Know Your Customer (KYC)

First Post in a Two-Post Series on Recent FATF Activity

Members presumably working from home, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) was active last week, first issuing its 3rd Enhanced Follow-up Report & Technical Compliance Re-Rating of the United States’s Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (“CTF”) (the “United States Report”) measures and, later, a statement from its President on COVID-19 and measures to combat illicit financing (the “Statement”).

In this post, we will discuss FATF’s Statement on the Coronavirus. In our next post, we will address FATF’s United States Report.

The Statement, issued on April 1, 2020, functions as both a high-level reminder to financial institutions of methods for continuing to carry-out know-your-customer (“KYC”) and other AML obligations while “facing confinement or strict social-distancing measures” and a warning to financial institutions to remain vigilant to increases in fraudulent activity – and resulting money laundering – so often associated with crises like the current Coronavirus pandemic.

The thrust of the Statement is an acknowledgement that the Coronavirus pandemic has created a perfect storm for money laundering where rapid and high-volume financial transactions from myriad sources for myriad purposes are occurring simultaneously with the almost spontaneous and enormous downsizing in personnel to monitor those transactions as many AML professionals shelter from home. Indeed, we recently blogged on this very threat posed by COVID-19 to financial institutions’ AML and anti-fraud systems (that is, the combination of increased fraud and a reduced capacity to guard against it) when discussing FinCEN’s latest pronouncement on COVID-19 issues.
Continue Reading  Financial Action Task Force Update: Statement on COVID-19’s Implications for AML Programs

AMA Details Components of a Strong AML/BSA Program for the Gaming Industry

Earlier this month, the American Gaming Association (“AGA”) released an updated Best Practices for Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) Compliance (“Best Practices Guidance”) reflecting a heightened focus on risk assessment as well as Know Your Customer/Customer Due Diligence measures for the gaming industry.  This update amends the industry’s first set of comprehensive best practices for AML compliance, issued in 2014.  At the time, the best practices were well-received by the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”).  These updated Best Practices have drawn from recent FinCEN guidance and enforcement actions, the Treasury Department’s National Money Laundering Risk Assessment, and the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (“OFAC”) updated compliance guidelines and provide detailed guidance regarding how the industry can continue to be “a leader in compliance.”

Continue Reading  AMA Updates AML Best Practices for AML Compliance

Second Post in a Two-Post Series

As we blogged yesterday, the issue of the beneficial ownership of entities and the potentially pernicious role of shell companies in perpetuating money laundering is the primary anti-money laundering (“AML”) concern across the globe for both enforcement officials and the financial industry.  Consistent with this concern, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”), an international and intergovernmental AML watchdog group, has issued a document entitled “Best Practices on Beneficial Ownership for Legal Persons,” (“Best Practices Guidance”) which urges countries to use multiple methods to identify accurately and timely the beneficial owners of legal entities, and sets forth some high-level recommendations.  Meanwhile, and as we just blogged, the U.S. House passed H.R. 2513, a two-part Act which sets forth in its initial section the Corporate Transparency Act, or CTA. If enacted, the CTA would require certain, defined U.S. companies to report identifying information regarding their beneficial owners to the Treasury Department – so that such information would be available to both the government and financial institutions carrying out their own AML duties.

However, it has been difficult to implement in practice beneficial ownership requirements in countries that already create repositiories of such information for law enforcement to access — as envisioned by the CTA.  The FAFT Best Practices Guidance represents an evaluation of historical efforts by the member countries’ approaches to the collection and maintenance of beneficial ownership information, followed by certain recommendations for going forward.
Continue Reading  FATF Issues Best Practices Guidance on Beneficial Ownership Information

U.S. House Passes Corporate Transparency Act; FATF Issues Guidance on Identifying Entities’ Beneficial Owners

First Post in a Two-Post Series on Beneficial Ownership

As we often blog, the issue of the beneficial ownership of entities and the potentially pernicious role of shell companies in perpetuating money laundering is the primary anti-money laundering (“AML”) concern across the globe for both enforcement officials and the financial industry.

Consistent with this concern, and within a single week, both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”), an international and intergovernmental AML watchdog group, recently took notable steps in the fight against the misuse of shell companies. Specifically, on October 23 the House passed H.R. 2513, a two-part Act which sets forth in its initial section the Corporate Transparency Act, or CTA. If passed into legislation, the CTA would require certain, defined U.S. companies to report identifying information regarding their beneficial owners to the Treasury Department – so that such information would be available to both the government and financial institutions carrying out their own AML duties. Meanwhile, FATF has issued a detailed document entitled “Best Practices on Beneficial Ownership for Legal Persons,” (“Best Practices Guidance”) which urges countries to use multiple methods to identify accurately and timely the beneficial owners of legal entities, and sets forth some high-level recommendations.

Today, we will discuss the CTA. Tomorrow, we will discuss FATF’s Best Practices Guidance, which approaches the problem of beneficial ownership from a different angle – the Guidance and its recommendations represent an evaluation of historical efforts by the member countries’ approaches to the collection and maintenance of beneficial ownership information in countries that already create repositiories of such information for law enforcement, as envisioned by the CTA.
Continue Reading  Shell Company Update: Congress and FATF Target Beneficial Ownership

The Issue of Who Truly Runs and Owns Entities Contines to Gnaw at Congress and Law Enforcement

First Post in a Two-Post Series on the ILLICIT CASH Act

On June 10, a bipartisan group of lawmakers in the U.S. Senate released a discussion draft of legislation proposing to overhaul the nation’s anti-money laundering (“AML”) laws. The discussion draft, titled The Improving Laundering Laws and Increasing Comprehensive Information Tracking of Criminal Activity in Shell Holdings (ILLICIT CASH) Act (“the Act”), is very detailed and sets forth many proposed changes to the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) over the course of 102 pages.

In this post, we will focus on a key provision of the Act, which sets forth a version of the now-familiar requirement aimed directly at tracking the beneficial ownership (“BO”) of U.S. entities. In our next post on the Act, we will summarize its many other provisions.
Continue Reading  Lawmakers Renew Effort to Overhaul AML Laws, Including Greater Beneficial Ownership Transparency

We are pleased to offer the latest episode in Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Monitor Podcast series — a weekly podcast focusing on the consumer finance issues that matter most, from new product development and emerging technologies to regulatory compliance and enforcement and the ramifications of private litigation.  Our podcast discusses the conduct for which financial

Ballard Spahr is very pleased to host on December 17, 2018 at noon in our Philadelphia office a CLE program for the gaming industry and associated counsel to participate in a panel discussion with speakers from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on the latest industry trends in BSA/AML compliance and examination.

Please join us in

Former Bank Employee Testimony Highlights Limited Whistleblower Protections in Europe

In September, the Danish law firm Bruun & Hjejle’s report (“B&H Report”) released its internal investigation report into alleged money laundering conducted through the Estonian branch of Danske Bank (“Danske”). The enormity of the scandal outlined in the report cannot be understated: from 2007 through 2015, at least 200 billion Euros were laundered through Danske. The release of the B&H Report has triggered the predictable cascade of resignations, investigations, hearings, recriminations and stock plunges that have begun playing out over the past eight weeks. These events, in turn, are beginning to illuminate the two principal sides of the scandal: the institutional failures at a large, sophisticated, international bank that allegedly allowed wrongdoing on this scale to go unchecked for eight years; and the efforts countries like Russia will make – and individuals and entities they will exploit – to illegally channel substantial wealth to the West.

As we previously blogged, the B&H Report found that Danske processed 200 billion Euros in suspicious transactions made by thousands of non-resident customers, principally from Russia and former Soviet states. According to the B&H Report, the success of the laundering was due to the near-total failure of the Estonian Danske branch to implement adequate anti-money laundering (“AML”) procedures and the parent Danske Bank Group’s failure to recognize and act upon numerous red flags that should have alerted it to the Estonian branch’s issues. However, while finding that the Estonian branch violated numerous legal obligations in failing to have and implement adequate AML processes and procedures, the B&H Report stopped short of accusing Danske’s Board of Directors, Chairman, Audit Committee, Chief Executive Officer or any executive of violating their legal obligations in regard to these failures.

Recent testimony by former Danske employee turned whistleblower painted a less forgiving picture.
Continue Reading  Danske Bank Money Laundering Scandal: The Tip of the Iceberg(s)

Second Post in a Two-Part Series

NYDFS Action Highlights the Need for Good Monitoring – and Good Consultants

In part one of this two-part post, we provided some practical tips for financial institutions to increase the chances that their Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) programs will withstand regulators’ scrutiny, including: (1) promoting a culture of AML/Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) compliance; (2) focusing on transaction monitoring; (3) improving information sharing; (4) identifying and handling high-risk accounts appropriately; and (5) knowing your risks and continually improving your AML program to control those risks.

In this post we’ll discuss the consequences of potentially failing to heed these practical tips in a specific case: the New York Department of Financial Services’ (DFS) recent enforcement action against Mashreqbank. Further, we look forward to discussing all of these issues in an upcoming podcast in Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Monitor Podcast series. So please continue to stay tuned.

Mashreqbank is the oldest and largest private bank in the United Arab Emirates. Its New York branch is Mashreqbank’s only location in the United States. It offers correspondent banking and trade finance services and provides U.S. dollar clearing services to clients located in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Northern Africa. In 2016, the branch cleared more than 1.2 million USD transactions with an aggregate value of over $367 billion. In 2017, the branch cleared more than one million USD transactions with an aggregate value of over $350 billion.

The DFS enforcement action asserted that Mashreqbank’s AML/BSA program was deficient in a number of respects and that the New York branch had failed to remediate identified compliance issues. The enforcement action began with a DFS safety and soundness examine in 2016. In 2017, DFS and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) conducted a joint safety and soundness examination. DFS provided a report of its findings to which Mashreqbank submitted a response.

In a consent order signed on October 10, 2018, Mashreqbank admitted violations of New York laws and accepted a significant monetary penalty and increased oversight for deficiencies in its AML/BSA and Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) programs. Regulators pursued the enforcement action despite the New York branch’s strong cooperation and demonstrated commitment to building an effective and sustainable compliance program. Among other things, Mashreqbank agreed to pay a $40 million fine; to hire a third-party compliance consultant to oversee and address deficiencies in the branch’s compliance function including compliance with AML/BSA requirements; and to develop written revised AML/BSA and OFAC compliance programs acceptable to DFS.

The DFS and FRBNY examination findings demonstrate Mashreqbank’s failure to follow the practical tips identified in part one of this post. Specifically, the regulators found that Mashreqbank failed to: (1) have appropriate transition monitoring; (2) identify and handle high-risk accounts appropriately; and (3) know its risk and improve its AML program to control those risks.

Further, and as our discussion will reflect, the Mashreqbank enforcement action is also notable in two other respects. First, the alleged AML failures pertain entirely to process and the general adequacy of the bank’s AML program – whereas the vast majority of other AML/BSA enforcement actions likewise discuss system failures, they usually also point to specific substantive violations, such as the failure to file Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) regarding a particular customer or set of transactions. Second, although the use of external consultants usually represents a mitigating factor or even a potential reliance defense to financial institution defendants, the DFS turned what is typically a defense shield into a government sword and instead criticized Mashreqbank for using outside consultants who, according to DFS, were just not very rigorous. This alleged use of consultants performing superficial analysis became part of the allegations of affirmative violations against the bank, thereby underscoring how financial institutions must ensure that their AML/BSA auditors or other consultants are experienced, competent, and performing meaningful testing, particularly when addressing issues previously identified by regulators.
Continue Reading  Practical Tips in Action: The Mashreqbank AML Enforcement Action

First Post in a Two-Part Series

How do financial institutions get in trouble with their regulators? Recent AML enforcement actions suggest that the following two failures are at the heart of most of these actions: (1) inadequately identifying, monitoring and/or reporting suspicious activity; and (2) failing to implement adequate internal controls. And these same issues crop up year after year.

In this post, we’ll discuss these failures and their root causes and provide practical tips for ensuring that your AML program will withstand the scrutiny of regulators. In our next post, we will discuss how these practical tips apply in a specific AML enforcement action: the recent consent order between the New York Department of Financial Services and Mashreqbank.  Further, we look forward to discussing all of these issues in an upcoming podcast in Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Monitor Podcast series.  So please stay tuned.

The U.S. financial institutions that recently found themselves in the government’s crosshairs allegedly engaged in the following behavior:

  • Failing to investigate alerts on high-risk accounts where those accounts had been investigated previously, even when the new suspicious activity to which the bank had been alerted differed from the activity that it previously had investigated.
  • Having a policy of not investigating or filing SARs on cash withdrawals from branches near the Mexican border if the customer said they were withdrawing cash in the U.S., rather than carrying cash into the U.S. from Mexico, in order to avoid having to file a Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments (CMIR).
  • Capping the number of alerts from its transaction monitoring systems based on the number of staff available to review the alerts rather than on the risks posed by the transactions (and lying to regulators about it).
  • Failing to report the suspicious activities of a longtime customer despite having been warned that the customer was laundering the proceeds of an illegal and fraudulent scheme through accounts at the bank.
  • Failing to conduct necessary due diligence on foreign correspondent accounts.
  • A brokerage company failing to file SARs on transactions that showed signs of market manipulation.
  • A MSB’s failing to implement proper controls and discipline crooked agents because those agents were so profitable for the MSB, thereby enabling illegal schemes such as money laundering.

Although the behavior of these financial institutions may differ, the root causes of their failures do not. They include the following:

  • An inadequate, ineffective or non-existent risk assessment.
  • Elevating the business line over the compliance function.
  • Offering products or using new technologies without adequate controls in place.
  • Compliance programs that are not commensurate with the risks, often due to under investment in AML technology or other resources and/or lack of awareness of AML risks or controls.
  • Corporate silos, both human and technological, that prevent or hinder information sharing.
  • Insufficient screening of parties and relationships and lack of effective processes and controls around EDD.

So how can you ensure that your AML program is adequate? Here are some practical tips.
Continue Reading  Practical Tips for Ensuring Your AML Program Withstands the Scrutiny of Regulators