Peter D. Hardy

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hardyp@ballardspahr.com | 215.864.8838 | view full bio

Peter is a national thought leader on money laundering, tax fraud, and other financial crime. He is the author of Criminal Tax, Money Laundering, and Bank Secrecy Act Litigation, a comprehensive legal treatise published by Bloomberg BNA.  Peter co-chairs the Practising Law Institute's Anti-Money Laundering program, and serves on the Steering Committee for the Cambridge Forum on Sanctions & AML Compliance

He advises corporations and individuals from many industries against allegations of misconduct ranging from money laundering, tax fraud, mortgage fraud and lending law violations, securities fraud, and public corruption.  He also advises on compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laundering requirements.  Peter handles complex litigation involving allegations of fraud or other misconduct.

Peter spent more than a decade as a federal prosecutor before entering private practice, serving as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia working on financial crime cases. He was a trial attorney for the Criminal Section of the Department of Justice’s Tax Division in Washington, D.C.

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Report Offers Weak Insight on Causation but Lists Steps that Treasury Can and Should Take

The Department of Treasury (“DOT”) recently released its first ever strategy report (the “Strategy”) on the topic of de-risking, taking the form of a 54-page document that combines a summary of the problem of de-risking with an overview of recommended steps to solve it. While the Strategy is the first document of its kind issued by the U.S. government, it is not unexpected – Section 6215 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (“AMLA”) requires the DOT to develop a strategy to mitigate the adverse effects of de-risking after conducting interviews with regulators, non-profit organizations and other public and private stakeholders.

As we’ve discussed over the years, “de-risking” is a practice taken by financial institutions (FIs) to restrict certain categories of customers from accessing their services – typically due to the perception that the compliance risk associated with such customers would outweigh the benefits, financial or otherwise, of servicing them. It is important to note that the concept of de-risking is not about a customer’s individual risk profile; rather, de-risking involves a FI making a wholesale or indiscriminate determination about a category of customers, and failing to use an individualized risk-based approach favored by the anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regulatory framework.  As we have discussed, and as global watchdog groups have noted, de-risking often has a disproportionate impact on developing countries.  The Strategy itself notes that de-risking “prevent[s] low- and middle-income segments of the population, as well as other underserved communities, from efficiently accessing the financial system[.]” Thus, the issue of de-risking is intertwined with concerns regarding economic and ethnic disparities. 

As the Strategy notes, de-risking also can undermine development, humanitarian and disaster relief funds flowing to other countries.  Finally, de-risking can threaten the U.S. financial system because driving funds outside of the regulated financial system makes it harder to detect and deter illicit finance, and increases the risk of sanctions evasion. 

According to the Strategy, the profit motive of FIs is the main driver behind the ongoing problem of de-risking:  because the cost of compliance for risky categories of customers would be too high, FIs cannot justify providing services to them from a profitability perspective.

Arguably, this claim in the Strategy suffers from, at best, a certain lack of self-awareness and, at worst, a degree of hypocrisy, used to deflect a Congressional demand that the DOT address and ameliorate the problem of de-risking. Increasingly onerous BSA/AML regulations, the occasionally haphazard enforcement of those regulations, and the practical disconnect between the expectations of AML examiners and law enforcement agents arguably represent the true source of the compliance-related fears and costs that drive FIs to de-risk.  If banks and other FIs are rejecting certain customers wholesale, it’s often because they fear that they will get “dinged” during a regulatory examination for servicing such customers if perceived problems develop after the application of 20/20 hindsight, and because the compliance hoops can range from the onerous to the practically impossible.  Similar considerations are partially why FIs now file over four million Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) annually, regardless of whether any given SAR is actually helpful to law enforcement: no one has been subjected to an enforcement action for filing too many SARs.…

Continue Reading  Department of Treasury Issues Strategy on De-Risking

Opinion Offers Narrow View of “Safe Harbor” Provision for Defense Attorneys Accepting Tainted Funds from Clients

Second in Series of Two Blog Posts Pertaining to Attorneys Convicted of Money Laundering

On April 25, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction of Baltimore defense attorney Kenneth Ravenell (“Ravenell”) for money laundering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).  Ravenell had proceeded to trial and had been acquitted of six charges, including conspiracy to distribute narcotics.  However, he was convicted on the single count of money laundering conspiracy, based on his alleged assistance to two drug dealer clients, and received a sentence of 57 months of imprisonment.

The Ravenell opinion (“Opinion”) involves a splintered set of findings across the three-judge panel.  It involves findings on important technical issues pertaining to the statute of limitations and the use of the conscious avoidance/willful blindness theory of prosecution, which is often critical in cases involving third-party professionals such as lawyers, accountants, and real estate agents.  But, more importantly, it involves a discussion of when defense attorneys may accept illegally-obtained proceeds from their clients as payment for legal representation, and if such funds ever may be provided through third parties.  As we will discuss, the Fourth Circuit interpreted very narrowly a “safe harbor” provision under 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f) for defense attorneys – and did so in a case in which the evidence, if accepted, made clear that the safe harbor did not apply.  Stated otherwise, bad facts may have resulted in inappropriately broad language applicable to other cases.

As we just blogged, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York also announced on April 25 that Robert Wise (“Wise”), a New York attorney, had pled guilty to a single count of conspiring to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  This case arose out of the indictment of Vladimir Voronchenko, who has been charged in connection with a scheme to make payments to maintain multiple properties in New York and Florida owned by his friend and associate, sanctioned Russian oligarch Viktor Vekselberg.  

These two cases are very different.  But they both illustrate how attorneys – either business attorneys, or criminal defense attorneys – can get caught up in the problems of their own clients, particularly given the ability of the government to pursue a theory of willful blindness.…

Continue Reading  Fourth Circuit Upholds Money Laundering Conspiracy Conviction of Baltimore Defense Attorney

Enforcement Trends, Crypto, Regulatory Developments — and More

I am very pleased to co-chair again the Practicing Law Institute’s 2023 Anti-Money Laundering Conference on May 16, 2023, starting at 9 a.m. in New York City (the event also will be virtual). 

I am also really fortunate to be working with co-chair Elizabeth (Liz) Boison…

Last week, FinCEN “communicated,” so to speak, to private industry, law enforcement, regulators, and legislators in three very different ways:  through a FY 2022 Year In Review infographic; a first-of-its kind enforcement action against a trust company; and in statements before the U.S. House of Representatives.  This post summarizes each of these developments, which are unified by the motif of FinCEN asserting that it has an increasing role in protecting the U.S. financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and other illicit activity; providing critical data and analytical support to law enforcement agencies pursuing these goals; and simultaneously policing and trying to collaborate with private industry regarding these goals.…

Continue Reading  FinCEN Round Up:  FY 2022 in Review; First AML Enforcement Against a Trust Company; and Comments to Congress

On April 13, the State of Wyoming took the extraordinary step of filing a request for permission to intervene in the ongoing dispute between Custodia Bank, Inc. (“Custodia”) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“the Fed”) and the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.  This dispute involves a complaint (now amended) filed by Custodia – a state-chartered special purpose depository institution (“SPDI”) based in Cheyenne, Wyoming – against the Fed and the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, alleging that the defendants improperly denied Custodia’s application for a “master account” with the Fed. Generalizing greatly, having a master account allows financial institutions to operate in the normal course as a custodial bank in the U.S.  Having a Fed master account is therefore critical to any institution looking to operate in the U.S. financial system.

In a nutshell, Wyoming’s request to intervene critiques the defendants because of their “view of perceived inadequacies in Wyoming’s laws and regulations for SPDIs, [which are] partially responsible” for the denial of Custodia’s master account application.  More specifically, Wyoming accuses the defendants of seeking to treat Wyoming SPDIs in an inequitable manner, thereby “treating state-chartered non-federally regulated banks as second-class banks ineligible to compete with federally-regulated ones.”

This blog post focuses on an important issue referenced seemingly in passing in Wyoming’s request for permission to intervene, which is clearly motivating in part the filing by Wyoming:  on March 24, 2023, the Fed made public its January 27, 2023  Order Denying Application for Membership (the “Order”) by Custodia, which had requested the Fed’s approval under Section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act to become a member of the Federal Reserve System.  According to Wyoming, the Fed’s decision to deny Custodia’s application has the effect of preventing Custodia and other Wyoming SPDIs from ever being able to attain the status of federal regulation.  We focus here on the Order because of its much broader anti-money laundering (“AML”) and sanctions implications for any banks which are contemplating targeted services for the digital asset industry.  The 86-page Order is very detailed, and often also discusses safety and soundness concerns, as well as other issues.

As we discuss, the Order suggests that any bank will have a hard time convincing the Fed that crypto-heavy banking services can comply with the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and U.S. sanctions law.  Likewise, the Fed has expressed its skepticism in the Order that blockchain analytics services, even when applied skillfully and with the best of intentions, actually can satisfy the BSA and U.S. sanctions law due to limitations inherent in crypto transactions relating to knowing with confidence who is actually conducting the transactions.  This same issue was also noted by the recent report by the U.S. Treasury regarding perceived AML and sanctions vulnerabilities in decentralized finance providers.…

Continue Reading  State of Wyoming Wades Into Custodia Bank Dispute with Federal Reserve — In Wake of Fed’s Rejection of Bank Due to Crypto-Related AML and OFAC Concerns

On April 6, 2023, the U.S. Department of the Treasury released a report examining vulnerabilities in decentralized finance (“DeFi”), including potential gaps in the United States’ anti-money laundering (“AML”) and countering the financing of terrorism (“CFT”) regulatory, supervisory, and enforcement regimes for DeFi.  The report concludes by making a series of recommendations, including the closing of “gaps” in the application of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) to the extent that certain DeFi services currently fall outside the scope of the BSA’s definition of a “financial institution” covered by the BSA.  The report cautions that it does not alter any existing legal obligations, issue any new regulatory interpretations, or establish any new supervisory expectations.…

Continue Reading  U.S. Treasury Releases Report and Recommendations Regarding Vulnerabilities in Decentralized Finance

On March 24, 2023, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a press release and published initial guidance to assist the public in understanding the beneficial ownership information (BOI) reporting requirements under the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA). The guidance comprised Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), a one-pager informative graphic explaining the applicable reporting filing dates, and a one-pager Answers to Key Questions on beneficial owner reporting. Additionally, FinCEN published a one-minute Introductory Video and a more detailed four-and-a-half minute Information Video about the BOI reporting requirement.

In the press release, FinCEN Acting Director Himamauli Das stated that the agency was committed to ensuring the implementation of the CTA’s BOI reporting obligations was “as simple as possible, particularly for small businesses who may have never heard of or interacted with FinCEN before.”

We have blogged extensively on the CTA and FinCEN’s final and proposed regulations (here, here, here, and here), and will not repeat our analysis of these regulations – other than to note that the stated primary goal of the CTA was to enable law enforcement and regulators to obtain information on the “real” beneficial owners of so-called “shell companies,” including foreign entities registered in the United States, in order to “crack down” on the misuse of such companies for potential money laundering, tax evasion and other offenses.

As we will discuss, these publications from FinCEN appear to be designed to assist the general public in understanding the basic rules regarding the CTA and its implementing regulations.  To that extent, they succeed on their own terms.  But, they do not address more difficult or more nuanced issues presented by the statute and the regulations.  Meanwhile, and as we will discuss, FinCEN has been subject to pressure and criticism from both the U.S. Senate and industry groups regarding many of these same difficult and nuanced issues, including (i) whether FinCEN will or can verify the BOI information reported to it under the CTA, and (ii) revising the CTA reporting form currently proposed by FinCEN, which, as we have blogged, invites bad actors to not answer key questions.…

Continue Reading  FinCEN Publishes Initial Guidance and FAQs on BOI Reporting Under CTA While Facing Backlash Over Proposed Access Rules and Reporting Form

On January 25, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued an “Alert on Potential U.S. Commercial Real Estate Investments by Sanctioned Russian Elites, Oligarchs, and Their Proxies” (the “Alert”).  The Alert defines “commercial real estate,” which the Alert refers to as “CRE,” as “property that is used for investment or income-generating purposes rather than as a residence by the owner.”  The Alert “specifically highlights sanctions evasion-related vulnerabilities in the CRE sector and is based on a review of Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) reporting indicating that sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies may exploit them to evade sanctions.”

The Alert seeks to assist financial institutions with identifying potential sanctions evasion activity in the CRE sector by providing potential red flags and typologies related to this activity.  As we discuss, the Alert also may represent a step towards BSA regulations for the CRE sector.…

Continue Reading  Russia Sanctions Evasion and Commercial Real Estate: An Alert

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued on January 13, 2023 an alert (the “Alert”) to financial institutions regarding the detection of financial activity related to human smuggling along the U.S. southwest border (“SW border”). The Alert builds upon FinCEN’s prior 2020 and 2014 human smuggling and human trafficking advisories in order to provide trends and typologies specifically related to human smuggling along the SW border. It also provides red flag indicators regarding transactions potentially related to human smuggling.

The Alert effectively lays out the breadth of the problem.  Effectively detecting and reporting human smuggling and trafficking, however, can be difficult, given the extensive use of cash.…

Continue Reading  FinCEN Issues Alert on Human Smuggling and Trafficking Along the Southwest Border:  Methodologies, Typologies and Red Flags

Factual Statement Is a Tale of Whistleblowing, High-Risk Customers, and Misleading U.S. Banks

Earlier this month, Danske Bank was sentenced in the Southern District of New York to three years of probation and forfeiture of $2.059 billion.  The sentencing capped a tumultuous and global scandal that became public several years ago, as the enormous scope of the bank’s anti-money laundering (“AML”) compliance problems emerge:  several hundred billion in suspicious transactions allegedly were processed over time at the bank’s former Estonian branch.  As a result of the sentencing, Danske Bank was ordered to make an actual payment of $1,209,062,646; the bank received credit for the rest of the forfeiture amount on the basis of a $178.6 million payment to the Securities and Exchange Commission and a $672.3 million payment to Denmark authorities.

Danske Bank was charged not with violating the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), but rather with bank fraud.  According to the press release issued in December 2022  by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) at the time of the bank’s plea, the bank had “defrauded U.S. banks regarding Danske Bank Estonia’s customers and [AML] controls to facilitate access to the U.S. financial system for Danske Bank Estonia’s high-risk customers, who resided outside of Estonia – including in Russia.”  The DOJ’s choice to charge bank fraud presumably was predicated upon issues relating to U.S. jurisdiction and the actual applicability of the BSA to Danske Bank and activities in Estonia – but the heart of the criminal case is that Danske Bank allegedly hid its own AML failures from three U.S. banks, thereby thwarting the U.S. banks’ own AML programs and compliance with the BSA.

The plea agreement contains a lengthy statement of facts full of eye-catching allegations.  As we describe, it sets forth a tale of intentional and sometimes brazen misconduct by Estonian branch employees, coupled with lax oversight and implicit approval, or at least tolerance, of such conduct by some people in upper management.  Further, it involves another example of a financial institution, in the eyes of law enforcement and regulators, over-valuing profit and under-valuing compliance systems.  The case also highlights, again, the potential risks associated with correspondent bank accounts held by non-U.S. banks, the importance of having fully integrated and coordinated monitoring systems, and the potential role of whistleblowers.

Finally, this saga is not necessarily over entirely.  Danske Bank is subject to three years of probation.  The plea agreement requires numerous compliance commitments by the bank, including signed certificates of compliance and self-reporting of potential AML failures.  Danske Bank’s troubles also have involved lawsuits brought by investors claiming to have been defrauded, although the bank has had success in fending off these actions (see here, here and here).…

Continue Reading  SDNY Sentences Danske Bank in Massive AML Scandal