treanorm@ballardspahr.com | 215.864.8131 | view full bio

Mary focuses her practice on white collar matters and complex commercial litigation. She advises clients on BSA and AML matters, including government and internal investigations. She also counsels financial institutions on SAR filings and confidentiality requirements. Prior to joining Ballard Spahr, Mary worked for a Washington, D.C. law firm, representing clients in market manipulation and failure to supervise enforcement actions brought by the CFTC and FERC. She also advised financial institutions on compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act and corresponding agency regulations.

We are pleased to offer the latest episode in Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Monitor Podcast series — a weekly podcast focusing on the consumer finance issues that matter most, from new product development and emerging technologies to regulatory compliance and enforcement and the ramifications of private litigation.

In this podcast, we examine two recent OCC

Regulatory Examination and Related Enforcement Also Highlights Perceived Risks of Banking Crypto Clients

The Department of the Treasury’s Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) recently issued a Consent Order against M.Y. Safra Bank arising from the bank’s decision to accept a variety of high-risk, Digital Asset Customers (“DACs”), allegedly without implementing the necessary Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) controls. Although the OCC did not impose a monetary penalty against the bank, it demanded that the bank implement and maintain a remarkably broad array of potentially costly and extremely detailed measures to strengthen its AML program. And, notably, the OCC specifically tasked the bank’s Board of Directors with implementing, overseeing, and reporting on these measures.

We describe here the OCC’s examination into and requirements imposed on M.Y. Safra Bank. The Consent Order is a reminder to the boards and management of all financial institutions that if they pursue novel and higher-risk customers – certainly, a potentially defensible business plan in our increasingly competitive business environment – then they absolutely have to adjust accordingly their AML compliance program and accompanying transaction monitoring to compensate for such increased risk. This is particularly true when those new customers employ novel technologies or business products which require a particularized ability to understand and address from an AML perspective. New, creative business lines are not necessarily bad – so long as the implementation of the AML compliance program is adjusted appropriately to identify and manage the new risk.

The Consent Order also is a reminder that, as the BSA/AML Examination Manual of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council states, “[t]he board of directors, acting through senior management, is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the bank maintains an effective BSA/AML internal control structure,” and otherwise must create a culture of compliance.

This Consent Order and related OCC AML exam and enforcement issues – including the liability of not just institutions, but also the potential individual liability of AML in-house professionals – will be the topic of a forthcoming installment in Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Finance Monitor Podcast by the firm’s AML Team. Please stay tuned our podcast, and read on here.
Continue Reading  OCC Action Highlights Increased Accountability Facing Boards of Directors

Note to Government Personnel: Don’t Disclose SARs

This week, major developments unfolded in the cases against two former federal government employees for their respective roles in disclosing Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) in violation of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”).

Historically, prosecutions pertaining to improper SAR disclosures have been supremely rare, so the fact that two court hearings involving this issue occurred in a single week is particularly notable. Both involve defendants allegedly acting on their own perceived sense of duty – perceptions which ran afoul of the law.

First, Natalie Mayflower Sours Edwards, a former senior advisor at the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), pleaded guilty to one felony count of conspiring to unlawfully disclose SARs related to Paul Manafort, Richard Gates, Maria Butina, Prevezon Alexander, and the Russian Embassy to a reporter. Second, John C. Fry, a former employee of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), was sentenced to five years of supervised probation and ordered to pay a $5,000 fine after similarly pleading guilty to his role in disclosing SARs to embattled attorney Michael Avenatti that related to likewise-embattled attorney Michael Cohen. Both prosecutions underscore the seriousness with which federal authorities view such disclosures. Likewise, they reflect that potentially subjective good intentions – of course – still don’t excuse violations of the carefully-crafted prohibitions in the BSA against the disclosure of SARs.

Continue Reading  Key Developments in the Prosecutions for Leaks by Government Personnel of SARs Related to Michael Cohen, Paul Manafort, Richard Gates, and Others

Happy New Year! And, happy birthday to Money Laundering Watch, which is entering its fourth year.

Let’s look back2019 has been yet another busy year in the world of money laundering and BSA/AML. We are highlighting 12 of our most-read blog posts, which address many of the key issues we’ve examined during

Arrest is Culmination of Elaborate FBI Sting Targeting Banker Who Allegedly Catered to Drug Dealers

On November 12, 2019, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida announced two key money-laundering developments concerning high-profile Guatemalans: the arrest of Alvaro Estuardo Cobar Bustamante, the director of a national Guatemalan bank, and the unsealing of a case against and guilty plea of Manuel Antonio Baldizon Mendez, a former presidential candidate in Guatemala who cooperated in the FBI and DEA sting operation against Cobar.

The government’s press release, coupled with its charging documents discussed below, underscore Guatemala’s strategic importance to drug traffickers and, by extension, money launderers. These developments likewise emphasize: (1) the increasing degree of international coordination often required to root out and prosecute both crimes; and (2) the United States’ willingness to prosecute alleged bad actors abusing the financial system, of which we have blogged about here.

Guatemala’s Strategic Importance to Central and South American Drug Trafficking Organizations

Since at least as early as 2013, the FBI and DEA have conducted extensive and numerous investigations into Drug Trafficking Organizations (“DTOs”) in Guatemala. Both agencies have emphasized the strategic importance of Guatemala for large-scale DTOs because it is a key transportation hub in the cocaine trafficking pipeline that begins in Colombia and moves through Central America and Mexico before branching off into various locations in the United States. Colombian and Mexican DTOs, seeking to avoid detection from U.S. law enforcement, often buy and sell multi-ton quantities of cocaine in Guatemala which, in turn, creates a plethora of opportunities for Guatemalan DTOs to serve as intermediaries receiving and re-selling cocaine.
Continue Reading  International Efforts to Combat Guatemalan Money Laundering Schemes Nets High-Profile Arrest and Guilty Plea

A Modest Proposal

The European Union (“EU”) recently has grappled with a series of massive money laundering scandals and strategized about how to more effectively combat international money laundering and corruption. Generally, the EU has continued to issue a series of reports identifying systemic vulnerabilities to money laundering and suggest process-based recommendations for how to address future threats. These recommendations typically mirror the same range of process-based improvements set forth in earlier reports: from enhancing cross-border information sharing to increasing resources for adequate implementation and enforcement of anti-money laundering (“AML”) and counter financing of terrorism (“CFT”) policies implemented by EU member states and financial institutions. Noticeably absent from these recommendations is one of the most powerful deterrents available – and a distinctly American approach – prosecuting the bad actors.

Although many of the recent EU money laundering scandals rest on conduct occurring years ago, the recurring waves of scandals strongly suggest that the EU – like the U.S. – has a serious problem with money laundering that is not going away any time soon. They likewise indicate that the EU’s financial system will continue to be abused by bad actors who appear to be unfazed by any potential consequences. The EU therefore should consider emulating – at least in part – the American approach of more aggressively investigating and prosecuting individuals, including the corrupt politicians, kleptocrats, drug dealers, fraudsters, and other criminals from around the globe who are laundering sometimes massive amounts of funds through European financial institutions.

Very recently, in a different but related context, the Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), Jay Clayton, delivered a speech during which he bemoaned his perception that his foreign counterparts failed to rigorously enforce their own anti-corruption laws. Specifically, Chairman Clayton asserted the following:

Corruption is corrosive. We see examples where corruption leads to poverty, exploitation and conflict. Yet, we must face the fact that, in many areas of the world, our work may not be having the desired effect. Why? In significant part, because many other countries, including those that have long had similar offshore anti-corruption laws on their books, do not enforce those laws.

Granted, the above comments pertained specifically to enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), and arguably the comments were in furtherance of a pro-American message regarding international competition between countries. The comments nonetheless exemplifies a certain American perception: the U.S. aggressively prosecutes individuals, whereas Europe does not. Obviously, this issue entails a lot of cultural baggage on both sides.

Although there are viable criticisms of the U.S. approach (both in theory and in practice), and although the EU’s strong focus on process and institutions’ AML and CFT systems is critical, any government’s enforcement “tool bag” must include targeted prosecutions of the people responsible for the laundering violations. Otherwise, few bad actors around the world will think twice about continuing to turn to EU institutions for their laundering needs. This blog post explores this idea.
Continue Reading  The EU’s Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, the Financing of Terrorism and Corruption Seem to Overlook a Very American Approach: Prosecute People

The United States continues to be plagued by mass shootings, which appear to be increasing in both frequency and lethality.  Certain businesses have reacted by adjusting their business models, such as the recent decision by mega-retailer WalMart to stop selling some — but not all — types of ammunition.  Likewise, some financial institutions

On June 12, 2019, Kenneth A. Blanco, Director of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), provided remarks at the NYU Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement that underscored the agency’s evolving approach to emerging threats in money laundering and terrorist financing.

His remarks specifically focused on:

  • FinCEN’s approach to addressing a number of emerging money-laundering threats, including the crisis in Venezuela and the rise in business email compromise (“BEC”) fraud schemes;
  • The agency’s collaboration with Congress to address the need to collect beneficial ownership information at a company’s formation; and
  • FinCEN’s ongoing efforts to strengthen and modernize the anti-money laundering (“AML”) and counter terrorism financing (“CFT”) system.


Continue Reading  FinCEN’s Evolving Approach to Lurking Threats in Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Director Blanco’s Remarks at NYU Law

On April 17, 2019, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida (the “Government”) announced its non-prosecution agreement (available here) entered into with a Miami-based gold refinery, Republic Metals Corp. (“RMC”), related to the refinery’s failure to maintain a robust anti-money laundering (“AML”) program. RMC is the second American refinery whose AML program has been identified as deficient by the Government as part of its ongoing probe into gold imports from South American countries such as Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador (dubbed “Operation Arch Stanton”). The Government’s decision to decline prosecution against RMC stands in stark contrast to its prosecution last year of another refinery, Texas-based Elemetal LLC (“Elemetal”), arising from the same probe.
Continue Reading  Gold and Money Laundering

As we have blogged, courts have held that financial institutions generally do not owe a duty of care to a noncustomer and that no special duty of care arises from the duties and obligations set forth in the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), absent a special relationship or contractual relationship. Moreover, there is no private right of action stemming from the BSA. Nor does the BSA define a financial institution’s standard of care for the purposes of a negligence claim.  A majority panel of the Eighth Circuit (“the Court”) very recently confirmed these principles in a detailed opinion which affirmed summary judgment in favor of a bank which had provided services to the alleged perpetrators of a $193 million Ponzi scheme, thereby rejecting claims brought by a Receiver on behalf of defrauded investors that the bank had aided and abetted fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and other claims.

After dissecting the record in detail, the Court determined in Zayed v. Associated Bank, N.A. — over a vigorous dissent — that the Receiver failed to present direct or circumstantial evidence that the bank actually knew about the Ponzi scheme being perpetrated by its former customers, much less that it substantially assisted the scheme. The Court emphasized the fact that evidence of possible “sloppy banking” and the existence of potential red flags fell short of the high bar required to sustain a claim for aiding and abetting a fraud against the third party non-customers.

Although the Zayed opinion is one of many cases rejecting AML-inspired tort claims by defrauded investors against a financial institution which had done business with a fraudster, it is notable for its methodical treatment of the facts — many of which appear in one form or another in other cases — regarding the various red flags which the Receiver claimed that the bank had missed, or the alleged misconduct which the Receiver claimed that bank personnel had perpetrated.  The list of alleged compliance failures discussed and found insufficient to establish potential liability in Zayed demonstrates that, however rigorous AML/BSA obligations and programs may be for financial institutions, their alleged violations often fail to pave a path to recovery for civil plaintiffs.
Continue Reading  Alleged BSA Violations Do Not Support Civil Negligence/Fraud Claims – Again