Currency and Monetary Instrument Report (CMIR)

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First in a Two-Part Series on the Utility of BSA Filings

Today we are very pleased to welcome guest blogger, Don Fort, who is the Director of Investigations at Kostelanetz LLP, and the past Chief of the Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal Investigation (CI) Division. 

As Chief of IRS-CI from 2017 to 2020, Don led the sixth largest U.S. law enforcement agency, managing a budget of over $625 million and a worldwide staff of approximately 3,000, including 2,100 special agents in 21 IRS field offices and 11 foreign countries. Don’s time in law enforcement included overseeing investigations of some of the most significant financial crimes involving tax evasion, sanctions evasion, money laundering, bribery, international corruption, bank malfeasance, cyber and cryptocurrency crimes, and terrorist financing.

We reached out to Don because we were interested in his perspective on the 2023 Year-in-Review (YIR) published by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), on which we previously blogged.  According to the YIR, there are about 294,000 financial institutions and other e-filers registered to file Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) reports with FinCEN.  Collectively, they filed during FY 2023 a total of 4.6 million Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and 20.8 million Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs), as well as 1.6 million Reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBARs), 421,500 Forms 8300 regarding cash payments over $10,000 received in a trade or business, and 143,200 Reports of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments (CMIRs) for certain cross-border transactions exceeding $10,000.  Although the YIR necessarily represents only a snapshot lacking full context, only a very small portion of those filings ever became relevant to actual federal criminal investigations.  But, the YIR makes clear that one of the most, or the most, important consumers of BSA filings is IRS-CI.

In our next related blog, we will discuss the utility of filings in the global anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism compliance regime, from the perspective of industry – specifically, recent publications by the Wolfsberg Group, and the Bank Policy Institute, the Financial Technology Association, the Independent Community Bankers of America, the American Gaming Association, and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association.

This blog post again takes the form of a Q&A session, in which Don responds to questions posed by Money Laundering Watch about the impact of BSA filings, from the perspective of IRS-CI.  We hope you enjoy this discussion on this important topic. – Peter Hardy and Siana Danch

Continue Reading  BSA Filings and Their Utility to Law Enforcement:  A Guest Blog

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) has issued its Year in Review for FY 2023 (“YIR”).  It consists of five pages of infographics.  According to FinCEN’s press release:

The Year in Review is intended to help stakeholders gain insight into the collection and use of Bank Secrecy Act [(“BSA”)] data, including FinCEN’s efforts to support law enforcement and national security agencies. The Year in Review includes statistics from fiscal year 2023 on BSA reporting and how it is queried and used by law enforcement agencies. The Year in Review also includes information on how FinCEN uses and analyzes BSA reporting to fulfill its mission, including to support alerts, trend analyses, and regulatory actions. The publication of the Year in Review is in furtherance of FinCEN’s commitment to provide information and statistics on the usefulness of BSA reporting, consistent with Section 6201 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020.

According to the YIR, there are approximately 294,000 financial institutions and other e-filers registered to file BSA reports with FinCEN.  Collectively, they filed during FY 2023 a total of 4.6 million Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) and 20.8 million Currency Transaction Reports (“CTRs”), as well as 1.6 million Reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (“FBARs”), 421,500 Forms 8300 regarding cash payments over $10,000 received in a trade or business, and 143,200 Reports of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments (“CMIRs”) for certain cross-border transactions exceeding $10,000.

As we will discuss, a massive amount of SARs and CTRs are filed every year.  Apparently – and the YIR necessarily represents only a snapshot lacking full context, so extrapolation is dangerous – only a very small portion of those filings ever become relevant to actual federal criminal investigations.  Further, the YIR suggests that information sharing under Section 314 of the Patriot Act between the government and financial institutions remains an under-utilized tool.

Continue Reading  FinCEN Releases Year-in-Review for FY 2023: SARs, CTRs and Information Sharing

First Post in a Two-Part Series

How do financial institutions get in trouble with their regulators? Recent AML enforcement actions suggest that the following two failures are at the heart of most of these actions: (1) inadequately identifying, monitoring and/or reporting suspicious activity; and (2) failing to implement adequate internal controls. And these same issues crop up year after year.

In this post, we’ll discuss these failures and their root causes and provide practical tips for ensuring that your AML program will withstand the scrutiny of regulators. In our next post, we will discuss how these practical tips apply in a specific AML enforcement action: the recent consent order between the New York Department of Financial Services and Mashreqbank.  Further, we look forward to discussing all of these issues in an upcoming podcast in Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Monitor Podcast series.  So please stay tuned.

The U.S. financial institutions that recently found themselves in the government’s crosshairs allegedly engaged in the following behavior:

  • Failing to investigate alerts on high-risk accounts where those accounts had been investigated previously, even when the new suspicious activity to which the bank had been alerted differed from the activity that it previously had investigated.
  • Having a policy of not investigating or filing SARs on cash withdrawals from branches near the Mexican border if the customer said they were withdrawing cash in the U.S., rather than carrying cash into the U.S. from Mexico, in order to avoid having to file a Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments (CMIR).
  • Capping the number of alerts from its transaction monitoring systems based on the number of staff available to review the alerts rather than on the risks posed by the transactions (and lying to regulators about it).
  • Failing to report the suspicious activities of a longtime customer despite having been warned that the customer was laundering the proceeds of an illegal and fraudulent scheme through accounts at the bank.
  • Failing to conduct necessary due diligence on foreign correspondent accounts.
  • A brokerage company failing to file SARs on transactions that showed signs of market manipulation.
  • A MSB’s failing to implement proper controls and discipline crooked agents because those agents were so profitable for the MSB, thereby enabling illegal schemes such as money laundering.

Although the behavior of these financial institutions may differ, the root causes of their failures do not. They include the following:

  • An inadequate, ineffective or non-existent risk assessment.
  • Elevating the business line over the compliance function.
  • Offering products or using new technologies without adequate controls in place.
  • Compliance programs that are not commensurate with the risks, often due to under investment in AML technology or other resources and/or lack of awareness of AML risks or controls.
  • Corporate silos, both human and technological, that prevent or hinder information sharing.
  • Insufficient screening of parties and relationships and lack of effective processes and controls around EDD.

So how can you ensure that your AML program is adequate? Here are some practical tips.
Continue Reading  Practical Tips for Ensuring Your AML Program Withstands the Scrutiny of Regulators