On June 14, 2024, President Biden declared June 15th World Elder Abuse Awareness Day.  In honor of the day, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) reminded financial institutions (FIs) to remain vigilant in identifying and reporting elder financial exploitation (EFE).

In issuing the reminder, FinCEN cited the Financial Trend Analysis (2024 Analysis) it recently performed which focused on patterns and trends identified in Bank Secrecy Act data linked to EFE, which we previously blogged on here.  In performing that analysis, FinCEN studied 155,415 suspicious activity reports (SARs) filed by FIs that referred to EFE.  Those SARs indicated approximately $27 billion in EFE-related suspicious activity occurred between June 15, 2022 and June 15, 2023.

In its reminder, FinCEN also recommended that FIs refer suspected victims of EFE to the Department of Justice’s National Elder Fraud Hotline and that victims file reports with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3).

Although not cited in FinCEN’s reminder, on April 30, 2024, the IC3 issued its own Elder Fraud Report (the IC3 Report) based on complaints it received in 2023.  The IC3 Report showed that complaints of EFE to the IC3 increased by 14% in 2023, and associated losses increased by approximately 11%.  However, the FBI noted that many of these crimes go unreported, and it warned that the threat EFE poses is likely much greater.

There are several key takeaways from the IC3 report:

  • Elder fraud is a costly crime, with fraud against individuals aged 60 and over causing more than $3.4 billion in losses in 2023.  The average older victim reported losing nearly $34,000, while 5,920 older victims reported losing more than $100,000.
  • Older people are disproportionately impacted by scams and fraud, with more than 101,000 victims aged 60 and over reporting these types of crimes in 2023.  In contrast, the second most impacted demographic – individuals aged 30-39 years old – filed 88,138 reports with losses totaling over $1.1 billion – less than a third of the $3.4 billion in losses experienced by older victims.  
  • Tech support scams were by far the most widely reported type of EFE, with the next most common type of scam, personal data breaches, being reported less than half as often.
  • While tech support scams were reported most often, investment scams were the most costly type of EFE in 2023, costing older victims more than $1.2 billion.

While the numbers in the IC3 Report were lower than those in FinCEN’s 2024 Analysis, recall that FinCEN’s analysis studied SAR filings, while the IC3 Report studied complaints of actual fraud (and, as stated previously, most victims do not file reports). 

FinCEN’s reminder – especially as accentuated by its 2024 Analysis and the IC3 Report – underscores the costly and growing problem EFE poses.  In issuing the 2024 Analysis and its June 2022 EFE Advisory (which we blogged on here), FinCEN has made it abundantly clear that it not only expects FIs to report EFE, but also to protect the elderly against scams.  To that end, in addition to identifying and reporting EFE, FIs should develop, implement and maintain internal protocols and procedures for protecting elder account holders.

If you would like to remain updated on these issues, please click here to subscribe to Money Laundering Watch. Please click here to find out about Ballard Spahr’s Anti-Money Laundering Team.

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) recently issued a Financial Trend Analysis (“Analysis”) focusing on patterns and trends identified in Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) data linked to Elder Financial Exploitation (“EFE”) involving scams or theft perpetrated against older adults.

The Analysis is a follow up to FinCEN’s June 2022 EFE Advisory (“2022 Advisory”). The Analysis reviews BSA reports filed between June 15, 2022 and June 15, 2023 that either used the key term referenced in the 2022 Advisory (“EFE FIN-2022-A002”) or checked “Elder Financial Exploitation” as a suspicious activity type.  In its 2022 Advisory, FinCEN warned financial institutions (“FIs”) about the rising trend of EFE, which FinCEN defines as “the illegal or improper use of an older adult’s funds, property, or assets, and is often perpetrated either through theft or scams.” The 2022 Advisory identified 12 “behavioral” and 12 “financial” red flags to help FIs detect, prevent, and report suspicious activity connected to EFE. Additionally, FinCEN recommended EFE victims file incident reports to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) and the Federal Trade Commission. Consistent with a risk-based approach to BSA compliance, FinCEN encouraged FIs to perform additional due diligence where appropriate.

Continue Reading FinCEN Issues Analysis of Increasing Elder Financial Exploitation

On June 15, FinCEN issued an Advisory on Elder Financial Exploitation (“Advisory”) to warn financial institutions about the rising trend of elder financial exploitation (“EFE”), which FinCEN defines as “the illegal or improper use of an older adult’s funds, property, or assets, and is often perpetrated either through theft or scams.”  The Advisory is detailed.  It highlights new EFE typologies and potential red flags and builds upon a related advisory issued in 2011.  It also offers tips on Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) filings and describes other resources available to fight EFE.

Continue Reading FinCEN Warns Against Elder Financial Exploitation

On August 28, 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) released an advisory (FIN-2025-A003) alongside a comprehensive Financial Trend Analysis (“FTA”), shining a spotlight on one of today’s most significant illicit finance risks: the integration of Chinese Money Laundering Networks (“CMLNs”) into the operations of Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations, better known as cartels. This pairing not only illustrates an evolution in global money laundering typologies but also presents new compliance challenges for financial institutions and multinational businesses alike.

The CMLN–Cartel Partnership

FinCEN’s latest analysis highlights how two very different regulatory environments have fostered an unlikely alliance:

  1. Mexican cartels, flush with U.S.-dollar drug proceeds but restricted by Mexican currency controls that limit dollar deposits into local financial institutions (See related blog posts herehere and here.)
  2. Chinese nationals, facing strict capital controls at home that cap annual foreign currency conversions at $50,000 per person.

These pressures have produced what FinCEN describes as “a mutualistic relationship”: CMLNs purchase dollars from cartels desperate to move cash out of reach; they then sell this cash to Chinese clients seeking ways around China’s capital controls, effectively weaving together criminal proceeds with ostensibly legitimate wealth migration.

As professional money launderers operating globally, including within U.S. borders, CMLNs have become vital intermediaries capable of handling vast sums quickly while minimizing risk for their cartel clients by offering both speed and sophistication at scale.

Mutual Interests

This alliance operates on simple logic: Cartels need to move large volumes of cash out of Mexico without attracting law enforcement scrutiny or breaching currency controls. Chinese individuals want access to overseas dollars beyond China’s annual conversion limits for investments or personal spending abroad.

CMLNs buy cash from cartel operatives at discounted rates, then sell this cash to Chinese clients seeking U.S. dollars outside formal channels, effectively blending criminal proceeds with legitimate wealth migration.

By operating globally, including within U.S borders, CMLNs serve as professional intermediaries who can rapidly move millions while minimizing risk for their cartel partners through fast settlements and advanced tradecraft.

Core Money Laundering Methods Used by CMLNs

FinCEN identifies three primary money laundering methodologies employed by CMLNs in support of cartel operations:

1. Mirror Transactions

Mirror transactions are at the heart of CMLN operations:

  • These transactions resemble informal value transfer systems (“IVTS”), where one member receives illicit cash in one country while another delivers an equivalent value, often in pesos or yuan, to a recipient abroad.
  • A hypothetical example: A U.S.-based operator collects dollar proceeds from a cartel contact. Simultaneously, an associate pays pesos directly to cartel representatives in Mexico without physically moving funds via formal banks.
  • Increasingly, mirror transactions rely on convertible virtual currencies such as Bitcoin for swift settlement outside traditional banking channels. This system allows participants to evade detection by avoiding official remittance routes altogether, a key reason why these schemes continue thriving despite heightened regulatory scrutiny worldwide.

2. Trade-Based Money Laundering

Trade-Based Money Laundering (“TBML”) remains central within this threat landscape:

  • Illicit funds are used within the United States to purchase bulk quantities of high-value goods, such as smartphones or luxury handbags, which are exported through complicit companies based often in Hong Kong or Latin America.
  • Shell entities facilitate shipments overseas. These goods may be resold for local currency or serve directly as stores of wealth among Chinese buyers seeking alternatives to mainland investment restrictions. Layered export-import flows obscure both originators and ultimate beneficiaries across multiple jurisdictions. Frequently involved are “daigou” buyers, agents familiar throughout Chinese diaspora communities who use credit cards funded from laundered proceeds before shipping inventory home for resale on popular e-commerce platforms.

3. Use and Exploitation of Money Mules

Money mules play a crucial role:

  • Large-scale recruitment targets vulnerable populations, including students on temporary visas (especially those restricted from lawful employment), retirees with modest means but clean credentials, or anyone willing to participate for compensation. These individuals may knowingly accept small fees or be misled under false pretenses via social media connections.  Facilitators within  CMLN structures may provide counterfeit passports for opening bank accounts. After the accounts are opened,  substantial deposits, often inconsistent with the account holder’s declared income sources, are made and quickly wired onward or converted into cashier’s checks used later for real estate acquisitions across desirable markets.

In addition,

  • FinCEN has documented extensive misuse of retail credit card systems, with laundered funds being used to finance shopping sprees that do not fit established customer profiles;
  • Outstanding balances are settled using fresh infusions from network-controlled accounts; and
  • Reward points earned through spending cycles become additional vehicles for offshore payments, all facilitated using promotional platforms that are popular among Peoples Republic of China (“PRC”) nationals.

Key Red Flags and Compliance Vulnerabilities

To assist financial institutions in learning how money launderers exploit gaps across KYC processes and transaction monitoring frameworks, FinCEN has identified the following red flags:

  1. Accounts opened with Chinese passports plus student or visitor visas, followed immediately by high-volume activity unrelated to customer profiles
  2. Frequent large-dollar cash deposits closely followed by wire-outs or cashier’s check purchases
  3. Multiple wire transfers originating abroad where legitimate business relationships cannot be substantiated
  4. Reluctance, or outright refusal, to explain sources behind incoming transfers when questioned during onboarding or enhanced due diligence reviews
  5. Shell companies focused on electronics or export trades reporting income inconsistent with typical business size, type, or geography
  6. Businesses receiving repeated credits from online marketplaces but rarely engaging suppliers or purchasing needed inventory

Legacy rules-based monitoring tools frequently fail to detect suspicious activity unless multiple red flags appear together over time. This highlights the importance of adding contextual behavioral analysis to existing AML programs for more effective detection.

Five-Year Data Trends: SAR Insights (2020–2024)

The FTA supporting FinCEN’s advisory analyzed more than 137,000 Suspicious Activity Reports (“SAR”s) filed between January 2020–December 2024 under Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) obligations, with roughly $312 billion flagged as activity possibly tied back toward CMLN involvement.

Major Takeaways:

1. Depository Institutions are Prime Gateways

  • Banks accounted for nearly 85% of all relevant filings, from national chains down through community branches serving immigrant-heavy metro areas where bulk-cash placement occurs largely undetected via traditional surveillance alone
  • About 9% came from money services businesses reflecting vulnerability among smaller operators less equipped with modern anti-money laundering controls

2. TBML Schemes Remain Prevalent

  • Over $9 billion cited specifically involved trade-based methods characterized by unusual funding behind exports/imports routed East Asia, Mexico, and Middle East corridors

3. Daigou Buyers and Credit Card Abuse Feature Prominently

  • Only twenty SARs flagged daigou buyers explicitly, but associated retail or luxury typologies driven mainly through serial credit card spending cycles accounted collectively upwards $19 billion

4. Human Trafficking and Elder Fraud Crossovers Noted

  • More than sixteen hundred filings implicated human trafficking or smuggling flows representing about $4+ billion transferred directly into massage parlors, spas, or restaurants owned ultimately via proxy structures linked back toward PRC and U.S dual residents (See related blog post here.)
  • Adult daycare and healthcare fraud centered around New York facilities reflected hundreds more filings totaling nearly three quarters-of-a-billion dollars

5. Real Estate Remains Favored Integration Channel

  • Over $53 billion in illicit funds were laundered through property acquisitions. These transactions were either conducted directly using accounts, wire transfers, or check payments held by money mules and falsely described as coming from “relatives abroad,” or indirectly routed through shell companies set up for single transactions and then abandoned after the deals closed.

6. Students Frequently Serve as Account Openers or Mules

  • Roughly fourteen percent ($13+ billion) cited account holders listing status only as students, with patterns showing repeat openings, multiple bank links, or spending behavior well beyond background justification

Banks remain frontline defenders against this evolving threat ecosystem, yet also risk becoming unwitting conduits if robust internal practices lag rising sophistication exhibited among laundering networks themselves.

Regulatory Responses and Risk Mitigation Strategies

The evolving legal environment reflects increased regulatory attention and a growing focus on industry compliance obligations:

  • FinCEN guidance aligns closely with broader policy developments including Executive Order 14157 which now designates major cartels and transnational crime organizations (“TCO”s) under Foreign Terrorist Organization statutes.
  • The Department of Justice view even indirect facilitation, such as what could occur unwittingly through correspondent banking and remittance partnerships, as grounds not merely technical BSA breaches, but also as potential material support violations.
  • In June 2025, FinCEN invoked new authority barring certain Mexican financial institutions labeled primary money laundering concerns from interacting with the U.S. financial system (See related blog post here).

For practitioners tasked daily with managing exposure amid rising complexity several actionable steps stand out:

Practical Steps Forward:

  1. Revisit transaction monitoring and risk rating models by integrating the latest red flag indicators and placing greater emphasis on behavioral surveillance, especially in situations where multiple risk vectors converge over time;
  2. Intensify customer due diligence especially regarding beneficial ownership verification and source-of-funds tracing;
  3. Ensure that escalation protocols and internal reporting lines facilitate prompt legal and compliance review of any linkages, even circumstantial, to sanctioned entities, TCOs, and CMLNs;
  4. Where third-party exposure exists overseas, including logistics providers, supply chain partners, freight forwarders, and export-import brokers operating out of affected regions, embed contract language granting audit rights and requires proof of adequate AML/CFT program compliance; and
  5. Educate staff routinely regarding current threat typologies, new sanctions lists, and red flag scenarios, ensuring awareness extends to non-financial operational units likely exposed day-to-day interactions.

Implementing these strategies helps ensure defenses remain dynamic in response to both evolving geopolitical realities and technological advances increasingly exploited criminal actors.

Conclusion: Adapting Amid Escalating Complexity

With more than $312 billion flagged suspicious over just four years, and robust government action underway, FinCEN’s message is unmistakable: professionalized global networks will continue adapting rapidly unless private sector vigilance rises correspondingly.

Financial institutions must evolve beyond box-ticking compliance toward genuinely intelligent risk assessment incorporating current geopolitical shifts, regulatory changes, and emerging technology-enabled evasion tactics deployed alike by the cartels and CMLN brokers.

As reflected throughout both FIN-2025-A003 advisory and the FTA, a multi-layered defense posture leveraging intelligence-driven detection capabilities will prove indispensable if industry participants aim not simply survive, but thrive, in today’s ever-changing regulatory landscape.

By implementing comprehensive detection techniques, drawing on international best practices and a nuanced understanding of the specific cross-border risks associated with modern money laundering methods, the financial sector can better protect itself and fulfill regulatory obligations to maintain the integrity of global payment systems.

If you would like to remain updated on these issues, please click here to subscribe to Money Laundering Watch.  Please click here to find out about Ballard Spahr’s Anti-Money Laundering Team.

On August 4, 2025, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued Notice FIN-2025-NTC1 (the “Notice”) to address mounting concerns over regulatory risks related to convertible virtual currency (“CVC”) kiosks, also known as cryptocurrency ATMs. This action is part of a broader response to the rise in money laundering, fraud, and other financial crimes linked to digital assets.

What Are CVC Kiosks? How Do They Work?

CVC kiosks are terminals that allow customers to exchange physical cash for cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. Their popularity has accelerated due to their user-friendly interfaces and widespread presence in public venues like convenience stores and supermarkets. Typically, a transaction begins with customer identification, ranging from providing basic details like a phone number to scanning a government-issued ID, depending on the kiosk operator’s compliance protocols. After verification, users enter or scan their personal crypto wallet address so the purchased funds can be transferred directly. Payment is settled either by depositing cash into the machine or using card payment options available at certain kiosks. These devices may connect in real time with online cryptocurrency exchanges or use pre-loaded inventories managed by operators.

While convenient access through high-traffic retail locations benefits legitimate consumers, including those who might otherwise avoid digital assets, the relative anonymity of CVC kiosk transactions and lower oversight compared to bank branches create significant opportunities for criminal misuse.

Why Is FinCEN Focusing on These Kiosks Now?

FinCEN has observed sharp increases in consumer complaints and financial losses associated with CVC kiosk-related scams. In 2024 alone, the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center recorded over 10,956 complaints involving these machines, a year-over-year surge of nearly 99%, with aggregate victim losses approaching $246.7 million (an increase of about 31%). This pattern extends beyond consumer fraud. Criminal organizations such as Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación have embraced virtual currencies for their rapid global transferability and anonymity unavailable through traditional banking channels.

These trends intersect with this administration’s priorities around anti-money laundering (“AML”) and countering terrorist financing (“CTF”): protecting vulnerable populations from fraud, disrupting cyber-enabled crime, and intercepting organized crime-driven money laundering activities.

Key Risks Identified by FinCEN

The Notice highlights several major risks linked to CVC kiosk usage. Organized crime groups increasingly exploit these terminals as alternatives to conventional cash-based schemes, particularly in U.S cities that have become hotspots for laundering proceeds via local kiosks instead of banks because transactions are faster and more difficult for authorities to monitor effectively. Vulnerable populations are especially at risk. FinCEN states that nearly two-thirds of scam-related losses involve individuals aged sixty or older. Many attacks begin with phone-based deception before victims are remotely guided through withdrawal processes at kiosks.

Prevalent scams exploiting CVC kiosks include tech support frauds where victims are told their computer is infected and instructed to pay via Bitcoin ATMs using QR codes supplied by scammers; government impostor schemes invent fake tax liabilities payable only through kiosk deposits; romance scams manipulate targets into sending cryptocurrency under false pretenses built on fabricated relationships; lottery hoaxes promise non-existent prizes contingent upon upfront payments made through crypto transfers at kiosks.

Regulatory Requirements

FinCEN reminds operators that they must register as Money Services Businesses (“MSBs”), comply fully with Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) obligations, including robust AML protocols. and maintain proper recordkeeping standards before operating any CVC kiosk business. Operators need strong Know Your Customer (“KYC”) procedures so customers can be properly identified, a critical measure against anonymous abuse facilitating illicit activity. In addition, ongoing monitoring for suspicious activity is required; this includes filing Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) when detecting patterns such as structured deposits just below reporting thresholds or rapid withdrawals indicative of potential money laundering efforts.

Regular audits and compliance reviews are essential since lapses expose operators not only to civil penalties but potentially criminal liability under federal law. Common compliance failures include inadequate customer verification procedures; poor retention of documentation; marketing strategies promoting “no-ID required” features contrary to regulations; lack of state licensure; or use of fraudulent business identities or accounts, all vulnerabilities that regulatory authorities scrutinize closely.

Practical Guidance

To help detect suspicious activity involving CVC kiosks, the Notice outlines key red flags:

  1. Customers structuring payments just below reporting thresholds using multiple accounts or kiosks.
  2. Unusual high-value transactions from customers lacking transaction history, with rapid movement across wallets or currencies.
  3. Multiple interconnected accounts, phone numbers, or wallet addresses used across geographically distant locations.
  4. Transactions sent directly toward wallets flagged by blockchain analysis as tied either to scams, illicit conduct, or investment fraud institutions.
  5. Elderly customers conducting large transactions after remote direction, often following significant cash withdrawals.
  6. Operators running without appropriate federal or state registration.
  7. Advertising minimal or no-ID requirements despite regulatory mandates regarding identification/documentation collection practices.

FinCEN reminds financial institutions to file SARs whenever they identify these indicators, even if supporting evidence is limited at the outset. All SAR filings must be securely retained for at least five years after submission, in accordance with BSA requirements and strict access controls to protect sensitive information. Section §314(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act also permits voluntary sharing of this information among authorized organizations engaged in efforts to disrupt terrorist financing and money laundering networks globally.

Looking Ahead

The issuance of this Notice signals intensifying regulatory scrutiny prompted not just by rising incidents but also industry control gaps among certain market participants operating outside robust standards expected within digital asset sectors today.

As digital asset transactions expand, it is important for banks, cryptocurrency platforms, fintech companies, and kiosk operators to proactively integrate FinCEN’s red flag indicators and enhance AML/CFT protocols. Doing so helps safeguard clients while meeting legal obligations and promoting trust within the sector. Consumers are also encouraged to be aware of potential risks associated with using CVC kiosks until industry-wide protections are strengthened.

If you would like to remain updated on these issues, please click here to subscribe to Money Laundering Watch.  Please click here to find out about Ballard Spahr’s Anti-Money Laundering Team.

On September 8, 2023, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) released an alert regarding a notorious virtual currency scam called “pig butchering,” because, unfortunately, it resembles the “fattening a hog before slaughter.” These scams are primarily perpetrated by criminal organizations in Southeast Asia where these scams are also called “Sha Zhu Pan.”

The unwitting victims are the so-called “pigs,” who, according to various U.S. law enforcement sources, have lost billions of dollars to this scam. Unfortunately, some victims have liquidated tax-advantaged accounts or taken out home equity lines of credit or second mortgages to purchase virtual currency, as part of falling victim to these scams. The alert highlights that pig butchering is linked to fraud and cybercrime, two of FinCEN’s stated national priorities.

As we discuss, FinCEN’s alert provides 15 “red flags” for financial institutions (“FIs”) to consider when attempting to detect, prevent and report potential suspicious activity relating to such scams.  These “red flags” may serve not only to put FIs on guard for potential Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) filings under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), but they also may serve as considerations for FIs to try to detect and stop such activity, in order to cut off potential related civil suits by victim customers who may blame a FI for purportedly “allowing” the scam to occur.

Continue Reading “Pig Butchering”: FinCEN Issues Alert on Virtual Currency Scam

Last week, FinCEN “communicated,” so to speak, to private industry, law enforcement, regulators, and legislators in three very different ways:  through a FY 2022 Year In Review infographic; a first-of-its kind enforcement action against a trust company; and in statements before the U.S. House of Representatives.  This post summarizes each of these developments, which are unified by the motif of FinCEN asserting that it has an increasing role in protecting the U.S. financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and other illicit activity; providing critical data and analytical support to law enforcement agencies pursuing these goals; and simultaneously policing and trying to collaborate with private industry regarding these goals.

Continue Reading FinCEN Round Up:  FY 2022 in Review; First AML Enforcement Against a Trust Company; and Comments to Congress

Government Alleges Systemic and Deliberate AML Failures

Filings Describe Tools for CVC Exchanges to Use for Customer Due Diligence and Transaction Monitoring

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) announced on August 10 (here and here) settlements with the operators of the BitMEX cryptocurrency trading platform for alleged anti-money laundering (“AML”) violations under the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), and for allegedly failing to register with the CFTC.  More specifically, FinCEN’s assessment of a civil monetary penalty and the CFTC’s consent order both involved the five companies operating the BitMEX platform: HDR Global Trading Limited, 100x Holding Limited, ABS Global Trading Limited, Shine Effort Inc Limited, and HDR Global Services (Bermuda) Limited (collectively, “BitMEX”).

BitMEX will pay regulators up to a combined $100 million civil monetary penalty; perform a “lookback” regarding the potential need to file additional Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”); and hire an independent consultant to conduct two reviews of BitMEX’s operations, policies, procedures, and controls, in order to confirm that BitMEX is not operating in the U.S., and that no U.S. customers are able to trade with the BitMEX platform.

According to the government filings, BitMEX is one of the oldest cryptocurrency derivative exchanges, with 1.3 million user accounts and a collection of annual fees in excess of $1 billion.  Combined, the government filings allege that for a period of six years between November 2014 and October 1, 2020, BitMEX offered trading of cryptocurrency derivatives to retail and institutional customers in the U.S. and worldwide through BitMEX’s website. Customers in the U.S. placed orders to buy or sell contracts directly through the website and BitMEX was aware that U.S. customers could access the BitMEX platform via virtual private network (“VPN”).

The civil penalty will be split between FinCEN and the CFTC.  However, the settlement involves an interesting “carrot” offered by the regulators:  $20 million of the penalty is suspended pending the successful completion of the SAR lookback and the two independent consultant reviews.

According to the government’s allegations, BitMEX deliberately ignored for years the most basic AML requirements, resulting in multitudinous violations and inviting – and even encouraging – its customers to launder illicit funds.  As we will describe, the government has alleged that BitMEX operated on the announced pretext that it was not subject to the BSA or U.S. commodities laws because it had no U.S. customers or operations, when senior management knew otherwise. Continue Reading FinCEN and CFTC Reach Groundbreaking $100 Million AML Settlement with BitMEX

Testimony Supports Bill Requiring States to Collect Beneficial Ownership Information at Entity Formation

As we have blogged, the proposed Corporate Transparency Act of 2019 (the “Act”) seeks to ensure that persons who form legal entities in the U.S. disclose the beneficial owners of those entities. Specifically, the Act would amend the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) to compel the Secretary of Treasury to set minimum standards for state incorporation practices. Thus, applicants forming a corporation or LLC would be required to report beneficial ownership information directly to FinCEN, and to continuously update such information.

If passed, the Act would build significantly upon FinCEN’s May 11, 2018 regulation regarding beneficial ownership (“the BO Rule,” about which we blog frequently and have provided practical tips for compliance here and here). Very generally, the BO Rule requires covered financial institutions to identify and verify the identities of the beneficial owners of legal entity customers at account opening. The issue of beneficial ownership is at the heart of current global anti-money laundering efforts to enhance the transparency of financial transactions.

On May 21, the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, held a hearing entitled: “Combating Illicit Financing by Anonymous Shell Companies Through the Collection of Beneficial Ownership Information.” This hearing, which provided fuel for passage of the Act, featured the exact same trio of speakers who had appeared before the Committee during a November 2018 hearing on “Combating Money Laundering and Other Forms of Illicit Finance: Regulator and Law Enforcement Perspectives on Reform,” which pertained to a broader set of potential changes to the BSA. The speakers were:

  • Grovetta Gardineer, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Bank Supervision Policy and Community Affairs at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) (written remarks here)
  • Kenneth A. Blanco, Director of FinCEN (written remarks here); and
  • Steven D’Antuono, Acting Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI (written remarks here).

Unlike the broader November 2018 hearing, which featured some distinct tensions between certain positions of the OCC and those of FinCEN and the FBI, this hearing reflected close alignment amongst the speakers. Every speaker stressed the advantages to be reaped by law enforcement, regulators and the public if a national database of beneficial owners was required and created. Only the OCC acknowledged the need to consider the issue and sometimes competing concern of the regulatory burden imposed on financial institutions by the current BSA/AML regime, and even the OCC seemed to assume that a national database on beneficial ownership would represent only a boon to financial institutions, as opposed to yet more data – however helpful – to be absorbed and acted upon to the satisfaction of regulators. None of the speakers addressed some of the potential ambiguities and problems inherent in the current language of the Act, such as the fact that the Act lacks precision and fails to define the critical terms “exercises substantial control” or “substantial interest,” both of which drive the determination of who represents a beneficial owner. Continue Reading Senate Committee Hears from OCC, FinCEN and FBI on Risks Posed by Anonymous Corporate Structures