Anti-Money Laundering (AML)

FCA Applies Penalty Formulas, Including Thirty Percent Reduction for Early Agreement by Bank

U.K. Enforcement System Provides Contrast to More Open-Ended U.S. System

On June 17, 2020, the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”), the non-governmental financial regulator in the United Kingdom, issued a Final Notice to Commerzbank London (the “Bank”), a branch of the large German business bank, assessing it £37.8 million for systemic failures to establish and effectively maintain an anti-money laundering (“AML”) program.

This was not the first large assessment for Commerzbank relating to AML. In 2015, Commerzbank AG and its U.S. affiliate entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice to forfeit $563 million and pay a $79 million fine for violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”). The FCA noted this fact as an aggravating factor in determining the financial penalty for the Bank.

Despite the egregious nature of the alleged violations, the FCA still provided a 30% discount pursuant to its executive settlement procedures in light of the Bank’s agreement to resolve the matter at an early stage. Without the discount, the financial penalty would have been £54,007,800.

The Final Notice underscores the relatively formulaic penalty regime of the FCA, which presumably provides the value of (some) predictability for industry. It also provides an interesting foil to U.S. enforcement regarding AML violations and the resulting penalties. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, has no formal and mechanistic system for adjusting financial penalties for AML violations. The closest U.S. counterpart appears to be general U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) guidance regarding the prosecution of corporations, and the factors set forth by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines regarding the sentencing of convicted corporate defendants.
Continue Reading UK Regulator Fines Commerzbank London £37.8 Million for AML Violations

On May 18, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued an Advisory “to alert financial institutions to rising medical scams related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This [A]dvisory contains red flags, descriptions of COVID-19 related medical scams, and information on reporting suspicious activity.” According to FinCEN, “[t]his is the first of several advisories FinCEN intends to issue concerning financial crimes related to the COVID-19 pandemic.” A Spanish-language version of the Advisory is here.  FinCEN also issued a companion Notice to the Advisory that “provides detailed filing instructions for financial institutions, which will serve as a reference for future COVID-19 advisories.”

Although FinCEN has made clear that future advisories will follow, the May 18 Advisory and Notice are themselves the latest in a string of prior pronouncements by FinCEN relating to the global pandemic. As we have blogged, FinCEN updated its March 16, 2020 COVID-19 Notice for the stated reason of assisting “financial institutions in complying with their Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) obligations during the COVID-19 pandemic, and announc[ing] a direct contact mechanism for urgent COVID-19-related issues.” FinCEN, of course, is not the only regulatory body addressing Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) issues implicated by COVID-19. As we also have blogged, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) recently issued a paper entitled “Covid-19-Related Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing – Risk and Policy Responses” This FATF Paper follows up on the April 1, 2020 statement issued by FATF’s President on COVID-19 and measures to combat illicit financing.

The Advisory is surprisingly specific when describing the possible scams and potential red flags that FinCEN believes that financial institutions should be monitoring for in order to detect, prevent, and report such suspicious activity. In addition to providing a list of red flags, the Advisory provides specific case studies demonstrating the real-world concerns surrounding these scams. Although this level of detail is helpful to financial institutions when integrating the Advisory into their own programs, it also seems to impose potential heightened due diligence requirements on financial institutions when dealing with companies engaged in providing medical services and supplies.
Continue Reading FinCEN Issues Advisory on Medical Scams Relating to COVID-19

We are very pleased to announce that we have published a detailed chapter, The Intersection of Money Laundering and Real Estate, in Anti-Money Laundering Laws and Regulations 2020, a publication issued by International Comparative Legal Guides (ICLG).

Money laundering and anti-money laundering concerns relating to the real estate industry is a topic on which

We are really pleased to be moderating the Practising Law Institute’s 2020 Anti-Money Laundering Conference on May 12, 2020, starting at 9 a.m. Perhaps needless to say, this year’s conference will be entirely virtual.  But the conference still should be as informative, interesting and timely as always.  Our conference co-chair, Nicole S. Healy of Ropers

The COVID-19 pandemic has created a perfect storm for money laundering and fraud. As we have blogged, financial institutions subject to the Bank Secrecy Act are facing increased incidents of fraud and must catch and report suspicious or illegal activity while compliance teams face potentially reduced staff and are trying to work remotely. The

We are pleased to offer the latest episode in Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Monitor Podcast series — a weekly podcast focusing on the consumer finance issues that matter most, from new product development and emerging technologies to regulatory compliance and enforcement and the ramifications of private litigation.

In this podcast, we examine two recent OCC

Danske Bank: “If we’re going down, you’re coming with us.”

First Post in a Two-Post Series

On March 19, 2020, Swedbank received the first of what will likely be multiple sanctions regarding alleged deficiencies in its Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) processes and mishandling of information exchanges with public investigations. At the conclusion of parallel investigations by Swedish and Estonian authorities, Swedbank AB must now pay a record 4 billion Swedish Krona ($38 million) and its subsidiary, Swedbank AS, has been ordered to improve its AML risk control systems to comply with the applicable requirements. These penalties are all prelude to the ongoing investigations by the Latvian Police Department, European Central Bank, Swedish Economic Crime Authority, several United States authorities and, presumably, the inevitable private securities litigation to come.

In this post, we will discuss the various public AML-related investigations and enforcement actions plaguing Swedbank.  In our next post, we will discuss the details and implications of the report of internal investigation regarding these problems performed by an outside law firm at the request of Swedbank, which has made the report publicly available.  The bigger picture: the saga of Swedbank is just part of the larger and seemingly non-stop AML debacle centered around Danske Bank and its now-notorious Estonian Branch.
Continue Reading AML Problems Plague Swedbank

First in a Two-Post Series

The U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) has issued its 2020 National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing (“2020 Strategy”). This document sets forth the key priorities of the U.S. government regarding enforcement of the Bank Secretary Act (“BSA”), and the furthering of the government’s Anti-Money-Laundering (“AML”) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (“CFT”) goals in general. It is lengthy document addressing numerous issues – albeit in a relatively high-level fashion in regards to any specific issue.

In this post, we will summarize the findings and recommendations of the 2020 Strategy, and will highlight some topics this blog has followed closely – including calls for: increased transparency into beneficial ownership; strengthening international regulation and coordination, and modernization of the AML/BSA regime. Our next post will focus on the 2020 Strategy as it relates to combating money laundering relating to real estate transactions and “gatekeeper” professions, such as lawyers, real estate professionals and other financial professionals, including broker-dealers.

The 2020 Strategy also focuses on several other important issues which we will not discuss in this limited blog series, but on which we certainly have blogged before, including the role of money laundering in international trade, casinos, money services businesses and digital assets.
Continue Reading Treasury Department’s 2020 National Illicit Finance Strategy: Aspirations for BSA/AML Modernization and the Combatting of Key Threats

AML Scandals Seem to Inevitably Spawn Investor Lawsuits

As we recently blogged, Westpac, Australia’s second-largest retail bank, has been embroiled in a scandal arising from approximately 23 million alleged breaches of Australia’s anti-money laundering/countering terrorist financing (“AML/CTF”) laws and regulations involving nearly $12 billion in transactions. The scandal broke on November 20, 2019 when the Federal Court of Australia filed a Statement of Claim (“SOC”) detailing how Westpac allegedly failed to monitor transactions involving its correspondent banks that, in turn, facilitated child exploitation abroad.

In this post, we discus the Westpac scandal, its massive consequences and the details of follow-on private securities litigation, including in U.S. courts. As we further discuss, the same legal threats continue to bedevil Dankse Bank, the center of the world’s largest AML scandal.
Continue Reading Investors Bring 10b-5 Action Against Westpac Over Money Laundering Scandal

Happy New Year! And, happy birthday to Money Laundering Watch, which is entering its fourth year.

Let’s look back2019 has been yet another busy year in the world of money laundering and BSA/AML. We are highlighting 12 of our most-read blog posts, which address many of the key issues we’ve examined during