grugant@ballardspahr.com | 215.864.8320 | view full bio

Terence’s practice focuses on representing clients involved in criminal, regulatory, and administrative investigations and litigation, and in civil litigation matters involving the federal securities laws and other allegations of fraudulent business practices. He represents financial institution clients in matters implicating their practices under the BSA and related AML laws, including compliance program advice, internal investigations, regulatory examinations, and related civil litigation.

The Small Business Administration (“SBA”) recently issued a procedural notice (the “Notice”) to “All SBA Employees and Paycheck Protection Program Lenders” setting forth “Revised SBA Paycheck Protection Platform Procedures for Addressing Hold Codes on First Draw PPP Loans and Compliance Check Error Messages on First Draw PPP Loans and Second Draw PPP Loans.”  The Notice sets forth procedures Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) lenders must follow in approving First or Second Draw PPP loans under the 2021 Economic Aid Act.

PPP Experience To Date

As we discussed in a recent blog post, with the third round of PPP funding currently underway, the government, through SBA and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), has begun taking steps to clarify lender compliance obligations in implementing the PPP.  The onus of implementing the PPP has been on the private lenders participating in the program.  The SBA reiterates this responsibility in the Notice, emphasizing, “[u]nder the CARES Act, PPP Lenders are deemed to have delegated authority to make and approve PPP loans without prior SBA review.”

While lenders have been acting with this “delegated authority” since Spring 2020, they are only now beginning to operate with answers to how it can meet their compliance obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) while quickly administering the PPP according to the parameters set forth in the CARES Act and subsequent SBA guidance.  And, with a new funding round opening nearly a year after the initial rounds, the government and private sector are both grappling with sifting through and processing relevant data accumulated through the first two funding rounds.

Under the CARES Act, PPP borrowers were originally limited to obtaining a single loan.  The Economic Aid Act changed that.  In addition to opening a new round of PPP lending to new borrowers – “First Draw” borrowers – the Economic Aid Act permitted prior borrowers to pursue a loan – “second Draw” PPP borrowers.  This expansion of the PPP program introduces lenders to a new category of borrowers: those that previously applied for and either did or did not (for whatever reason) receive a PPP loan.   What does this mean for lenders from a Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering (“BSA/AML”) perspective?  Information.
Continue Reading New PPP Procedural Requirements Reflect Lenders’ Emerging AML Duties

With the third round of lending through the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) in full swing, the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) – administrator of the PPP – has developed new guidance in consultation with the United States Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”).  The February 1, 2021 FAQs specifically address how lenders can meet some of their Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) obligations when issuing PPP loans.

As we previously blogged, the PPP, with its combination of size, scope and the limited time-frame for lenders to process and disburse loans pursuant to it, has created numerous compliance challenges for PPP lenders and presented significant enforcement risks, including future false claims act liability, compliance enforcement, state attorneys’ general investigations and private litigation.  At the root of those challenges and concerns is the question of how lenders can meet their anti-money laundering (“AML”) obligations under the BSA while administering a program designed to get money to as many recipients as possible as quickly as possible.
Continue Reading FinCEN Issues PPP Lender Guidance

Covered Companies Must Report Beneficial Ownership to National Database Upon Incorporation

First Blog Post in an Extended Series on Legislative Changes to BSA/AML Regulatory Regime

Change is upon us.  The U.S. House and Senate have passed – over a Presidential veto – the National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”), a massive annual defense spending bill.  As we have blogged, this bill, now law, contains historic changes to the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), coupled with other changes relating to money laundering, anti-money laundering (“AML”), counter-terrorism financing (“CTF”) and protecting the U.S. financial system against illicit foreign actors. This sweeping legislation will affect financial institutions, their clients, and law enforcement and regulators for many years.  This will be the first post of many on these important legislative changes, which should produce related regulatory pronouncements throughout 2021.

Today, we will focus on the enactment that has received the most attention:  the NDAA’s adoption of the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”) and its requirements for covered legal entities to report their beneficial owners at the time of their creation to a database accessible by U.S. and foreign law enforcement and regulators, and to U.S. financial institutions seeking to comply with their own AML compliance obligations.  The issue of beneficial ownership and the misuse of shell corporations has been at the heart of global AML regulation and enforcement for many years.  This legislation will be held out as a partial but important response to the continuing critiques by the international community of the United States as a haven for money laundering and tax evasion, often due to the perception that U.S. and state laws on beneficial ownership reporting are lax.

Beyond “just” the CTA, the breadth of the BSA/AML legislation is substantial. We have discussed BSA/AML reform for years, and many of the reforms (acknowledging that the word “reform” often involves a value judgment, and whether a particular change represents “reform” is typically in the eye of the beholder) that have been repeatedly bandied about by Congress, industry, think tanks and law enforcement are incorporated into this legislation, or at least referenced as topics for further study and follow-up.  We therefore will be blogging repeatedly on the many and various components of this legislation, which implicates a broad array of key issues: BSA/AML examination priorities; attempting to modernize the BSA regulatory regime, including by improving feedback by the government on the usefulness of SAR reporting; potential “no action” letters by FinCEN; requiring process-related studies tied to the effectiveness and costs of certain BSA requirements, including current SAR and CTR reporting; increased penalties under the BSA for repeat offenders; greater information sharing among industry and the government; enhancing the ability of the government to investigate the use of correspondent bank accounts; cyber security issues; focusing on trade-based money laundering; adding a whistleblower provision to the BSA; and including dealers in antiquities to the definition of “financial institutions” covered by the BSA.
Continue Reading U.S. Passes Historic BSA/AML Legislative Change

Farewell to 2020.  Although it was an extremely difficult year, let’s still look back — because 2020 was yet another busy year in the world of money laundering and BSA/AML compliance.

We are highlighting 12 of our most-read blog posts from 2020, which address many of the key issues we’ve examined during the past year

Businessmen whisperingOn December 10, 2020, Kenneth Blanco, Director of FinCEN, issued public comments at the American Bankers Association/American Bar Association Financial Crimes Enforcement Conference announcing new FinCEN guidance for covered financial institutions to utilize the voluntary information sharing provisions of section 314(b) of the USA Patriot Act (“Guidance”). The Guidance encourages information sharing under section 314(b) and emphasizes the potential breadth of the provision, which protects compliant financial institutions from civil liability.
Continue Reading FinCEN Provides New Guidance on Section 314(b) Information Sharing

As we’ve blogged, high-end artwork can create an ideal vehicle for money laundering. And, as we’ve also blogged, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations for the U.S. Senate released in July 2020 a detailed report titled “The Art Industry and U.S. Policies That Undermine Sanctions,” focusing on the nexus between high-end art and U.S. sanctions law violations, potential money laundering schemes and anti-money laundering (“AML”) risks. The Senate report recommends in part that the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) be amended to include art dealers as “financial institutions” subject to AML obligations under the BSA.

Indeed, recent legislation has included a proposal to (i) add to the list of “financial institutions” covered by the BSA “a person trading or acting as an intermediary in the trade of antiquities, including an advisor, consultant or any other person who engages as a business in the solicitation of the sale of antiquities;” and (ii) require a study by the Secretary of the Treasury “on the facilitation of money laundering and terror finance through the trade of works of art or antiquities,” including an evaluation of whether art industry markets should be regulated under the BSA.

This is a “hot” topic.  In the latest development in this area, and in what appears to be a response to — or affirmation of – the Senate report, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s (“Treasury”) Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) recently issued a new advisory (the “Advisory”) highlighting the related problem of individuals blocked by OFAC from entering the U.S. financial system trying to evade those restrictions through the commerce of art, and emphasizing sanctions for U.S. persons who engage in prohibited transactions.
Continue Reading Art and OFAC

Second Post in a Three-Post Series Regarding Recent Regulatory Action by FinCEN

On September 16, 2020, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPRM”) soliciting public comment on what it describes as “a wide range of questions pertaining to potential regulatory amendments under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”).” As stated, the job which FinCEN created for itself that resulted in the ANPRM was not a small one: “to re-examine the BSA regulatory framework and the broader AML regime.”

The ANPRM seeks to help modernize the current BSA/AML regime – modernization being a frequent theme of public comments by FinCEN Director Ken Blanco, as we have blogged. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s 2020 National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing calls for AML modernization, in order to “[l]everag[e] new technologies and other responsible innovative compliance approaches to more effectively and efficiently detect illicit activity.” Meanwhile, and as we have blogged, Congress has been contemplating various proposals for BSA/AML reform for some time (see here, here, here, here and here).

Despite its broad language, however, the ANPRM essentially boils down to a potential amendment requiring those financial institutions already required under the BSA to have an AML compliance program to formally include a risk assessment as part of their program – and for the risk assessment to take into account the government’s AML priorities, which the government will announce approximately every two years. On the one hand, this proposal does not add much that is new, because the vast majority of financial institutions required to maintain AML programs already perform risk assessments in order to conduct KYC and file Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”). On the other hand, the ANPRM takes a standard industry practice and turns it into a new regulatory requirement, thereby increasing liability risk. The ANPRM also touches on the tension between the government creating objective requirements – which can be helpful because they add clarity – in a compliance and enforcement regime that is supposed to be flexible and “risk based.” Under any scenario, the ANPRM is important and certainly will be the focus of industry attention.

This is the second post in a series of three blogs regarding a recent flurry of regulatory activity by FinCEN. In our first post, we discussed a final rule by FinCEN extending BSA/AML regulatory requirements to banks lacking a Federal functional regulator. In our third and final post, we will discuss the publication by FinCEN of a request for comment on existing regulations regarding enhanced due diligence for correspondent bank accounts.
Continue Reading Regulatory Round Up: FinCEN Issues ANPRM on Modernizing the BSA/AML Regulatory Regime

Can BSA/AML Requirements Lead to Deemed Knowledge of Borrower Fraud?

The first two weeks of August brought a milestone of sorts in the ongoing recovery from the economic downturn brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) ended its enrollment period on August 8, 2020 and the window for borrowers to apply to have their PPP loans forgiven opened on August 10, 2020.

The PPP was a centerpiece of the over $2 trillion Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) that, according to a study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology published on July 22, 2020 had to that point saved between 1.4 and 3.2 million jobs. Less formally observed but possibly more widely agreed, the PPP caused at least as many headaches with its rocky initial rollout and the ongoing uncertainty over applicable loan forgiveness standards. But, whereas implementing the PPP poses challenges to lenders now, due to the rampant fraud in the program (which, along with all COVID-19-related enforcement actions and policy statements, we track here) and its funding mechanics, it creates substantial downstream enforcement risk through the False Claims Act (“FCA”) for participating financial institutions.

Numerous districts already have charged borrowers with PPP-related fraud. To date, cases generally involve one of these scenarios:

  • Borrowers submitted fraudulent loan applications and supporting documents to seek PPP funds for businesses that either already had failed pre-pandemic or that they did not actually own.
  • Borrowers lied about amount, or even existence, of employees and payroll. These schemes involve inflated numbers of employees for companies, or even completely fake companies.
  • Borrowers certified that they would use loan funds to support payroll expenses or other allowable expenses, but in fact used all or most loan funds to pay personal and non-business expenses.

The prosecutions to date have all centered on relatively obvious fraud by borrowers, not lenders. But, wider-reaching investigations are occurring and though we are very much at the beginning of the enforcement phase, the magnitude of fraud in these programs is coming into focus. On September 1, 2020, the House Select Committee on the Coronavirus Crisis released a preliminary analysis finding, among other things, over $1 billion in fraudulent PPP loans were issued and identifying red flags with respect to an additional $2.98 billion in loans made to 11,000 borrowers.

And, as we discuss, the anti-money laundering (“AML”) requirements of lenders imposed under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) may expose lenders to greater risk under the FCA, which can impose civil liability for the reduced mental state of reckless disregard. Many lenders have extended PPP loans to previously-existing customers. This is a rational business decision, given typically lower business risks presented by existing customers and lower compliance costs, because existing customers do not need to provide beneficial ownership information under the Customer Due Diligence (“CDD”) rule of the BSA. However, because lenders also are required under the BSA to understand to a degree the historical and current activities of its customers, lenders may be deemed in future FCA actions to have “known” about red flags generated by fraudulent borrowers because of information obtained by the lenders properly executing their AML programs. That is, compliance with the BSA ironically may generate evidence for downstream FCA enforcement actions based on deemed “knowledge” by the lender of borrower malfeasance. This irony may be exacerbated by any disconnect in real time between the AML compliance staff at financial institutions and the front-line business people extending loans, particularly given the incredible speed with which institutions have extended PPP loans, at the government’s urging.

The point here is not that PPP lenders will face direct regulatory liability for alleged BSA/AML failures – although they may. Rather, the point is that PPP lenders may face enhanced FCA liability due to borrower information obtained through an entirely functional BSA/AML program. This phenomenon highlights the need for the “front” and “back” offices at lenders to communicate.
Continue Reading PPP Lenders and Fraudulent Borrowers: False Claims Act Liability and AML Risk

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) just issued another Advisory pertaining to two consumer fraud schemes exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. This Advisory focuses on “imposter schemes” and “money mule schemes, ”which we discuss below.

This most recent Advisory is the latest in a string of pronouncements relating to the pandemic by FinCEN, which has stated that it regularly will issue such documents. As we have blogged, FinCEN issued an Advisory on May 18 regarding medical scams related to the pandemic, and issued a companion Notice that “provides detailed filing instructions for financial institutions, which will serve as a reference for future COVID-19 advisories.” On April 3, 2020, FinCEN also updated its March 16, 2020 COVID-19 Notice in order to assist “financial institutions in complying with their Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) obligations during the COVID-19 pandemic, and announc[ing] a direct contact mechanism for urgent COVID-19-related issues.”

The most recent Advisory again provides a list of potential red flags that FinCEN believes that financial institutions should be monitoring for, in order to detect, prevent, and report such suspicious activity. As we previously have commented: although such lists can be helpful to financial institutions, they ultimately may impose de facto heightened due diligence requirements. The risk is that, further in time, after memories of the stressors currently imposed by COVID-19 have faded, some regulators may focus only on perceived historical BSA/AML compliance failures and will invoke these lists not merely as efforts by FinCEN to assist financial institutions in deterring crime, but as instances in which FinCEN was putting financial institutions on notice.

Further, the most recent Advisory suffers from the fact that its list of red flags for imposter schemes is best directed at consumers themselves, rather than at financial institutions offering services to consumers: many of the red flags pertain to anomalies in the communications sent directly by fraudsters to targeted consumer victims – information that financial institutions rarely possess.
Continue Reading FinCEN Issues Advisory on COVID-19 and Imposter and Money Mule Schemes

Internal Investigation Report Stresses Lack of Intentional Misconduct – But the Investigation May Broaden

Westpac Banking Corporation (“Westpac”), Australia’s second largest retail bank, has been besieged by serious allegations of violating Australia’s Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) and Counter-Terrorism Financing (“CTF”) Act. Just as Westpac was attempting to put some of these problems behind it, new potential AML/CTF problems have come to light.

In this post, we discuss what to expect for Westpac going forward, and the potential broadening of Australian regulator’s investigation into Westpac – a recent revelation quickly coming on the heels of Westpac’s public release on June 4 of the findings by the bank’s own internal investigation report into allegations that systemic compliance failures resulted in Westpac committing over 23 million breaches of Australia’s AML/CTF laws, pertaining in part to financial transactions involving alleged child exploitation. We previously have blogged on these alleged breaches (and the Statement of Claim brought by AUSTRAC, Australia’s AML/CTF regulator, stemming from those breaches), as well as on the private securities suits that followed these serious revelations.

The headline finding in the internal investigation report — which has been criticized — was its conclusion that the significant AML/CTF violations and failures it admitted were “due to technology failings and human error,” and that “[t]here was no evidence of intentional wrongdoing.” Consistent with a theme that emerges in many AML scandals, the lack of adequate and sufficiently trained personnel has been a key factor here.  Likewise, the Westpac internal investigation report also underscores the limits of automated AML/CFT systems.  Ultimately, any AML/CFT program is only as good as the people running it.
Continue Reading Westpac’s Alleged AML Failures Back in the News