cost of compliance for risky categories of customers would be too high, FIs cannot justify providing services to them from a profitability perspective.
Arguably, this claim in the Strategy suffers from, at best, a certain lack of self-awareness and, at worst, a degree of hypocrisy, used to deflect a Congressional demand that the DOT address and ameliorate the problem of de-risking. Increasingly onerous BSA/AML regulations, the occasionally haphazard enforcement of those regulations, and the practical disconnect between the expectations of AML examiners and law enforcement agents arguably represent the true source of the compliance-related fears and costs that drive FIs to de-risk. If banks and other FIs are rejecting certain customers wholesale, it’s often because they fear that they will get “dinged” during a regulatory examination for servicing such customers if perceived problems develop after the application of 20/20 hindsight, and because the compliance hoops can range from the onerous to the practically impossible. Similar considerations are partially why FIs now file over four million Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) annually, regardless of whether any given SAR is actually helpful to law enforcement: no one has been subjected to an enforcement action for filing too many SARs.
Continue Reading Department of Treasury Issues Strategy on De-Risking
On April 19, 2023, the United States Supreme Court issued a highly-anticipated decision in the case of Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S., aka Halkbank v. United States. The court ruled that Turkish state-owned Halkbank remained subject to criminal prosecution in U.S. courts under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) for fraud, money laundering and sanctions-related charges related to the bank’s alleged participation in a multi-billion dollar scheme to evade U.S. sanctions involving Iran. Specifically, in a seven to two decision, the Court held that the FSIA does not provide foreign states and their instrumentalities with immunity from U.S. criminal proceedings. However, the Court remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to determine whether Halkbank still can claim sovereign immunity under common law principles. The Court’s opinion clearly extends beyond just financial institutions owned by foreign governments, and instead implicates any number of foreign state-owned entities.
Continue Reading Supreme Court Rules Halkbank is Not Immune from Prosecution Under FSIA
We are extremely pleased to offer a podcast (here) on the legal and logistical issues facing financial institutions as they implement the regulations issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) pursuant to the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (AMLA) and the Corporate Transparency Act
Case Highlights the Role of Correspondent Bank Accounts and Circumvention of AML Programs On April 4, 2022, Magistrate Judge Zia M. Faruqui of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the government’s Application for Warrant to Seize Property Subject to Forfeiture, finding that there was probable cause to believe that the yacht Tango, a 255-foot luxury yacht allegedly owned by sanctioned Russian oligarch Viktor Vekselberg, was subject to forfeiture based on alleged violations of U.S. bank fraud, money laundering, and sanction statutes. The Tango is located in a shipyard on the Spanish island of Mallorca, and the warrant and subsequent seizure by the United States and its allies was part of Task Force KleptoCapture, an interagency law enforcement task force designed to help deploy U.S. prosecutorial and law enforcement resources to identify sanctions evasion and related criminal conduct.
Sanctions were imposed on Vekselberg and the company he founded, the Renova Group, in April 2018 by the Treasury Department. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Vekselberg was hit with new penalties by the U.S. government on March 11, 2022. These sanctions were pursuant to various Executive Orders under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) imposed against persons responsible for or complicit in certain activities with respect to Ukraine.
Continue Reading Russian Oligarch’s Yacht Subject to Forfeiture Based on Alleged Violations of Bank Fraud, Money Laundering, and U.S. Sanction Statutes
The Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in a recent 27-page decision, held that Halkbank, the state-owned Turkish lender, cannot claim sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) in a money laundering and sanctions-related prosecution. Upholding a decision by U.S. District Judge Richard M. Berman, the court ruled that even if the FSIA could shield the bank in a criminal case, the charges against Halkbank fall under the “commercial activity” exception to FSIA immunity. This interpretation of the commercial activity exception significantly limits the immunity bestowed under the FSIA in criminal cases and furthers American deterrence against foreign financial institutions that allegedly facilitate evasion of U.S. sanctions or launder funds through the U.S. financial system. Halkbank now faces potential trial for an alleged $20 billion money laundering scheme, bank fraud, and conspiracy charges.
Continue Reading Second Circuit Says Turkish Halkbank Must Face Criminal Charges In Money Laundering and Iran Sanctions Case
On October 21, 2021, a grand jury indictment was unsealed in the Southern District of Florida charging two Venezuelan and three Colombian citizens with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering and four counts of money laundering. The indictment revealed an alleged bribery scheme involving a former Venezuelan state governor and Venezuelan government authorities that provide food and medicine to citizens in need. A portion of the $1.6 billion in contracts secured by alleged bribes was laundered into or through the United States through a web of accounts and businesses. This indictment serves as yet another example of the United States Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) use of money laundering charges to combat corruption in Venezuela (as we have blogged about repeatedly: here, here, here, here, here and here). It also represents another example of DOJ using the money laundering statutes to charge foreign government officials at the highest levels when the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act cannot apply.
Continue Reading (More) Money Laundering Charges Announced for Alleged $1.6 Billion Venezuelan Corruption Scheme
Second Post in a Series on the FATF Plenary OutcomesAs we blogged, last month the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) held its fourth Plenary, inviting delegates from around the world to (virtually) meet and discuss a wide range of global financial crimes and ongoing risk areas. Following the Plenary, FATF identified a number of strategic initiatives for future research and publication, and issued six reports to detail their findings on specific topics. One such report, Money Laundering from Environmental Crime (the “Report”), and its implications for anti-money laundering (“AML”) and countering the financing of terrorist (“CFT”), will be the focus of this post.
The 66-page Report is compiled from case studies and best practices submitted by over 40 countries, as well as input from international organizations like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. While this Report is the first deep dive into environmental crimes and recommendations for members of the FATF Global Network, it is not the first time FATF has addressed environmental issues. The current Report aims to build upon FATF’s previous study on money laundering and the illegal wildlife trade, on which we also blogged. The current Report is also connected to earlier FATF studies on money laundering risks from the gold trade and the diamond trade. Indeed, the Report references U.S. enforcement cases involving money laundering and gold or diamonds on which we previously have blogged (see here, here and here).
As this post will discuss, these areas of money laundering risk are often overlooked and are especially difficult to monitor. Further, the Report finds that “[l]imited cooperation between AML/CFT authorities and environmental crime and protection agencies in most countries presents a major barrier to effectively tackle [money laundering] from environmental crimes.” Stated otherwise, government AML/financial flow experts and government environmental law experts don’t understand or even consider each other’s area of expertise, and often don’t communicate with each other, resulting in missed enforcement opportunities. With global environmental crimes generating up to $281 billion per year, the Report suggests that government interventions are not proportionate to the severity of this issue. By issuing this Report, FATF hopes to raise awareness of the scope and scale of harm caused by environmental crimes and related money laundering, and enhance collaboration by financial crime and environmental crime enforcement officials.
Continue Reading FATF Issues First-Ever Report on Environmental Crime and Money Laundering