On March 7, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued an alert “advising all financial institutions to be vigilant against potential efforts to evade the expansive sanctions and other U.S.-imposed restrictions implemented in connection with the Russian Federation’s further invasion of Ukraine.” The press release is here. The alert itself is here.
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The FFIEC’S Third 2021 Update to the BSA/AML Examination Manual
On December 1, 2021, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (“FFIEC”) released updates to its Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering (BSA/AML) Examination Manual (the “Manual”), which provides guidance to examiners for evaluating a financial institution’s BSA/AML compliance program and its compliance with related regulatory requirements. This update is the third of 2021: the FFIEC also released updates to the Manual on February 25, 2021 and June 21, 2021.
This most recent update to the Manual adds a new introductory section, Introduction – Customers. The updated Manual also includes changes to sections pertaining to Charities and Nonprofit Organizations, Independent Automated Teller Machine Owners or Operators, and Politically Exposed Persons (“PEP”). The breadth of this most recent Manual update is consistent with the previous 2021 updates. In February, FFIEC released an introductory section and updates to three sections pertaining to Customer Identification Programs (“CIP”), Currency Transaction Reporting (“CTR”), and Transactions of Exempt Persons. In June, the FFIEC released updates to four sections pertaining to International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments Reporting, Purchase and Sale of Monetary Instruments Recordkeeping, Reports of Foreign Financial, and Special Measures.
Consistent with prior FFIEC Interagency press releases associated with Manual updates, the FFIEC explained that “[t]he updates should not be interpreted as new requirements or as a new or increased focus on certain areas,” but rather “provide information and considerations related to certain customers that may indicate the need for bank policies, procedures, and processes to address potential money laundering, terrorist financing, and other illicit financial activity risks.” Despite this disclaimer, the updates provide helpful insight into what examiners prioritize with regard to BSA/AML compliance.
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FinCEN and CFTC Reach Groundbreaking $100 Million AML Settlement with BitMEX
Government Alleges Systemic and Deliberate AML Failures
Filings Describe Tools for CVC Exchanges to Use for Customer Due Diligence and Transaction Monitoring
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) announced on August 10 (here and here) settlements with the operators of the BitMEX cryptocurrency trading platform for alleged anti-money laundering (“AML”) violations under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), and for allegedly failing to register with the CFTC. More specifically, FinCEN’s assessment of a civil monetary penalty and the CFTC’s consent order both involved the five companies operating the BitMEX platform: HDR Global Trading Limited, 100x Holding Limited, ABS Global Trading Limited, Shine Effort Inc Limited, and HDR Global Services (Bermuda) Limited (collectively, “BitMEX”).
BitMEX will pay regulators up to a combined $100 million civil monetary penalty; perform a “lookback” regarding the potential need to file additional Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”); and hire an independent consultant to conduct two reviews of BitMEX’s operations, policies, procedures, and controls, in order to confirm that BitMEX is not operating in the U.S., and that no U.S. customers are able to trade with the BitMEX platform.
According to the government filings, BitMEX is one of the oldest cryptocurrency derivative exchanges, with 1.3 million user accounts and a collection of annual fees in excess of $1 billion. Combined, the government filings allege that for a period of six years between November 2014 and October 1, 2020, BitMEX offered trading of cryptocurrency derivatives to retail and institutional customers in the U.S. and worldwide through BitMEX’s website. Customers in the U.S. placed orders to buy or sell contracts directly through the website and BitMEX was aware that U.S. customers could access the BitMEX platform via virtual private network (“VPN”).
The civil penalty will be split between FinCEN and the CFTC. However, the settlement involves an interesting “carrot” offered by the regulators: $20 million of the penalty is suspended pending the successful completion of the SAR lookback and the two independent consultant reviews.
According to the government’s allegations, BitMEX deliberately ignored for years the most basic AML requirements, resulting in multitudinous violations and inviting – and even encouraging – its customers to launder illicit funds. As we will describe, the government has alleged that BitMEX operated on the announced pretext that it was not subject to the BSA or U.S. commodities laws because it had no U.S. customers or operations, when senior management knew otherwise.
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Implementing the Corporate Transparency Act: A Guest Blog
A Guest Blog by Angelena Bradfield
Today we are very pleased to welcome guest blogger Angelena Bradfield, who is the Senior Vice President of AML/BSA, Sanctions & Privacy for the Bank Policy Institute. BPI is a nonpartisan public policy, research and advocacy group, representing the nation’s leading banks. Its members include universal banks, regional banks and the major foreign banks doing business in the United States. BPI has been engaged in efforts to modernize the U.S. anti-money laundering/ countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime for almost half a decade and worked closely with Senate and House leadership throughout the introduction and final passage of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (AML Act). Angelena previously was a Vice President at The Clearing House Association, where she supported its regulatory affairs department in similar policy areas. Before that, she supported comprehensive immigration reform efforts at ImmigrationWorks USA and worked on various domestic policy issues at the White House where she served as a staff assistant in both the Domestic Policy Council and Presidential Correspondence offices.
We reached out to Angelena regarding BPI’s recent letter to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) commenting on its implementation of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA). Congress passed the CTA on January 1, 2021, as part of the AML Act. The CTA requires certain legal entities to report their beneficial owners to a directory accessible by U.S. and foreign law enforcement and regulators. This directory also will be accessible to U.S. financial institutions seeking to comply with their own AML obligations, particularly the beneficial ownership regulation, otherwise known as the Customer Due Diligence Rule (CDD Rule), already applicable to banks and other financial institutions. The CTA’s beneficial ownership directory is one of the most important and long-awaited changes to the BSA/AML regulatory regime, but it presents many challenges, both legal and logistical. On April 5, 2021, FinCEN issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking to solicit public comment on the CTA’s implementation. In response, FinCEN received over 200 letters from industry stakeholders – including the letter from BPI.
This blog post again takes the form of a Q&A session, in which Angelena responds to questions posed by Money Laundering Watch about the CTA and how it should be implemented. We hope you enjoy this discussion on this important topic. – Peter Hardy and Shauna Pierson
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New PPP Procedural Requirements Reflect Lenders’ Emerging AML Duties
The Small Business Administration (“SBA”) recently issued a procedural notice (the “Notice”) to “All SBA Employees and Paycheck Protection Program Lenders” setting forth “Revised SBA Paycheck Protection Platform Procedures for Addressing Hold Codes on First Draw PPP Loans and Compliance Check Error Messages on First Draw PPP Loans and Second Draw PPP Loans.” The Notice sets forth procedures Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) lenders must follow in approving First or Second Draw PPP loans under the 2021 Economic Aid Act.
PPP Experience To Date
As we discussed in a recent blog post, with the third round of PPP funding currently underway, the government, through SBA and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), has begun taking steps to clarify lender compliance obligations in implementing the PPP. The onus of implementing the PPP has been on the private lenders participating in the program. The SBA reiterates this responsibility in the Notice, emphasizing, “[u]nder the CARES Act, PPP Lenders are deemed to have delegated authority to make and approve PPP loans without prior SBA review.”
While lenders have been acting with this “delegated authority” since Spring 2020, they are only now beginning to operate with answers to how it can meet their compliance obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) while quickly administering the PPP according to the parameters set forth in the CARES Act and subsequent SBA guidance. And, with a new funding round opening nearly a year after the initial rounds, the government and private sector are both grappling with sifting through and processing relevant data accumulated through the first two funding rounds.
Under the CARES Act, PPP borrowers were originally limited to obtaining a single loan. The Economic Aid Act changed that. In addition to opening a new round of PPP lending to new borrowers – “First Draw” borrowers – the Economic Aid Act permitted prior borrowers to pursue a loan – “second Draw” PPP borrowers. This expansion of the PPP program introduces lenders to a new category of borrowers: those that previously applied for and either did or did not (for whatever reason) receive a PPP loan. What does this mean for lenders from a Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering (“BSA/AML”) perspective? Information.
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FATF Identifies Red Flags for Virtual Assets and Money Laundering
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recently published a report titled Virtual Assets: Red Flag Indicators of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. The report discusses a number of red flag indicators of suspicious virtual asset (VA) activities identified “through more than one hundred case studies collected since 2017 from across the FATF Global Network, literature reviews, and open source research.” The purpose of the report is to help financial institutions (FIs), designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) to create a “risk-based approach to their Customer Due Diligence (CDD) requirements.”
The report focuses on the following six categories of red flag indicators: those (1) related to transactions, (2) related to transaction patterns, (3) related to anonymity, (4) about senders or recipients, (5) in the source of funds or wealth, and (6) related to geographical risks.
When discussing red flags relating to transactions, FATF suggests that the size and frequency of transactions can be a good indicator of suspicious activity. For example, making multiple high-value transactions in short succession (i.e. within a 24-hour period) or in a staggered and regular pattern, with no further transactions during a long period afterwards. With regard to transaction patterns, FATF notes that large initial deposits with new users or transactions involving multiple accounts should also raise suspicion.
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PPP Lenders and Fraudulent Borrowers: False Claims Act Liability and AML Risk
Can BSA/AML Requirements Lead to Deemed Knowledge of Borrower Fraud?
The first two weeks of August brought a milestone of sorts in the ongoing recovery from the economic downturn brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) ended its enrollment period on August 8, 2020 and the window for borrowers to apply to have their PPP loans forgiven opened on August 10, 2020.
The PPP was a centerpiece of the over $2 trillion Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) that, according to a study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology published on July 22, 2020 had to that point saved between 1.4 and 3.2 million jobs. Less formally observed but possibly more widely agreed, the PPP caused at least as many headaches with its rocky initial rollout and the ongoing uncertainty over applicable loan forgiveness standards. But, whereas implementing the PPP poses challenges to lenders now, due to the rampant fraud in the program (which, along with all COVID-19-related enforcement actions and policy statements, we track here) and its funding mechanics, it creates substantial downstream enforcement risk through the False Claims Act (“FCA”) for participating financial institutions.
Numerous districts already have charged borrowers with PPP-related fraud. To date, cases generally involve one of these scenarios:
- Borrowers submitted fraudulent loan applications and supporting documents to seek PPP funds for businesses that either already had failed pre-pandemic or that they did not actually own.
- Borrowers lied about amount, or even existence, of employees and payroll. These schemes involve inflated numbers of employees for companies, or even completely fake companies.
- Borrowers certified that they would use loan funds to support payroll expenses or other allowable expenses, but in fact used all or most loan funds to pay personal and non-business expenses.
The prosecutions to date have all centered on relatively obvious fraud by borrowers, not lenders. But, wider-reaching investigations are occurring and though we are very much at the beginning of the enforcement phase, the magnitude of fraud in these programs is coming into focus. On September 1, 2020, the House Select Committee on the Coronavirus Crisis released a preliminary analysis finding, among other things, over $1 billion in fraudulent PPP loans were issued and identifying red flags with respect to an additional $2.98 billion in loans made to 11,000 borrowers.
And, as we discuss, the anti-money laundering (“AML”) requirements of lenders imposed under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) may expose lenders to greater risk under the FCA, which can impose civil liability for the reduced mental state of reckless disregard. Many lenders have extended PPP loans to previously-existing customers. This is a rational business decision, given typically lower business risks presented by existing customers and lower compliance costs, because existing customers do not need to provide beneficial ownership information under the Customer Due Diligence (“CDD”) rule of the BSA. However, because lenders also are required under the BSA to understand to a degree the historical and current activities of its customers, lenders may be deemed in future FCA actions to have “known” about red flags generated by fraudulent borrowers because of information obtained by the lenders properly executing their AML programs. That is, compliance with the BSA ironically may generate evidence for downstream FCA enforcement actions based on deemed “knowledge” by the lender of borrower malfeasance. This irony may be exacerbated by any disconnect in real time between the AML compliance staff at financial institutions and the front-line business people extending loans, particularly given the incredible speed with which institutions have extended PPP loans, at the government’s urging.
The point here is not that PPP lenders will face direct regulatory liability for alleged BSA/AML failures – although they may. Rather, the point is that PPP lenders may face enhanced FCA liability due to borrower information obtained through an entirely functional BSA/AML program. This phenomenon highlights the need for the “front” and “back” offices at lenders to communicate.
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ABA Issues Formal Opinion on Lawyers as “Gatekeepers” for Client Criminality
For years, lawyers have been in the cross hairs of prosecutors and regulators, who sometimes regard lawyers as potential gatekeepers responsible for preventing wrongdoing by clients. On April 29, 2020, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) issued an important opinion (“Opinion 491”) reminding lawyers that they are responsible for conducting sufficient inquiry into the facts and circumstances of a matter a client or prospective client asks them to undertake if there is a “high probability” that the client is seeking to use the lawyer’s services to commit a crime.
As we frequently blog, there are myriad ways that lawyers can hit the tripwire and face ethical or criminal liability for professional work performed for clients. The need for lawyers to be on guard against potential money laundering activity by clients is a primary focus of Opinion 491.
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Financial Action Task Force Grades America’s AML Compliance
Second Post in a Two-Post Series on Recent FATF Activity
As we just blogged, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) issued a statement from its President on COVID-19 and measures to combat illicit financing during the pandemic (the “Statement”). Before turning its attention to COVID-19, however, FATF issued a more traditional report, and one with potentially longer-term implications: its 3rd Enhanced Follow-up Report & Technical Compliance Re-Rating of the United States’s Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (“CTF”) (the “United States Report”) measures. The United States Report was the third follow-up on a mutual evaluation report of the United States that was adopted in October 2016. During the first two evaluations, “certain technical compliance deficiencies” were identified. The United States Report evaluates the United States efforts’ in addressing those deficiencies. Moreover, FATF evaluated the United States’ progress in implementing new recommendations since February 2016.
FATF’s judgment: The United States has improved, particularly in the area of customer due diligence and the identification of beneficial ownership.
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Financial Action Task Force Update: Statement on COVID-19’s Implications for AML Programs
First Post in a Two-Post Series on Recent FATF Activity
Members presumably working from home, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) was active last week, first issuing its 3rd Enhanced Follow-up Report & Technical Compliance Re-Rating of the United States’s Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (“CTF”) (the “United States Report”) measures and, later, a statement from its President on COVID-19 and measures to combat illicit financing (the “Statement”).
In this post, we will discuss FATF’s Statement on the Coronavirus. In our next post, we will address FATF’s United States Report.
The Statement, issued on April 1, 2020, functions as both a high-level reminder to financial institutions of methods for continuing to carry-out know-your-customer (“KYC”) and other AML obligations while “facing confinement or strict social-distancing measures” and a warning to financial institutions to remain vigilant to increases in fraudulent activity – and resulting money laundering – so often associated with crises like the current Coronavirus pandemic.
The thrust of the Statement is an acknowledgement that the Coronavirus pandemic has created a perfect storm for money laundering where rapid and high-volume financial transactions from myriad sources for myriad purposes are occurring simultaneously with the almost spontaneous and enormous downsizing in personnel to monitor those transactions as many AML professionals shelter from home. Indeed, we recently blogged on this very threat posed by COVID-19 to financial institutions’ AML and anti-fraud systems (that is, the combination of increased fraud and a reduced capacity to guard against it) when discussing FinCEN’s latest pronouncement on COVID-19 issues.
Continue Reading Financial Action Task Force Update: Statement on COVID-19’s Implications for AML Programs