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FinCEN Issues Corresponding But Limited Extensions of Reporting Deadlines

The Fates of the CTA and Corresponding CDD Rule Remain in a State of Flux

The Fifth Circuit has granted the government’s request to stay temporarily the order and injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, which had issued a nationwide stay prohibiting enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”).

As we have blogged, on December 3, 2024, in the case of Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., et al. v. Garland, et al., the Eastern District of Texas issued an order (“Order”) granting a nationwide preliminary injunction that: (1) enjoined the CTA, including enforcement of that statute and regulations implementing its beneficial ownership information reporting requirements, and, specifically, (2) stayed all deadlines to comply with the CTA’s reporting requirements.

The Order created great uncertainty, if not chaos, because the CTA’s reporting deadline for covered entities existing prior to January 1, 2024 was January 1, 2025. The uncertainty regarding the status of the CTA was exacerbated last week during the looming federal  showdown, in which the initially proposed budget stop-gap bill included language which would have extended the CTA’s filing deadline for previously-existing covered entities by one year. But, that initial spending bill did not pass, and the spending bill which ultimately did pass did not include any language regarding the CTA.

Nonetheless, these political machinations suggest that the CTA and its implementation may face a rocky road when the new administration takes over in January 2025. The CTA could be undone by Congress, or just not enforced by a new administration. Or the implementing regulations could be revised significantly. It’s very hard to predict right now.

Continue Reading Fifth Circuit Halts Nationwide Stay of CTA Enforcement

In a closely watched and complicated case, Van Loon et al. v. Dep’t of the Treasury et al., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) cannot sanction Tornado Cash, “an open-source, crypto-transactions software protocol that facilitates anonymous transactions by obfuscating the origins and destinations of digital asset transfers.” The opinion, which reversed the ruling of the District Court, is here.  A recording of the oral argument is here. The opinion is complex but written in a very clear style.

We previously blogged on OFAC’s designation of Tornado Cash (here) and the resulting civil suit (here). We also covered the indictment returned against the alleged developers of Tornado Cash, Roman Storm and Roman Semenov, who were charged with conspiring to commit money laundering, operating an unlicensed money transmitting business, and violating sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA (here). The DOJ subsequently obtained a superseding indictment against Storm only (here); Storm’s trial currently is scheduled for April 2025). When the initial indictment was unsealed, Treasury simultaneously sanctioned Semenov, who remains outside the U.S., by adding him to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN”) List. 

These actions are a reminder that, putting aside the complex issues presented by the Fifth Circuit decision regarding OFAC’s (in)ability to sanction a technology, law enforcement and regulators still can pursue people for related alleged conduct. And, invariably, people are involved in a technology.

Continue Reading Fifth Circuit Rejects OFAC Designation of Tornado Cash Immutable Smart Contracts

A Gesture Providing Limited Solace to a Now-Defunct Bank

Riga, Latvia

Six years ago, in early 2018, we blogged about the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (“FinCEN’s”) designation of ABLV Bank, AS (“ABLV”), then the second-largest bank in Latvia, as a foreign financial institution “of primary money laundering concern” pursuant to Section 311 of the U.S.A. Patriot Act, on the stated grounds that ABLV had made money laundering a pillar of its business practices, had lax and non-existent risk mitigation and anti-money laundering (“AML”) policies, and facilitated, inter alia, transactions for individuals connected to entities involved in procurement or export of ballistic missiles by the North Korean regime. This designation effectively served to sever ABLV’s access to the U.S. financial system by restricting U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts with or on behalf of ABLV.

Last month, in an action without recent precedent, FinCEN announced that it had submitted a notice to the Federal Register withdrawing that designation. As laid out in more detail in the Notice of Withdrawal, FinCEN ascribed this reversal to “material subsequent developments” which have served to “mitigate[] the money laundering risks associated with ABLV.” Most significantly, in the wake of FinCEN’s 2018 designation, ABLV had its banking license withdrawn by the European Central Bank (“ECB”) on the basis of the ECB’s determination that the bank was failing. As a result, ABLV no longer functions as a depository institution, thus depriving it of the bulk of its utility in a money laundering scheme. More fundamentally, the bank as it existed in 2018 has been, essentially, dismantled: the Latvian government is supervising its irrevocable liquidation, and the authorities have brought criminal charges against its owners and senior management in connection with the bank’s previous illicit activities.

This FinCEN action should not be seen as existing in a vacuum; in fact, it may be viewed as another in a series of steps by the U.S. to integrate the former Soviet republics more closely with the West’s financial system by promoting anti-corruption initiatives (a stated “core national security interest” of the Biden Administration) in the face of renewed efforts by Russia to expand its sphere of influence. FinCEN’s press release makes a point of “recogniz[ing] the notable progress made by the Government of Latvia to substantially strengthen its AML/CFT regime through a series of meaningful legal and regulatory reforms of its financial sector.” The message is clear – follow through on these reforms, clean up your problem institutions, and the U.S. will notice and respond accordingly.

If you would like to remain updated on these issues, please click here to subscribe to Money Laundering Watch. Please click here to find out about Ballard Spahr’s Anti-Money Laundering Team.

On August 27, 2024, the New York State Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) announced a consent order involving a $35 million settlement with Nordea Bank Abp (“Nordea”) for alleged significant failures related to anti-money laundering (“AML”) compliance. Nordea, headquartered in Helsinki, Finland, operates globally, including through a licensed branch in New York, which has its own AML and transaction monitoring requirements.

The enforcement action, which followed revelations from the Panama Papers leak, found that Nordea allegedly failed to conduct proper due diligence on high-risk correspondent banking relationships and maintained inadequate AML controls.  According to the NYDFS, the Panama Papers implicated Nordea in aiding clients in establishing offshore shell companies in order to facilitate illicit activities.

The consent order alleges that Nordea violated New York law by allowing compliance failures in its AML program and procedures to persist.  Meanwhile, Danish officials recently charged Nordea with repeatedly violating Denmark’s anti-money laundering act between 2012 and 2015, thereby exposing Nordea, potentially, to extremely significant fines.  As we will discuss, although the consent order implicates many different issues, the NYDFS enforcement action represents, in part, the latest chapter in the continued fall-out from the massive AML scandal involving Dankse Bank.  The consent order also highlights, once again, the particular risks posed by correspondent banking relationships, on which we repeatedly have blogged (for example, here, here, and here).

Continue Reading NYDFS Imposes $35 Million Fine on Nordea Bank for Alleged AML Failures Following Panama Papers Revelations

Strategy Touts Regulations on Beneficial Ownership, Real Estate and Investment Advisers, but Bemoans Lack of Supervisory Resources for Non-Bank Financial Institutions

The U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued its 2024 National Strategy for Combatting Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing (“Strategy”).  It is a 55-page document which, according to the government’s press release, “addresses the key risks from the 2024 National Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Proliferation Financing Risk Assessments. . . and details how the United States will build on recent historic efforts to modernize the U.S. anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, enhance operational effectiveness in combating illicit actors, and embrace technological innovation to mitigate risks.”

The Strategy discusses an enormous list of topics.  Given the breadth of its scope, the Strategy generally makes only very high-level comments regarding any particular topic.  This post accordingly is extremely high level as well, and offers only a few select comments. 

Continue Reading Treasury Issues Broad National Strategy for Combatting Illicit Financing

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) recently issued a Financial Trend Analysis (“Analysis”) focusing on patterns and trends identified in Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) data linked to Elder Financial Exploitation (“EFE”) involving scams or theft perpetrated against older adults.

The Analysis is a follow up to FinCEN’s June 2022 EFE Advisory (“2022 Advisory”). The Analysis reviews BSA reports filed between June 15, 2022 and June 15, 2023 that either used the key term referenced in the 2022 Advisory (“EFE FIN-2022-A002”) or checked “Elder Financial Exploitation” as a suspicious activity type.  In its 2022 Advisory, FinCEN warned financial institutions (“FIs”) about the rising trend of EFE, which FinCEN defines as “the illegal or improper use of an older adult’s funds, property, or assets, and is often perpetrated either through theft or scams.” The 2022 Advisory identified 12 “behavioral” and 12 “financial” red flags to help FIs detect, prevent, and report suspicious activity connected to EFE. Additionally, FinCEN recommended EFE victims file incident reports to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) and the Federal Trade Commission. Consistent with a risk-based approach to BSA compliance, FinCEN encouraged FIs to perform additional due diligence where appropriate.

Continue Reading FinCEN Issues Analysis of Increasing Elder Financial Exploitation

Years in the making, on February 13, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”) to include “investment adviser” (“IA”) within the definition of “financial institution” under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”). FinCEN has posted a fact sheet on the NPRM here.

The NPRM subjects broad categories of IAs to statutory and regulatory anti-money laundering/countering terrorist financing (“AML/CTF”) compliance obligations. FinCEN is accepting comments on the NPRM until April 15, 2024.

Continue Reading FinCEN Seeks to Make Investment Advisers Subject to Bank Secrecy Act

A Huge Monetary Penalty for Sprawling Allegations – But Will Zhao Receive a Prison Sentence?

As the world now knows, Binance Holdings Limited, doing business as Binance.com (“Binance” or the “Company”), has entered into a plea agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”).  

Binance is registered in the Cayman Islands and regarded as the world’s largest virtual currency exchange. It agreed to plead guilty to conspiring to willfully violating the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) by failing to implement and maintain an effective anti-money laundering (“AML”) program; knowingly failing to register as a money services business (“MSB”); and willfully causing violations of U.S. economic sanctions issued pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”). Despite the plea agreement, Binance will continue to operate.

Changpeng Zhao, also known as “CZ,” also pleaded guilty to violating the BSA by failing to implement and maintain an effective AML program. Zhao is Binance’s primary founder, majority owner, and – until now – CEO. As part of his plea agreement, Zhao has stepped down as the CEO, although he apparently will keep his shares in Binance.

As part of its plea agreement, Binance has agreed to forfeit $2,510,650,588 and to pay a criminal fine of $1,805,475,575 for a total criminal penalty of $4,316,126,163. Binance also entered into related civil consent orders with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), and the Office of Foreign Assets Controls (“OFAC”). Zhao also entered into a consent order with the CFTC.

The allegations are vast and detailed, and much digital ink already has been spilled regarding this matter. Our discussion therefore will be relatively high-level. Distilled, the government alleges that Binance – under the direction of Zhao – tried to hide the fact that it operated in the U.S., purposefully avoided any meaningful AML compliance, and consequently laundered many millions of dollars’ worth of cryptocurrency involving extremely serious criminal conduct, including terrorism, child pornography, and U.S. sanctions evasion.

As for Zhao, and as we will discuss, whether he will go to prison – and if so, for how long – is an open and very interesting question. His sentencing currently is scheduled for February 23, 2024.

Continue Reading Binance Settles Criminal and Civil AML and Sanctions Enforcement Actions for Multiple Billions – While its Founder, Owner and Former CEO Zhao Pleads Guilty to Single AML Crime

On October 23, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) published a notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”) entitled Proposal of Special Measure Regarding Convertible Virtual Currency Mixing, as a Class of Transactions of Primary Money Laundering Concern.  Section 311 of the Patriot Act, codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318A (“Section 311”), grants the Secretary of the Treasury authority – which has been delegated to FinCEN – to require domestic financial institutions and agencies to take certain “special measures” if FinCEN finds that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that one or more classes of transactions within or involving a jurisdiction outside of the United States is of “primary money laundering concern.” 

In this NPRM, FinCEN proposes to designate under Section 311 all convertible virtual currency (“CVC”) mixing transactions, as defined by the NPRM.  This designation would require imposing reporting and recordkeeping requirements upon covered financial institutions (“FIs”) regarding transactions occurring by, through, or to a FI when the FI “knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect” that the transaction involves CVC mixing.

The NPRM is complicated and raises complex questions.  We only summarize here, and note selected issues.  Comments are due on January 22, 2024.  FinCEN can expect many comments.

Continue Reading FinCEN Proposes to Require Recordkeeping and Reporting for CVC Mixing Transactions

Complex Civil and Criminal Cases Converge

On August 17, 2023, Judge Robert Pitman of the federal district court for the Western District of Texas issued an Order granting summary judgment for the U.S. Treasury Department (“Treasury”) in a lawsuit brought by six individuals, and denying the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by the individuals. The lawsuit alleged that Treasury overstepped its authority by imposing sanctions on the coin mixing service Tornado Cash.  Deciding for the government, Judge Pitman determined that Tornado Cash is a “person” that may be designated by OFAC sanctions.  Specifically, the regulatory definition of “person” includes an “association,” and Tornado Cash is an “association” within its ordinary meaning.

Shortly thereafter, on August 23, 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) unsealed an indictment returned in the Southern District of New York against the alleged developers of Tornado Cash, Roman Storm (“Storm”), a naturalized citizen residing in the U.S., and Roman Semenov (“Semenov”), a Russian citizen.  The indictment charges them with conspiring to commit money laundering, operate an unlicensed money transmitting business, and commit sanctions violations involving the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA.  When the indictment was unsealed, Storm was arrested and then released pending trial.  Treasury simultaneously sanctioned Semenov, who remains outside of the U.S., adding him to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN”) List.

These are very complicated cases raising complicated issues.  They are separate but obviously related.  As we will discuss, the factual and legal issues tend to blend together, and how a party characterizes an issue says a lot about their desired outcome:  has the government taken incoherent action against a technology, or has it pursued a group of people attempting to hide behind tech?

Continue Reading All Roads Lead to Roman: Alleged Tornado Cash Co-Founders Roman Storm Arrested and Roman Semenov Sanctioned, Days After Treasury Defeats Lawsuit Challenging OFAC